晚期資本主義時代的新基本矛盾

曼德爾
1992


美國貿易赤字升到138億元的消息，觸發華爾街股市在4月14日再暴跌101點。自從去年10月股市崩潰以來，即使是金融市場的微小波動，也足以激起人們拿1929至30年的情況作比較。

但即使美元繼續下跌、銀行倒閉、債務達到天文數字、生產過剩和失業嚴重，資產階級評論家仍堅持稱在國際商業的「真實」世界內，一切良好。真正的情況是怎樣的呢？只是「紙上的危機」，與實際工業生產和增長沒有關係嗎？本文描述現時資本主義的危機，指出所有目前的經濟指標，都顯示在最近將來會出現普遍的國際性衰退。

國際資本主義經濟在86年上半年經歷了小型衰退，除了英國之外。在87年1月，西德的生產比一年前下降了3%。美國則下降1%。但這次衰退並沒有加深。86年底的生產又再陸續上升，並持續到87年底（見表一）

表一 1890-1986年原料價格指數

加拿大	+8.8%	（11月至11月）
法国	+4.0%	（11月至11月）
西德	+2.0%	（12月至12月）
意大利	+3.6%	（10月至10月）
日本	+8.6%	（12月至12月）
西班牙	+8.9%	（11月至11月）
英国	+4.9%	（12月至12月）
美国	+5.1%	（12月至12月）

只因為裡根政府繼續推行凱因斯政策，推行龐大的預算赤字，才制止了86年的小型衰退。它將更多商品從日本、西德、南朝鮮、台灣、巴西等國家及地區吸收到美國國內市場，亦因此令美國貿易赤字惡化，令美元加劇下跌。這也解釋了股市、地產、藝術品的瘋狂投機。

股市、地產瘋狂投機的原因
87年10月19日的股市崩潰，標誌著這個趨勢的轉折點。它預示了普遍衰退的來臨，越延遲越嚴重。

股市崩潰的直接原因是87年全年的投機，亦即是沒有投入生產的金融資本過剩。龐大的資金尋找資產出路。由於原料相對過剩，價錢很低，所以引不起投機者的興趣。其他的「投資」便被投機者搶購，令價格飛漲。

美國紐約道瓊斯指數從84年初800點，升到87年3月的2400點，到8月更高達2700點。英國金融時報指數從82年底的400點升到87年3月的1500點。日本股票也從84年初的800點水平，升到87年3月的1900點水平。對美國和較少程度上對日本和英國股票的國際需求，是股價飛漲的重要因素之一。87年上半年，外國購買了超過180億美元的美國股票，包括來自日本的75億美元、英國40億、法國18億、拉丁美洲接近10億。股價飛漲，股票的息率卻低得可憐。日本股票年息低至1.5%；美國股票年息不到2.5%，美國的股息扣除通貨膨脹率後，比日本的更低。在這些情況下，離算賬的日子已不遠了。

在巴黎、倫敦、紐約等地已很瘋狂的地產投機，在東京更為驚人：新宿區在兩年內從每平方公尺24萬港幣漲至60萬港幣，銀座區更達到177萬港元一平方公尺！120平方公尺的住宅月租達5萬港元！銀行貸款有10%是借給地產的。

銀行資金的兩個結構性因素，推動了這種狂熱。首先，金融交易額的異常的增加（全球四個主要外匯市場的全年交易額達到60萬億美元，但全球貿易額每年只是2萬億美元。因此，絕大部份的外匯交易是投機性的），導致財務經理的非專業化、無能和犯錯，其年薪卻高達數百萬美元。此外，不擇手段迅速發財的意識和道德觀，推動大規模的欺詐，例如美國的內幕交易案；欺詐又刺激投機，反過來又刺激更多欺詐和罪惡。

87年的瘋狂股市和地產投機，主要是由於資本主義世界的資金過剩，後者卻根源於更深刻的結構性原因：標誌著從70年代開始的「衰退長波」的不斷的資本過度積累。過度的積累，表示每年利潤所形成的資本不再找到能夠保證取得平均利潤的投資機會。這些資本不再作生產性投資，助長經濟的不景氣，特別是就業人數的下降，轉過來又加劇資本的過度積累，成為游資，走向投機。

投機的基本原因是商品生產過剩和剩餘生產能力，它們阻礙生產性投資。即使是在79年的工業週期的高點，美國平均的過剩生產能力也高達25%。從79年到84、85年的另一個高點，過剩生產能力增加到33%。在82年的衰退期間，過剩生產能力更高達41%。

這個情況解釋了金融投機活動並不限於純粹的投機者；龐大的工業托拉斯也普遍參與投機。尤其是在日本，從83年到87年，工業企業的股市交易增加5倍有多，甚至主要的跨國公司的利潤也有不少部份來自金融活動，例如日立的比例是45%，信興電業60%。但從這點作結論，說帝國主義國家出現「非工業化」，尚言之過早。從這意義看，股災客觀上開始令資產階級重新調配，不利於銀行和純金融部門而有利於傳統的工業金融資本。

股災的連鎖打擊
資本主義的鎖鏈首先在最弱的環節——股市——斷裂。這個斷裂差不多自動導致其他斷裂。目前最受威脅的是經紀行和其他財務公司；較弱的銀行；國家的資金周轉（不僅是欠債較多的第三世界國家）；一些國家的社會保障制度；以及一些受重創的跨國公司。所有這些危機的連鎖反應，令整個國際信貸和貨幣制度崩潰的危機增加。

不少主要經紀行在股災中損失數千萬美元。很多銀行被股災和長期不景氣（例如農業危機、油價下跌、第三世界的壞賬等）嚴重打擊。在美國，87年有200家銀行倒閉；儲蓄銀行普遍虧損，估計總數達45億美元；86年的奧克拉荷馬第一國民銀行的倒閉，是74年以來最大的銀行倒閉。

比這些中型銀行的情況更為嚴重的是美國的主要銀行之一——曾經是全球最大的「美國銀行」的困境，它要靠日本資本大規模援助才挽救過來。

美國銀行系統的困難比其他國家更為人所知，但其他帝國主義國家的銀行的問題也逐漸洩露出來。加拿大6家主要銀行之中，有5家是虧蝕的。瑞典三大主要銀行在股災中損失超過1億美元，挪威的主要銀行更損失2億美元。英國米特蘭銀行87年虧損估計達9億美元，要靠香港匯豐銀行收購來渡過難關。

澳洲股災對非金融公司的打擊最大。三個最大的托拉斯企業受損超過5億美元。雖然這只是賬面上的損失。但當這些公司的資產值下降時，它們的借款能力便相應減少，影響投資和其他活動。澳洲首富許雅葛的企業的價值，在幾天之內從57億美元跌至12億美元。

第三世界國家無力償還的債務，構成這幅灰暗的圖畫。這些國家的債據在市場上正以五折的價格出讓。如果這些債據都只值五折，美國大通銀行便會失去一半資產，化學銀行會失去全部資產。此外，美國各大銀行借作收購行動等的高風險的貸款，佔了銀行很高資產的比例，例如占法爾高銀行超過100%的資產、英國銀行71%、化學銀行45%、大通銀行21%、萬國寶通銀行20%。

股市的崩潰是由美國利率增加而觸發的；七大國羅浮宮協議加息的目的是阻止美元下跌。利率增加幾乎一定導致股價下跌，因為股票價格客觀上是以股票利息與利率作比較、競爭。但股價下跌的幅度與利率的增加完全不成比例：華爾街在股災後的最低點與87年最高點比較，跌了28%，倫敦跌了33%，西德35%，澳洲41%，香港45%。股市崩潰當日，紐約股票市場差點解體。

美國和日本政府立即大規模介入，降低利率，增加貨幣供應，以避免經紀行和財務機構因現金周轉問題而被迫拋售股票。

兩難的挽救措施
但在試圖挽救危機時，美國政府卻同時加劇了結構性的金融危機。要填補美國龐大貿易赤字，需要外國資金大量和不斷湧入。由於美國匯率下跌和通貨膨脹率較外國高，外國資本家更加不願借錢給美國，除非美國利率在8厘至9厘以上。如果資金停止注入美國，美國便不能支付外債和短期商業債務和票據。事實上，美國的外匯儲備已不足以支付每年1500億美元的貿易赤字。

因此，我們正目睹一場巨大賭博，兩方面的參加者都面對兩難局面。美國繼續打出令美元下跌的牌，以重新取得貿易優勢，刺激出口，減少進口，因此會促成日本、西德、南朝鮮、台灣、巴西等國家及地區的衰退；但如果因此而造成美元崩潰，在整個資本主義經濟內造成極嚴重的金融和經濟危機、通貨膨脹和美國出口下跌，則美國經濟亦會受嚴重衰退打擊。如果美國以提高利率來穩定美元，卻會立即觸發國內衰退。

另一方面，假如西德和日本要保衛美元匯率（亦保衛本國貨幣的穩定性），只有大規模增加購買美元，而買來的美元卻越來越貶值，導致重大損失。日本估計擁有的2000億美元資產，一年內貶值一半。但這些國家讓美元自由下跌，它們的貨品便會不夠受美國貨競爭，加劇出口的下降，導致衰退，同時它們現有的美元資產便會更貶值。

總衰退危機加深
87年10月19日以來的連鎖反應的危機——股市危機、財務公司危機、銀行危機、美元危機、國際貨幣制度的機能失調、第二次股市崩潰的威脅——加劇了資本主義經濟在88年走向總衰退的傾向。

事實上，一些經濟學者說衰退在美國已經開始，因為連續7個月的「週期指標」已指向下跌。汽車銷量在87年已下跌15%；新建樓宇的數目下降；工業生產即使未下跌，但不少產品已變為存貨；零售水平也在下降。

有經濟學者指出美國的「廉價金錢」和低利率政策的不良影響：會導致不斷的貨幣和金融市場危機，最後會導致利率提升到觸發衰退的水平。1月25日的《國際先鋒論壇報》一篇文章標題是《華爾街等待衰退的來臨》，開始便指出問題不是衰退是否來臨，而是什麼時候來；它說，有些觀察家認為是89年而不是88年。

87年底，33名著名資本主義經濟學家發表聲明，提議主要資本主義國家統治者聯合行動，以避免嚴重的經濟危機。他們首先呼籲美國實行緊縮政策，消減國內消費，消除貿易赤字和預算赤字。他們卻似乎沒有預見到這個政策會大大增加美國的失業，短期內造成美國衰退。

最樂觀的經濟學者希望美國經濟能矇混過關，悲觀的則預測嚴重的衰退。基本的原因，明顯地不是由於股市的崩潰或貨幣危機，而是生產能力的增長（逐漸以機器代替活的勞動）與市場（「最終消費者」的購買力）的相對停滯兩者之間的不平衡。它導致平均利潤率下降和資本過度積累。對債務的停頓和瘋狂的投機，加劇這些矛盾，加強走下坡的動力。

在股災之後，收購行動仍然繼續，甚至受到低股價的鼓勵。銀行繼續毫無警戒地向收購行動提供巨額貸款，而不理會以往的教訓。第二次股市崩潰的陰影已隱現。它會否在東京開始呢？不少啟示指出這個可能性。

日本經濟危機四伏
日本股市很脆弱，因為股票價格與利息的比例高得不合理。在上次股災中，日本只是下跌10%左右，並沒有對股價作適當調整。

此外，日本出口數量正在收縮，因為日元價高、美元價跌和南朝鮮、台灣和香港的工業有更大的競爭。日本資產階級正嘗試加強資本輸出和擴充國內市場，特別是房屋市場，以補償出口的下跌。為了避免企業利潤減少，擴充國內市場的做法首先是增加公共開支，即增加已過分膨脹的公共債務。日本的公共債務其實相對地比美國的還大，86年已達到國民總產值的90.9%，而美國是52.4%。美國的預算赤字是國民總產值的3.4%，日本達到4.2%。這個因素加劇了日本經濟現時的脆弱性。

這問題更因為日本工業在世界市場上的優勢已停滯或受損而變得更嚴重。日本汽車占世界出口的比例從80年開始不再上升，甚至稍為下降。彩色電視機出口在84年見頂。從現在到90年，製造業和煤礦業受國外競爭打擊，將會消減9萬個職位。日本整套工廠的出口，從82年到86年下降了76%。

令日本資本主義憂慮的，是日本的活動重心急劇轉到「紙面上的經濟」。在87年，日本成為世界最大的資本輸出國，但超過一半的輸出集中在金融業和地產上。現時主要支撐日本經濟上揚的部門，是化學品、房屋建築、廣告和「休閒工業」。

美國衰失支配地位
美元的下跌加劇了美國的金融至尊地位的下降。世界十大銀行主要是日本資本的，美國只有兩家。美國已在國際上成為負債國，它的外債今天已達到5000億美元，而且以每年1000到1500億的可怕速度增加，在幾年內，不難超過第三世界國家負債的總和。

在美國喪失貨幣和金融支配地位的背後，是美國工業和科技支配地位明顯地急劇地下降。美國占世界出口的比例從81年的20%跌到86年的13.8%；同時，進口占美國國內市場的比例急劇上升，較突出的有：鋼鐵占15.9%、鋁22.7%、電子零件18.1%、信息技術（電腦等）18.7%、機械工具40%、紡織機器48.8%、鞋62.5%、電視機和收音機63.8%（以上為86年數字）。

美國帝國主義當然不會接受「非工業化」的。依賴進口鞋可以忍受，但依賴重要核子飛彈或電子零件是不可忍的，這正是美國政府否決日本富士收購美國快捷半導體托拉斯，以及提供巨額政府津貼以發展半導體技術的原因。但美國的地位已嚴重受損。例如全球6個主要半導體生產者之中，日本的NEC、日立和東芝佔了頭三名，美國合資的摩托羅拉排第四，美國的德州儀器排第五。在電訊工業中，美國只佔全球十大企業的兩家半。在飛機工業，美國波音公司受到歐洲的空中巴士公司重大挑戰。

美國帝國主義要求「重新工業化」，特別是希望藉美元下跌幫助出口，其背後原因是生產性投資嚴重缺乏。在82年，日本的工業投資率比美國高3倍。雖然美國工業近年來做出努力，但生產力的差距仍在擴大。從80年到86年，各大國的勞動生產率的平均增長率分別為：日本5.6%，英國4.7%，法國4%，美國3.4%，西德3.3%，其中英國生產力的增加主要是由相對地消減工資而取得的。在87年，如以西德的工資成本為100點計，那麼，美國為76，日本75，法國68，英國則為53。如以西德的一小時勞動生產出來的價值為100點計，美國為90，日本83，法國75，英國54。

正如以往每個「不景氣長波」時期一樣，國際資本主義經濟現時的特點是：在過去占支配地位的帝國主義強國衰落之後，並沒有出現新的帝國主義強國來取代它的地位。正因為這個原故，美元的地位並沒有被日元或歐洲貨幣單位所取代（估計各資本主義國家86年的全部外匯儲備中約有42%是黃金，50%是美元，8%是其他貨幣，其中日元只佔1%），而各國政府呼籲全球共同行動的努力只會是白費的。

對第三世界的影響
美國「經濟調整」對第三世界國家經濟的影響，大概可以分為三類國家來看。

首先，是有貿易盈餘的石油輸出國組織國家，例如沙特阿拉伯、科威特等。這些國家受油價下跌和美元下跌的雙重影響，令他們的資產和儲備大幅貶值。但問題仍未到群眾消費水平或工業生產下降的地步。

其次，是半工業化的國家及地區，如南朝鮮、巴西、台灣、墨西哥、新加坡、香港等。在87年，它們的工業生產上揚，主要由於往美國的出口不斷擴大。美元下跌和美國衰退的影響，限制它們的出口，觸發它們也會衰退，日本市場不夠大，所以不足以代替美國市場或抵消衰退影響。

還有其他第三世界國家，它們特別受國際貨幣基金會強迫實施的調整政策影響，造成災難性的非工業化和貧困化。大量資源從貧窮國家轉移到富裕國家去（從80到86年，總共1450億美元從拉丁美洲轉移到帝國主義國家），而帝國主義國家在第三世界國家的市場亦劇烈萎縮。非工業和貧窮化在拉丁美洲特別顯著。從80年到86年，智利平均國民產值下跌64%、墨西哥12%、阿根廷14.2%、委內瑞拉19%、玻利維亞27%。工人、貧農、失業和半失業者的購買力下降更為嚴重。墨西哥工資的購買力從80年到87年下降了一半，巴西則介乎37%到55%。

美元的下跌，的確減輕了它們的債務和利息（利率也有下跌），但只是由於第三世界國家部份資源是出口到歐洲、日本等國。然而，由於第三世界國家的經濟越來越「美元化」（譯按：指經濟依賴美元運行而不再受本國貨幣支配），所以這些得益被抵消了。

國際資本主義經濟現在經歷著兩個平面的分化。一方面是在帝國主義之間（雖然台灣也包括在內），美元兌其他貨幣急劇貶值；另一方面是在第三世界平面，其本國貨幣受通貨膨脹更大打擊，連兌美元也告貶值。

此外，還有不利於第三世界的進口交換比率的持續下降所造成的影響（從84年到86年，原料的價格下跌了四份之一）。它迫使第三世界輸出更多資源，是利率下降和美元貶值所補償不了的。另外還有第三世界有產階級不斷將資金調離國外的影響。

所有這些因素，令第三世界的債務不斷增加，儘管人民做出驚人的犧牲，經濟也非工業化。第三世界的長期債務從84年的7140億美元，增加到88年的9800億美元，短期債務則保持在84年的1630億美元，到88年的1550億美元的水平。

對半工業化國家來說，支付債務利息和還本的影響也不少。由於它們的出口主要是靠減低工資成本，尤其是透過通貨膨脹，所以，隨著出口增加，內部市場也同時縮減。結果是這些國家也出現大規模的生產能力過剩。例如，巴西的「資本」貨物（機器）的生產設備使用率從82年的64.1%跌至84年的54.9%在87年又回復到62.9%。

工人運動與保護主義
不久將會來臨的新的總衰退，首先會造成新一輪的失業。單是在帝國主義國家內，現在約有4千萬人失業（日本和美國的真正失業數字是被嚴重低估的，美國現時的真正失業率大約是10%）；在未來危機之中，這個失業人數可能達到4500萬或更多。

面對著購買力下降和社會保障制度受威脅的情況，很多帝國主義國家的工會戰略受到恐懼失業的影響。對抗消減職位的戰略有兩種。有些工會集中爭取大量消減每週的工作小時；其他則受保護主義的誘惑。後者只是階級合作代替國際無產階級團結的變種，不是團結所有國家的工人爭取35小時或32小時工作周，而是聯合自己的老闆來對付其他國家的工人及其職位。這就是將失業輸出的政策，它對國際工人階級的災難後果，在1929年到39年已可深刻體驗。美國的工會官僚是最大程度上臣服於這政策的誘惑的。

這種反應和它在某些工人階級之中產生共鳴的客觀基礎，是帝國主義國家的工人與半工業化國家的工人的巨大工資差距。以目前匯率比較，是十比一之巨。當資本家將生產轉移到低工資國家時（實際的轉移比想像中少得多），人們以為資本家「背叛了本國工業」。資本家的直接反應是：讓我們一同在本國降低工資和限制外國貨物入口（即增加消費品價格，等於將實際工資降低更多）。

工會接受這個理由後，便會跌進災難中，工資逐步降低（美國的每週實際工資從73年的201美元降至87年的167元），直到等於半工業化國家的工資水平為止；「兩階梯社會」（在法國，5個工人之中1個是沒有「真正」工作的）和臨時工作將工人的社會保障消減；不斷侵蝕就業數目。

在任何國家，都可以找到比其工資更低的國家，作為消減工資和加強保護主義的理由。從工人的角度來看，這個政策特別有害，因為它摧毀工作職位：雖然它增加利潤，但同時卻減少營養額，因為工資被消減。如果沒有利潤上升和營業同時增加，正如在保護主義政策之下，則資本主義便不能持續增長。事實上，所有在工會接受消減工資以「保衛職位」的國家內，就業人數都繼續下降。

因此，必須嚴拒保護主義和任何「為保衛職位而作必要犧牲」的做法；必須呼籲所有國家的工人共同行動，爭取劇減每週工作小時而不減工資，以及工會共同行動提高半工業化國家的令工人飢餓的工資。這些國家的民族資本家所謂提高工資會阻止工業化，是與帝國主義國家的保護主義論調同樣不能接受的。事實上，半工業化國家更高的工資會刺激工業化，擴展內部市場和發展更高級的經濟模式。

資本主義新的基本矛盾
導致股票崩潰和將會帶來1970年代以來第三次總衰退的巨大的不平衡，顯示了「晚期資本主義」在「不景氣長波」的新的基本矛盾。這些矛盾在上一階段的增長時期已顯露了出來。

龐大的債務與資本主義制度的生存已經結構性地連結起來；單是美元債務現已達到800萬億至850萬億美元的天文數字！如果不是不斷製造巨大債務的話，便不能保證商品的出路、企業的擴展或支持公共開支。

無疑，現在出現了過剩的流動資金。積累的債務不合比例地超過了「正常」資本主義積累的需要。因此「虛假」資本和部份「紙上的經濟」將會被摧毀，部分債務會透過破產或者協議而撤除。但即使在衰退之後，債務仍會存在。

因此，生產積累的「正常化」將會極之困難或不可能。軍備生產經濟將會在病態資本主義經濟之中起著更大的商品出路的作用，儘管有各種東、西方裁軍協議。新的利潤率受債務的施累，仍將會是升得很慢和不足的。

國際資本主義經濟將不會有類似1948/73年的擴展時期，只要工人階級和一連串重要國家的反帝國主義運動沒有被嚴重挫敗而造成剩餘價值率的重大提升的話。在可見的將來，這個情況暫不會出現。

大部分債務是私人債務。同時，在私人手中和官方外匯儲備內的資本的比例，突然完全倒轉了。在1958年，十大帝國主義國家的中央銀行比私人資本家多擁有5倍的外匯儲備。在86年，私人資本家的流動或半流動資金，比中央銀行的外匯儲備（不計黃金）多十倍。

包括美國在內的民族國家的削弱甚至癱瘓，反映了這個情況，也反映了超越任何國家控制的跨國托拉斯的興起。「國家干預政策」的式微，只是反映了新的現實，但也令人誤以為市場會恢復平衡，滿足資本的需要。

87年10月的股災之後，人們對市場再也沒有信心了，轉而要求有效的政府的行動。但在各個互相競爭不休的國家之間，是沒有可能聯合行動的，況且它們相比私人資本，已越來越弱。在資本主義制度之內，不可能有一個世界國家或「最終的貸款者」。這是籠罩著地球的一個新的致命威脅。

恩道爾：「糧食危機」背後的政治

許未來
21世紀經濟報道
2008-11-22

「當前全球媒體更多聚焦於金融危機，但糧食危機才是缺糧國家真正要應對的更大的政治風險。」11月4日，旅德美籍地緣政治學家恩道爾在北京向本報記者提醒道。

恩道爾的新著《糧食危機》中文譯本最近出版上市。一直對中國讀者懷有善意和期待的恩道爾專程來華講學兩周。其間，接受了本報記者的獨家專訪。

他以阿根廷為例說道，上世紀80年代之前，這個南美洲國家不僅能實現農產品的自給，還有盈餘，但到1982年，卻深陷美國的債務圈套之中。

洛克菲勒家族憑借與時任阿根廷總統的梅內姆的緊密關係推銷轉基因農作物，到2004年，阿根廷48%的土地被用來種植轉基因大豆，由於種子和農藥都要從美國公司購買，再加上孟山都公司在專利費上所持的強硬立場，僅10年時間，在轉基因技術進步的名義下，阿根廷的糧食自給能力逐漸喪失，整個國家的農業經濟徹底受控於外國權勢集團。

「美國試圖擴散的轉基因生物計劃，目的就是將糧食政治化，以實現對全世界的控制，而不是為了讓人類獲得更好更多的糧食。」恩道爾強調說，在金融危機重創美國在全球的金融支柱的情況下，美國會加強對世界糧食的控制。怎樣避免重蹈阿根廷的覆轍，保證糧食安全，是糧食短缺國家面臨的更為嚴峻的挑戰。

糧食危機還是轉基因危機？

《21世紀》：今年上半年世界銀行在一份報告中稱，今年以來的糧食暴漲，至少有75%的原因直接與美歐將大片農田種植生物用作燃料有關。也就是說，是生物燃料革命導致了糧食危機的爆發，你認同這種觀點嗎？

恩道爾：肇始於美國的「生物燃料革命」，只是這場糧食危機的引爆器，而禍根潛藏已久。

全球糧價飆升，人們陷入糧食恐慌之中。這正是美國嘉吉穀物公司（Cargill）、ADM公司、邦基公司（Bunge）等實力強大的糧食卡特爾們所願意看到的。他們也正在借這次被操縱的糧食價格恐慌來佐證，轉基因糧食是唯一應對全球糧食短缺的解決方法。

實際上，美國擴散GMO的目的絕不是為了給人類提供更多、更好的糧食，而是為了控制全世界。

1999年至2007年的研究顯示，轉基因大豆的產量比非轉基因大豆低4%-12%，轉基因玉米與傳統玉米的產量相比，大抵相同或低12%。而根據印度的記錄，轉基因棉花歉收高達100%。

不僅如此，GMO還具有很大的風險。倫敦社會科學研究所所長侯美婉博士是知名的GMO批評者，她揭示GMO依據的是騙人的偽科學，「既危險又無效」，並強烈警告我們應該注意：「轉基因的不穩定性是個大問題，從一開始就是一個大問題。」

世界頂尖的轉基因科學家、蘇格蘭阿帕德·普茲泰博士的研究也印證了這一觀點，據他發現，轉基因玉米的毒性是非轉基因玉米毒性的3000倍。

《21世紀》：儘管如此，從裡根開始，已至少有四屆美國總統支持GMO，並不遺餘力地在世界範圍內擴散，為什麼？

恩道爾：這不是認識問題，而是權勢集團的利益需求。基因改造最早在20世紀70年代美國的研究實驗室中產生。花費數萬億美元資助這項研究的，是洛克菲勒家族的基金會。

1980年代，裡根政權在遠未確定這種基因改造農作物是否有害的時候，決意對基因工程採取無為的放任政策，並放在優先發展的戰略位置，意在借此確保美國的全球領先地位。

而促成這件事的，是他的副總統、原中央情報局局長老布什。老布什正是洛克菲勒家族栽培起來的政治精英之一，除他以外，洛克菲勒還培養出了美國前國務卿亨利·基辛格、美聯儲前主席格林斯潘，以及為小布什政府發起反恐戰爭提供學術基礎的《文明的衝突》的作者塞繆爾·亨廷頓等政界、學術界精英。

早在1986年，作為裡根政府副總統的老布什與孟山都的高管團體進行了一次所謂的「白宮特別戰略會議」，目的就是撤銷對生物技術行業的管制，為GMO的產業化開綠燈。孟山都是美國化學巨頭,在60年代的越戰中為美軍發明了致命的除草劑。

老布什在當選總統之後的1992年，置一些資深科學家們對轉基因生物可能產生意料之外毒素的警告於不顧，做出了一項毫無科學根據的行政裁定：所有的轉基因植物和食品與同品種的傳統植物「實質上相同」。這樣，美國政府就不需要對轉基因植物進行特別的衛生和安全檢測。這一裁定為孟山都和其他美國化學巨頭如杜邦、陶氏化學打開了隨意獲取轉基因技術的方便之門。

為了「阻止缺德的農民侵害企業利益」，美國農業部和轉基因巨頭聯合研發了一項種子絕育技術，可廣泛應用於所有的植物種子，並於2007年獲得了名為「植物基因表達控制技術」的美國專利。這項基因改造技術在種子成熟前產生一種毒素，使每個種子的植物胚胎自動毀滅，又被戲稱為「終結者」。農民不得不再次向孟山都等供應商購買新種子，從而被迫淪為美國種子供應商的新農奴。

需要提醒的是，既然「實質上相同」，按照各國專利法，是無法申請專利的。這件事之所以在美國行得通，原因很簡單，孟山都等大公司聘請官員擔任高管並安插高管人員到政府任職，政府與企業一唱一和，推行GMO的秘密計劃，華盛頓已經成為聲名狼藉的「旋轉門政府」。比如，前國防部長唐納德·拉姆斯菲爾德曾任孟山都旗下西爾列公司的總裁，反過來孟山都的董事會中就包括尼克松和裡根時期的環保署長。

《21世紀》：你認為奧巴馬是否會繼續轉基因擴散計劃？

恩道爾：美國商業利益集團已經與政府沆瀣一氣，利益集團會告訴他們的新總統如何去支撐他們的全球利益。尤其當前正在世界蔓延的金融危機已使美國對世界金融市場的支配地位受到嚴峻衝擊，因此我認為美國將進一步加強對世界糧食的控制。至少目前我沒看到奧巴馬會有任何「變革」的跡象。

一場「新鴉片戰爭」

《21世紀》：在《糧食危機》中文版序中，你把美國的轉基因生物擴散比喻成一場「新鴉片戰爭」，是不是危言聳聽以吸引中國讀者的眼球？

恩道爾：孟山都、杜邦、陶氏益農三家美國公司和實際上由英國人控制的先正達這四家轉基因巨頭公司強迫其他國家政府接受轉基因種子和化學除草劑，我只能將其比喻為一場「新的鴉片戰爭」，以讓更多的人關注轉基因生物工程擴散的真相。

美國政府和跨國農業巨頭共同擁有「終結者」技術專利，這也就意味著，如果他們將這種種子推廣到歐盟、非洲，甚至中國和亞洲其他地區，也許10年之內，這些與五角大樓的秘密生物戰爭及其他計劃有著密切關係的私人跨國公司，將具有控制全人類生與死的權利。

這不是我危言聳聽的書齋理論。美國已經利用政治和軍事權術將轉基因生物擴散到整個美洲大陸和部分亞洲、非洲國家。比如美國政府和孟山都在1990年代向當時的阿根廷總統、洛克菲勒的朋友卡洛斯·梅內姆行賄，使阿根廷成為轉基因作物活體實驗場。在美國入侵伊拉克位於阿布·格萊布價值連城的小麥種子庫之後，美國國際開發署強迫伊拉克接受了轉基因種子。

如果一些明智的國家不團結起來加以抵制，也許用不了10年時間，它們將完全控制全球基本口糧的供應。可見，所謂的「基因革命」比1840年的鴉片戰爭要更加可怕。

《21世紀》：你呼籲世界上所有的國家團結起來抵制GMO的擴張，那麼您認為是否有必要通過什麼機構或平台來實現這一目標？

恩道爾：我還沒有發現哪個組織可以抵制GMO的擴張，也沒有哪個組織能夠明確地指出GMO的危險性。在人們的理解中，竭力推進自由貿易的日內瓦的世貿組織可以擔當此任，但是，它是在其前身關貿總協定不聽美英轉基因企業巨頭的使喚而被解散的基礎上成立的，在轉基因問題上，實際上是掛著推行農產品自由貿易的羊頭，賣GMO的狗肉。

在我看來，應對GMO不需要再增加更多的反對力量，尤其是中國和印度已經表明要反對它。從政府層面講，出於對國民健康和政府安全的考慮，我建議中國至少在10到15年內應該對GMO進行全面的禁止。這樣就有足夠的時間，用來證明GMO食物對於老鼠或其他動物是否安全。

另外，中國自主解決了13億人的口糧問題，回擊了西方人「誰來養活中國」的疑問。我還瞭解到，近年來中國政府出台了取消農業稅等一系列惠農政策，並做出確保18億畝種糧耕地紅線決策。我認為，無論是應對當前的金融危機，還是糧食危機，正如胡錦濤主席所講的，先把自己的事情辦好，就是對世界最大的貢獻。

《21世紀》：GMO並非像美英轉基因巨頭宣稱的那樣可以化解糧食危機，你有沒有解決世界糧食危機的建議，以更有效抵制GMO在全世界的擴散？

恩道爾：我個人的能力非常有限。長期以來，我最大的成就是努力澄清諸如石油危機、糧食危機以及地緣政治學上的一些戰略問題，我的這些觀點很少被公開，或是被如實反映，我也非常希望通過《21世紀經濟報道》的傳播，讓更多的國家更好地確定自己的答案。

我認為，各國政府應該借鑒中國的做法，在全球各地建立基本糧食應急儲備。中國具有戰略應急糧食儲備，這才渡過了糧食危機的難關。這是利大於弊的好事，而且它反過來又削弱了糧食利益集團對於市場價格的控制能力。

目前，歐盟的百姓也希望他們的政府能夠這樣做。但不幸的是，由於嘉吉、ADM、邦基等美國跨國農業巨頭的不斷施壓，美國和歐盟這兩個世界上最大的糧食輸出地政府早已徹底取消了沿襲多年的糧食儲備制度，以讓私營的全球化公司「更有效」地儲存和供應糧食。

面對糧食危機，這些糧食卡特爾們卻為自己的利益爭辯道：「我們現在需要市場導向的農業。」那市場導向究竟意味著什麼？——每個家庭的食品費用平均上漲了150%到300%！

我們必須警惕，一旦孟山都公司的GMO大豆、大米和玉米進入了一個國家，那麼一切都將太遲了！

孟山都公司或其他公司的「終結者」種子就可以成為控制他國的資本。這就是說，如果華盛頓認定中國在蘇丹或伊朗開採石油是「不法行為」，那麼華盛頓就可以私下指使孟山都公司不給中國運送種子。

接受GMO就等於把國家的糧食安全交給了三四個私人公司，美英對轉基因農作物的操縱，隱含的真正目的實際上是企圖控制全球糧食，以對付中國和印度這樣人口眾多的國家，以及從非洲到拉丁美洲和亞洲的整個發展中世界，實施地緣政治控制。

（《糧食危機》的譯者、國家科技部科技發展戰略研究院趙剛博士對本文有巨大貢獻，特此致謝！）

地緣政治學家恩道爾談全球糧食危機

新浪財經
2008年11月07日

威廉‧恩道爾 (F. William Engdahl) 是旅德美籍財經作家。他近年的兩部令他名卓著的著作：《石油戰爭：石油政治決定世界新秩序》(A Century Of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order ) 和《糧食危機：運用糧食武器獲取世界霸權》( Seeds of Destruction - The Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation)，經已在國內出版。。本文是他最近因新推介《糧食危機》一書而訪問中國，接受新浪財經網站視頻訪問的文字記錄。視頻見：http://video.sina.com.cn/finance/receptionroom/capitalmarket/20081107/211210436.shtml

2008年以來糧食危機席捲全球，在埃及首都開羅民眾排長隊購買廉價麵包，在海地食品危機引發的社會動盪迫使總理下台，世界糧倉美國也未能倖免，對顧客購買部分品種的大米數量加以限制……

在中國，城鄉一體化的加快，退耕還林的深入，大量高經濟作物的播種佔用，導致耕地大量減少，中國人未來的口糧在那裡？糧食進口能否解決老百姓的吃飯問題？當中又有什麼不為人知的秘密？

11月7日，新浪財經特邀世界著名經濟學家、地緣政治學家威廉‧恩道爾做客《財經會客廳》，解析世界糧食危機的奧秘。

威廉‧恩道爾，美國著名經濟學家、地緣政治學家，長期旅居德國。從事國際政治、經濟、世界新秩序研究已逾30年。美國普林斯頓大學政治學學士、瑞典斯德哥爾摩大學比較經濟學碩士。

恩道爾作為獨立經濟學家和新聞調查記者，先後在美國和歐洲工作。他的研究涵蓋領域極為廣泛，除金融、能源和地緣政治外，還包括世界農業問題、糧食交易壟斷、關貿總協定、世界貿易組織、國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行、第三世界債務、對沖基金和亞洲金融危機等。威廉恩道爾先生還經常應邀在一些有關地緣政治、經濟、金融、農業、能源問題的國際會議上發表演講，並定期為世界全球化中心及許多國際出版物撰寫文章，還經常為歐洲主要銀行和私募基金經理提供咨詢。

以下為對話實錄：

主持人權靜：各位親愛的新浪網友大家好，歡迎您來到新浪《財經會客廳》，我是主持人權靜。最近大家說的最多的一個問題就是金融危機，但是我們知道其實糧食安全、能源安全和金融安全是並稱世界最重要的三大安全。今天我們就請來幾位嘉賓，跟大家共同探討一下當前世界糧食的這種危機，和世界糧食安全，包括我們中國面臨的糧食安全等諸多方面的因素。

介紹一下，坐在我左手邊的這位，就是國家糧食局科學研究院的研究員丁聲俊教授，歡迎丁教授。丁教授旁邊這位是新浪的老朋友，之前也是做過專訪的，是世界著名的經濟學家，也是地緣政治學家恩道爾先生；恩道爾旁邊這位是國家知識產權局知識產權出版社第五編輯室編審主任劉忠，歡迎劉主任。來給大家特別介紹一下，今天劉主任也會充當我們的翻譯，為恩道爾先生翻譯中文。

首先要告訴大家的是，恩道爾先生的這本新書，叫做《糧食危機》已經出版了，之前還出版了一本《石油戰爭》，恩道爾先生一直很關注國際地緣政治，包括糧食和石油等能源在世界關係當中的影響。首先藉著這本新書的出版，請問一下恩道爾先生，您這本書叫做《糧食危機》，您覺得當前這個世界糧食的形勢到底危機到了一個什麼程度？

恩道爾(劉忠翻譯)：實際上糧食危機，我們可以說它是一種嚴重的糧食政治危機。這個發生的背景是2005年，美國政府給了美國的農民大量的補貼，鼓勵他們種植轉基因玉米，來作為燃料進行燃燒。與此同時，歐洲的歐盟也採取了類似的政策，導致了糧食的短缺和危機。

更主要的原因是美國的權勢集團，他們為了控制世界的人口，尤其是第三世界的人口，他們使用了轉基因的玉米和糧食，來作為一種飼料，這樣導致全世界將近十億人飢餓，導致他們的死亡。控制人口的政策實際上從2008年開始已經寫入了美國五角大樓的一個戰略計劃中，其目標就是要發動一場生物戰爭，來消滅世界上的有色人種。

實際上大家可能都不敢相信，這是一種謀殺，而且要謀殺上十億的人口。可能這個事實大家都不敢相信，但是現實就是這樣。實際上尤其是美國的這些權勢集團，他們從二十年代開始和納粹德國進行合作，進行所謂的「人種改良」，其目的就是要讓大量的世界人口，尤其是有色人種處於飢餓狀態，從而從世界上消滅掉。

主持人權靜：您提到這場糧食危機，那直接的後果會是什麼？什麼樣的過程會最終導致您說的這種後果？是說糧食的價格會不斷地飆升，導致大量貧困人口他們買不起糧食，還是會出現什麼樣的情況？

恩道爾(劉忠翻譯)：我們要追溯到WTO的農業政策，實際上WTO的農業政策和農業協議是向一些國際大的糧食集團操縱的，他們制定了一個市場導向的一種糧食政策，認為通過市場的調節能自然而然提供糧食，糧食供應，他們以這種方式取消了世界的糧食儲備，市場沒有糧食儲備，一部分的玉米又當成燃料進行燃燒了，所以說整個世界，尤其是政府不存糧食儲備，就導致過去18個月到20個月期間糧價的飆升。

主持人權靜：丁教授，剛才恩道爾先生說了那麼多他對當前世界糧食形勢的看法，您作為國內一個研究糧食形勢的專家，您是否認同恩道爾先生的看法？您對當前國內糧食形勢是什麼看法？

丁聲俊：剛才恩道爾教授非常尖銳地指出了當前糧食危機、金融危機和石油危機的一個重要現象，美國和歐盟發展生物燃料，對近幾年來的世界糧食危機起了一個推波助瀾的作用。到去年年底，整個世界消滅的庫存降低到30年來的最低點。

主持人權靜：是多少？這個庫存夠全世界的人吃多少天？

丁聲俊：這個庫存僅僅相當於糧食安全線的40%以下，糧食安全線按照FAO，這個糧食庫存至少要相當於當年糧食消費量的17%到18%，而現在已經降低到30年來的最低點，降低到安全線的40%以下。

主持人權靜：那導致的直接後果是什麼？

丁聲俊：直接後果是糧食價格飆升，發展中國家沒錢購買糧食，這是第一個結果；第二個，有八億以上的人，甚至有的數字講有十億人口營養不良，陷入飢餓，其中有一億人原來已經生活有所好轉，現在又重新回到新的饑民。由於美國最近以來可以說世界聲討美國發展生物燃料，他用了八千五百多萬噸的玉米生產生物燃料，供汽車，所以有的經濟學家講，八億輛的汽車奪走了八億窮人的麵包。所以是十億以上的人陷入飢餓，其中大家知道海地總理因為糧食饑荒而下了台。最近的數據，世界飢餓嚴重惡化的，在非洲有十個國家，都在發展中國家。所以說這一次世界糧價上漲的結果，損害最大的是發展中國家，是貧窮的發展中國家。

主持人權靜：恩道爾先生，您在這本新書裡邊也給我們詳細地闡述了為什麼會出現世界糧食危機的這種情況，這背後錯綜複雜的利益集團的糾葛到底是怎麼樣的？能不能再給我們講一講？

恩道爾(劉忠翻譯)：其實美國真正權利不是掌握在總統手中，不是掌握在克林頓、布什還是新當選的奧巴馬的總統手中，而掌握在一些機構，一些權勢集團手中。這些權勢集團多少年都持續在生存和發展，表面上美國是一個美麗的、民主的國家，但是真正的決策是取決於極少數精英分子和權勢集團，比如說農業的一些綜合企業，杜邦公司等等這些家族，他們控制了美國的政治。這些集團不僅控制了金融，而且還控制了糧食，而且控制了石油。比如說BP，雪佛龍，這些集團他們為了保持他們的權利，他們就對，包括對石油進行控制，所以說這就是糧價飆升的真正原因，糧價飆升一時半會兒還不能緩解。正如基辛格所說的一樣，誰控制了糧食，誰就控制了所有的人民，誰控制了石油，誰就控制了所有的國家，誰控制了貨幣，誰就控制了整個世界。

另外一個因素，基於一種錯誤的科學。現在大家所知道的基因學。實際上現在的很多除草劑都是極少數的化學公司，像杜邦這樣的公司開發的，豬都來吃這種轉基因食品，這種轉基因食品實際上對人體，包括對老鼠是有害的，實驗表明這種基因食品對老鼠的大腦會產生很嚴重的損害，讓它萎縮，甚至造成它的器官萎縮。所以這種轉基因食品是不穩定的，危險的，它的現狀還不確定的這種轉基因食品會造成世界上大多數人口受到迫害。下個月有一種新的技術就要商業化了，這個技術的名稱叫做終結者技術，這種技術它能允許種子收穫一季之後，它就自動自殺，然後農民不得不去再買他的種子，因為你不能用那個種子來生產，它會自動自殺，用一種轉基因技術。正是這三、四家私人集團，西方的三、四家，尤其是美國的三家私人公司，他們通過擁有了前所未有的控制糧食的權利，他們控制了全世界的糧食生產，通過這種技術。

從健康方面來說，實際上轉基因食品還有很多的不確定性，它的一些負作用可能要通過好多年的時間才能顯現，而且它是不穩定的，從科學上來說是不穩定的。他們就是用這種非常惡毒的手段，他們的目的就是要實現控制，實現對有色人種的滅絕和控制。

主持人權靜：丁教授，剛才恩道爾先生給我們講述了轉基因食品的危害。其實轉基因食品在國內也一直都是大家討論的非常多的一個話題，尤其最近食品安全的不論是牛奶問題三聚氰氨，還是飼料等等一系列話題，我們再次把關注的焦點放到了食品安全上。這個轉基因食品是否也會對人的食品安全產生非常大的威脅？我們國內現在對轉基因食品是一個什麼樣的態度？

丁聲俊：剛才恩道爾先生講到，世界糧食危機是由少數有權勢的人造成的。大家都知道，在世界上有五大糧食帝國，這五大糧食帝國其中有四家在日本，有一家在歐洲的，它控制了世界的糧食貿易，所以我們中國現在今後的糧食，應該坦率地講，我們中國糧食在世界進口方面我們沒有什麼話語權，所以剛才教授講到了，美國的一些政治家侵略了他們，特別是在糧食方面。因此這一次世界糧食危機，這五大跨國糧食公司在這裡面起了推波助瀾的作用。比如說去年美國糧食出口糧減少了，但是他賺的錢多了幾十億美元，另外就是一些基金，最早的時候他們要到芝加哥的交易所去，但是由於當時美國國會開始不同意，但到後來國會休假的時候這個基金去了，這個基金在芝加哥交易所裡面推波助瀾，把糧價煽起來了。所以有一個國外的經濟學家這樣評論，說我們在芝加哥交易所已經聞到了基金的血腥味。

主持人權靜：也就是說您跟恩道爾先生達成一個共識，此輪全球的糧食危機，包括糧價的暴漲都是由少數利益集團操控的。

丁聲俊：實際上過去糧食還是有一定的儲備糧的，但是由於價格上去了以後，發展中國家買不起了，所以饑民又重新陷入困境。但是他們一年多賺了幾十億美元，這個問題說完了以後，然後再說轉基因的問題。

我1990年，剛才和教授講了，我在德國學習，正好有一個研究所的博士，我們在中午吃飯的時候他就問我，丁先生，你對轉基因技術有什麼看法？我當時就講，那天講了很長時間，他說這個轉基因技術至少現在還不能斷定，還不能下結論有害還是沒害，這個人是一個博士。他說在西歐，在日本，在韓國，轉基因食品必須要在標籤上標明，這個是轉基因食品，讓消費者來選擇。因為什麼？因為科學界沒有給它下結論，沒有定論它是有害還是沒害，在這種情況下由消費者來選擇。這是我所經歷的。

在中國國內有兩種意見，一種，有些科學家們認為我們對這個問題必須要嚴肅地看待，因為科學界並沒有下出定論，因此我們要嚴肅地對待。有的提出來，就是在轉基因上只能夠在纖維作物中應用，在食品中不能夠應用，這是一種意見；另外一種意見，少數的科學家他們認為沒問題。

主持人權靜：大家特別關心我們國內現在大家吃的糧食裡邊，到底有多少是轉基因的？佔多大的比例？

丁聲俊：目前中國在糧食上，在穀物上還沒有轉基因的食品，但是油，這個有一些是國外進口的大豆，有相當一部分，進口的大豆是轉基因大豆，因此在油裡邊有相當部分是轉基因豆油。但是現在在超市裡邊，可能你沒規定，國家規定它必須在標籤上註明，是不是轉基因，由消費者選擇，大米和麵粉這些還沒有。

主持人權靜：那除了大米、麵粉和油之外，其他的好像還有很多的食品，這裡邊都有嗎？

丁聲俊：這些都沒有，大豆油已經有了，因為它進口的大豆是轉基因的大豆，中國進口了三千多萬噸大豆，我們國產大豆一年大概就是一千六百多萬噸，大豆壓搾工業程序比較多，原料從美國、南美、巴西、阿根廷進來的，所以大豆油裡有轉基因的。

主持人權靜：恩道爾先生有什麼補充？

恩道爾(劉忠翻譯)：我想補充一下丁教授剛才說的，實際上在美國，1992年美國老布什總統任內的時候，搞了一個行政令，他禁止對轉基因食品進行測試，而且他認為轉基因食品它和一般食品是實質相同的。搞過一些測試，而這些測試都是美國的這些糧食集團提供給美國政府的一種測試，當然他們之間完全是有一種陰謀勾當，而且完全是腐敗的作為，賄賂的作為，他們有一些交易在裡邊，甚至對很多食品他們都是禁止，而且他們禁止貼標籤。因為他們認為實質相同，就沒必要對轉基因食品貼標籤。

所以這樣完全就把轉基因食品和傳統食品混為一談了。他們就是通過這種方式來對轉基因的測試進行操縱，這就完全改變了我們人類糧食供應、食品供應的歷史，很多土豆，實際上很多轉基因土豆，轉基因大豆，轉基因玉米，它都存在很多不穩定性，產生的變異需要十年以後才能顯現出來，所以說它是很危險的。

我的立場得到印證，因為最近在德國做了一個法律上的裁決，證實食用了先正達的轉基因玉米，這個玉米叫BT176，有很多事實，食用了這個轉基因 176玉米的這些牛，它們的肝會裸露出來，或者出生以後就死亡，或者食用以後出現中毒現象。實際上這種轉基因玉米通過牛身體裡邊的反映以後出現很大的毒性，而且牛的排泄物污染了土地，這些土地可能六、七年都不能把毒性去掉。

我剛才談到老鼠食用了轉基因的土豆，做了個測試，英國一個著名的生物學家，也是轉基因專家，他做了個實驗，老鼠吃了轉基因土豆以後明顯的顯現就是說器官萎縮，甚至是大腦萎縮。從來沒有進行過獨立的長效的對轉基因食品的作用這種測試，所以說他們一直在說謊，掩蓋真相。比如說在越戰期間，他們就使用了很多化學毒劑，他們幫助美國國防部研製出了化學毒劑，對越南的生態和越南人民造成了很大的傷害，所以他們這些人總是在撒謊。

主持人權靜：很多網友跟恩道爾先生觀點比較一致，很多網友說轉基因食品的危害不是幾年之內就可以看出來的，確實方方面面的毒性跟負面的東西，可能需要十年、二十年長期的積累才能表現出來，它對人的身體的影響現在我們是不可知的。所以丁教授，我特別擔心這方面的問題，就是說我們中國對於剛才恩道爾先生提到的這種如此多危害的轉基因食品，有沒有一個詳細的規定，或者說立法一個制度，來防止對我們國內人民安全的這種影響？

丁聲俊：今年在我的印象裡邊制定了三個條例，就是禁止轉基因生物，都有這個規定，有嚴格的規定。但是面對國際上的這種鼓吹轉基因的聲浪越來越大，因此在國內有少數的科學家鼓吹這個，他們認為，在歐洲反對轉基因是一種技術壁壘。我在這裡想勸這些科學家，要以科學家嚴肅的態度對待這個問題。我認為歐洲的科學家他們是非常嚴肅地指出了這個問題沒有定論，要到下下代來看，因此我希望中國的科學家要以十分嚴肅的科學態度對待這個問題，不要認為歐洲是一種技術壁壘。

主持人權靜：剛才咱們說了這麼多轉基因食品的危害問題，今天我們還要談糧食安全跟整個糧食危機的話題。我想中國面臨的糧食現狀，除了轉基因食品的危害以外，還有一點，就是中國有如此眾多的人口，中國要吃飯的人佔到全世界人口的21%左右，中國要養活這麼多張嘴，要吃飯，糧食的儲備跟這個數量，也是關係到國家安全的一個重大問題。我們看到在十七屆三中全會上，國家就把糧食安全列為一個關係到國計民生的一個重要話題，這方面丁先生有什麼意見？

丁聲俊：你這個問題提得非常好，非常重要。我們養活了這麼多人口，既是對世界糧食安全的一個貢獻，同時對我們中國來講任務是非常之艱巨的。因此，中國的糧食安全必須警鐘長鳴，必須要有憂患意識。

主持人權靜：怎麼個警鐘長鳴法呢？

丁聲俊：就目前來講，中國的糧食安全形勢是好的，就這次世界糧食危機到目前為止還沒有給中國帶來嚴重的衝擊，但是它的傳導作用、影響作用肯定是有的。

主持人權靜：為什麼沒有給中國帶來衝擊？給我們解釋一下？

丁聲俊：為什麼沒有帶來衝擊呢？這是由於中國政府在這一屆的新政府採取了一種正確的戰略，就是在世界其他國家忽視農業的時候，這屆中國政府一直把「三農」作為各項工作的重中之重，一直在大力支持和扶持農業糧食生產。所以年年財政支持的力度都增加，2007年達到4千多億，2008年財政支持的力度達到5千多億，而且給農民是四補貼、四減免，農民都講了，現在不用交皇糧了。

主持人權靜：如果說我們進口的糧食特別多的話，是不是世界糧食的危機會對我們有更大的衝擊？現在我們國內糧食是以自給自足為主嗎？

丁聲俊：我們中國歷來是堅持以自力更生為主，因此我們對世界糧食市場的依賴度很低，因為我們對它的依存度很低，因此它這個糧食衝擊對我們的影響很小，甚至沒有。但是這個地方我要說明一點，在世界糧食危機的形勢下，中國對世界糧食安全作出了重大貢獻，因為這兩年中國不僅沒有進口糧食，而且穀物是出口的，像2007年我們穀物進出口840多萬噸。

主持人權靜：接下來我們還要採取什麼措施？

丁聲俊：現在我們措施是什麼？因為中國人口多，土地少，因此我們要堅定地堅持以自力更生為主解決自己吃飯問題的方針，這是一個方針問題；第二個，從戰略上來講，黨中央國務院把農業和糧食放在重中之重的地位，國家拿財政的錢來扶持，來支持，這個和世界上許多發展中國家是不一樣的，他們是忽視農業，是以糧食為中心，我們是重視農業，要給農民支持的力度，給他補貼。像民間糧食的價格要進一步提高，這是國務院已經宣佈的，而且比較大幅度的提高。

主持人權靜：這樣會更利於農民增收，這個會不會對我們通脹有一些衝擊呢？

丁聲俊：這個不會，因為在支持糧價上漲的同時也採取了很多措施，在必要的時候價格干預等等。比方說去年油價漲的很高的時候，國家發出一條，不管你是合資企業，也不管是國有企業，你要提價必須要向國家發改委申報。

主持人權靜：總的來說，就是讓我們保證糧價上漲、農民增收的同時，控制對通貨膨脹的進一步衝擊。

丁聲俊：控制通貨膨脹，控制經濟過熱。

主持人權靜：恩道爾先生，在您回答問題之前我先幫網友問您一個問題。

網友：恩道爾先生，據您瞭解，在美國國內有轉基因食品在市場上銷售嗎？

恩道爾(劉忠翻譯)：據我瞭解，67%的食品在美國都被轉基因污染了，而且美國政府採取不貼標籤的政策，所以美國人民是在毫無知情的情況下食用轉基因食品。而這種情況下，像權勢集團大家族他們有錢有勢，可以自由自在選擇自己的一些自然食品。轉基因食品，實際我很同意丁教授的意見，就是中國採取一種自給自足的糧食政策是非常正確的，能保證糧食安全。而歐洲很多國家在很多問題上是吃了大虧的。世界上所有的人民都希望食用健康的、營養的食品，而要食用健康和營養的食品現在越來越困難了，因為大的糧食集團，還有糧食的綜合企業，他們把整個糧食生產到銷售，到食用，到加工，產品鏈他們完全壟斷了，進行工業化。比如說養雞場，從五十年代開始就實行工業化的養雞場，一個養雞場裡邊能同時關五萬隻雞，而且這些雞都是踩在自己的糞便上，然後食用一些飼料，實際上和著自己的糞便來進行餵養。我認為它們就是禽流感病毒最初的攜帶者和感染者。

主持人權靜：剛才您說67%的美國食品都被轉基因因素污染，我們有一位網友提出一個質疑，就覺得67%的這個數據可靠嗎？您有什麼依據？

恩道爾(劉忠翻譯)：我的意思是67%的農田，美國的農田，都是被污染了的，大多數的雞肉都是食用的轉基因大豆，或者其他的飼料生長的。

主持人權靜：如果我們確切到說大概有多少比例的食品是受到了轉基因的污染，就是食品的比例大概會是多少？

恩道爾(劉忠翻譯)：實際上所有的肉、奶製品、魚和豬，轉基因玉米，或者是轉基因其他的一些作物，糧食，餵養的飼料，所以我可以這麼說，基本上所有的食品都被轉基因污染了。

主持人權靜：看來我們食品安全的形勢還是非常嚴峻的。其實我們今天的時間已經到了，但是在最後我還是想請問恩道爾先生最後一個問題，也請您很簡短地回答我，就是說您說當前這種很嚴峻的情況，包括現在整個世界糧食的危機如此嚴重的情況，您覺得如果有解決出路的話，我們下一步該怎麼樣做？

恩道爾(劉忠翻譯)：我簡短的一個意見，就是禁止公開的種子和銷售轉基因食品，因為在政治上是現實的，就是公開的種子和銷售轉基因，政治上是可行的。因為這個是英美極少數精英集團為了控制人口，消滅有色人種，他們的一種政治圖謀和政治陰謀。在委內瑞拉，實際上很多拉丁美洲國家已經開始禁止轉基因這種東西了，歐洲80%的人都反對轉基因食品，儘管歐盟跟他有一些私下的陰謀，但是也是反對的，從每個國家來說都是反對的，教皇也是反對轉基因食品。當時他以為是為了解決世界上十億人挨餓，他們也想鼓勵轉基因食品的生產，但是最後時刻被我書裡面的論點所說服，所以堅決反對轉基因食品的傳播。

主持人權靜：我們今天的直播就先進行到這兒了，非常感謝恩道爾先生和丁教授給我們帶來的關於食品安全的這場精彩的訪談。正如剛才恩道爾先生所說的，轉基因食品對於人類的危害現在還遠遠看不到它最後會有什麼樣的影響，但是我想對於轉基因食品的禁止，正如恩道爾先生提倡的，應該擴展到世界上每一個國家去，同時感謝丁教授為我們分析了我國目前的糧食政策，讓我感到欣慰的是目前在世界糧食危機動盪的情況之下，無論是我們的金融還是我們的糧食，都保持了相對的安全，我們也希望中國以後無論在金融安全，還是在糧食安全上，都能保持這種持續的穩定，保證大家生活的平穩。感謝三位做客新浪的直播間，我們下次再接著聊。

The Birth of the Mount

Fidel Castro
November 16, 2008

(Reflections by comrade Fidel) Bush seemed happy to have Lula sitting to his right during dinner on Friday. On the other hand, Hu Jintao, whom he respects for the enormous market in his country, the capacity to produce consumer goods at low cost and the volume of his reserves in US dollars and bonds was sitting to his left.

Medvedev, whom he offends with the threat of locating strategic radars and missiles not far from Moscow, was assigned a seat rather distant from the White House host.

The King of Saudi Arabia, a country that in a near future will produce 15 million tons of light oil at highly competitive prices was also sitting at his left, at Hu’s side.

Meanwhile, Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and his most faithful allied in Europe, could not be seen close to him in the pictures.

Nicolas Sarkozy, who is rather disappointed at the present architecture of the financial order, was far from him looking embittered.

The President of the Spanish Government, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, a victim of Bush’s personal resentment attending the conclave in Washington, I could not even see in the television images of the dinner.

That’s how those attending the banquet were sitting.

Anyone would have thought that the following day there would be a profound debate on the thorny issue.

On Saturday morning, the press agencies were reporting on the program that would unfold at the National Building Museum in Washington, D.C. Every second was covered. There would be an analysis of the current crisis and the actions to be taken. It would start at 11:30 a.m. local time. First, there would be a photo op, or “family picture” a Bush called it, and twenty minutes later the first plenary session would start followed by a another one in the second half of the day. Everything was strictly planned, even the fine sanitary services.

The speeches and analysis would last approximately three hours and 30 minutes. Lunch would be at 3:25 local time, immediately followed by the final declaration at 5:05. One hour later, at 6:05, Bush would be leaving for Camp David to rest, have dinner and have a pleasant sleep.

Those following the event were impatient to see the day going by and trying to know how the problems of the earth and the human specie would be dealt with in such a short time. A final declaration had been announced.

The fact is that the Summit’s final declaration was worked out by previously chosen economic advisors, very much in line with the neoliberal ideas, while Bush in his statements prior to the summit and after its conclusion claimed more power and more money for the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other world institutions under strict control of the United States and its closest allies. That country had decided to inject 700 billion dollars to bailout its banks and multinational corporations. Europe had offered an identical or even higher figure. Japan, its strongest pillar in Asia, has promised a 100 billion dollars contribution. In the case of the People’s Republic of China, which is developing increasing and convenient relations with Latin American countries, they are expecting another contribution of 100 billion dollars from its reserves.

Where would so many dollars, euros and pound sterlings come from if not from the deep indebtedness of new generations? How can the structure of the new world economy be built on paper money, which is what is really circulating in the short run, when the country issuing it is suffering from an enormous fiscal deficit? Would it be worthwhile traveling by air to a place on the planet named Washington to meet with a President with only 60 more days left in government and signing a document previously designed to be adopted at the Washington Museum? Could the US radio, TV and press be right not to pay special attention to this old imperialist game in the much-trumpeted meeting?

What is really incredible is the final declaration adopted by consensus in the conclave. It is obviously the participants’ full acceptance of Bush’s demands made before and during the summit. Some of the attending countries had no choice but to adopt it; in their desperate struggle for development, they did not want to be isolated from the richest and most powerful and their financial institutions, which are the majority in the G20.

Bush was really euphoric as he spoke. He used demagogic phrases which mirror the final declaration.

He said: “The first decision I had to make was who was coming to the meeting. And obviously I decided that we ought to have the G20 nations, as opposed to the G8 or the G13. But once you make the decision to have the G20 then the fundamental question is, with that many nations, from six different continents, who all represent different stages of economic development, would I be possible to reach agreements, and not only agreements, would I be possible to reach agreements that were substantive? And I’m pleased to report the answer to that question was, absolutely.”

“The United States has taken some extraordinary measures. Those of you who have followed my career know that I’m a free market person –until you are told that if you don’t take decisive measures then it’s conceivable that our country could go into a depression greater than the Great Depression.”

“[…] we just started on the $700 billion fund to start getting money out to our banks.”

“[…] we all understand the need to work on pro-growth economic policies.”

“Transparency is very important so that investors and regulators are able to know the truth.”

The rest of what Bush said goes more or less along this line.

The final declaration of the summit, which takes half an hour to read in public due to its length, is clearly defined in a number of selected paragraphs:

“We, the leaders of the G20 have held a first meeting in Washington, on November 15, in the light of serious challenges to the world economy and financial markets…”

“[…] we should lay the foundations for a reform that will make this global crisis less likely to happen again in the future. Our work should be guided by the principles of the free market, free trade and investment….”

“[…] the market players sought to obtain more benefits failing to make an adequate assessment of the risks and they failed…”

“The authorities, regulators and supervisors from some developed nations did not realize or adequately warned about the risks created in the financial markets…”

“…insufficient and poorly coordinated macroeconomic policies as well as inadequate structure reforms, led to an unsustainable macroeconomic global result.”

“Many emerging economies, which have helped sustain the world economy, are increasingly suffering from the world brakes.”

“We note the important role of the IMF in response to the crisis; we salute the new short-term liquidity mechanism and urge the constant reviewing of its instruments to ensure flexibility.”

“We shall encourage the World Bank and other multilateral developing banks to use their full capacity in support of their agenda for assistance…”

“We will make sure that the IMF, the World Bank and other multilateral developing banks have the necessary resources to continue playing their role in the solution of the crisis.”

“We shall exercise a strong monitoring of the credit agencies through the development of an international code of conduct.”

“We pledge to protect the integrity of the world financial markets by reinforcing protection to the investor and the consumer.”

“We are determined to advance in the reform of the Bretton Woods institutions so that they reflect the changes in the world economy to increase their legitimacy and effectiveness.”

“We shall meet again on April 30, 2009, to examine the implementation of the principles and decisions made today.”

“We concede that these reforms will only be successful if they are based on a serious commitment to the principles of free market, including the rule of law, respect for private property, free trade and investment, efficient and competitive markets and effectively regulated financial systems.”

“We shall refrain from erecting new barriers to investment and trade in goods and services.”

“We are aware of the impact of the current crisis on the developing nations, especially on those most vulnerable.”

“We are certain that as we advance through cooperation, collaboration and multilateralism we will overcome the challenges and restore stability and prosperity to the world economy.”

This technocratic language is beyond grasp of the masses.

The empire is treated courteously; its abusive methods are not criticized.

The IMF, the World Bank and the multilateral credit organizations are praised despite the fact that they generate debts, enormous bureaucratic expenses and investments while supplying raw materials to the large multinationals which are also responsible for the crisis.

This goes on like that until the last paragraph. It’s a boring declaration full of the usual rhetoric. It doesn’t say anything. It was signed by Bush, the champion of neoliberalism, the man responsible for genocidal wars and massacres, who has invested in his bloody adventures all the money that would have sufficed to change the economic face of the world.

The document does not have a word on the absurd policy promoted by the United States of turning food into fuel; or the unequal exchange of which the Third World countries are victims; or about the useless arms race, the production and trade of weapons, the breakup of the ecological balance and the extremely serious threats to peace that bring the world to the brink of annihilation.

Only a short four-word phrase in the long document mentions the need “to face climate change.”

The declaration reflects the demand of the countries attending the conclave to meet again in April 2009, in the United Kingdom, Japan or any other country that meets the necessary requirements --nobody knows which- to examine the situation of the world finances, dreaming that the cyclical crisis with their dramatic consequences never happen again.

Now is the time for the theoreticians from the left and the right to offer their passionate or dispassionate criteria on the document.

Form my point of view the privileges of the empire were not even touched. Having the necessary patience to read it completely, one can see that is simply a pious appeal to the ethic of the most powerful country on earth, both technologically and militarily, at the time of economic globalization; it’s like begging the wolf not to eat up little red riding hood.

Battered Labour Movement Needs to Agitate Like It's 1944

John F. Conway
Planet S

John Conway teaches at the University of Regina. This article is originally appeared in Planet S, a local magazine published in Regina, Canada

"Democracy leads the struggle of the working class not only for better terms for the sale of labour power, but for the abolition of the social system that compels the propertyless to sell themselves to the rich…Trade unionist politics of the working class is precisely bourgeois politics of the working class." — V. I. Lenin, What Is To Be Done?

Lenin's famous booklet, What Is To Be Done?, is considered the blueprint for his successful leadership of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 in Russia. He was writing in 1902 and the working class was on the rise. From the mid-1800s to the 1940s the working classes of the advanced capitalist nations engaged in two struggles. One was the narrow economic battle for collective bargaining rights to improve the terms and conditions of work — which led to the trade union movement. The other was the general political campaign for the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of a socialist society — which led to communist, socialist and social democratic political parties.

What Lenin consistently argued — as Marx had, and as every militant political leader of the working class continued to argue to the present day — was that the working class had to remain keenly aware that the economic fight within capitalism through trade unions, though immensely important, must never be allowed to divert the working class from the general struggle for socialism.

Socialism was never achieved in the advanced capitalist societies. The socialist victory in industrially backward Russia became so distorted under Stalin, after both the death of Lenin and Trotsky's purge and murder, that it tended to discredit the promise of socialism for many. Nevertheless, great gains were made as the capitalist ruling classes embraced the welfare state — if only to prevent the victory of working class political parties. The construction of the welfare state accelerated after the Great Depression and World War II, largely because working class parties either won power or came very close to winning power in the industrial world: the victories of the Labour Party in 1945 in Great Britain and of the CCF in Saskatchewan in 1944; the near victories of the Communist Parties of France and Italy after the war; the rise to power throughout western Europe of social democratic parties.

Add to this the rise of the Soviet Union as an international contender for ideological support for socialism and against capitalism as an economic system, and the pace of the reform of capitalism was astonishing from 1945 to 1980.

Yet Capitalist ideological hegemony, and political and economic power, remained dominant in the western, industrialized world. When the Soviet Union imploded in 1991 and turned to capitalism, and the Chinese revolution embraced capitalism to become the industrial workshop of the now capitalist world, socialism was dead as a viable alternative.

As you look around you today, the things that you take for granted as part of our good life were won by the political struggles of the working class and its allies: free health care; free K to 12 public education; minimum wages; labour standards; the health and safety regulation of work places; workers' compensation; employment insurance; the Canada Pension plan — the list goes on and on. Each of these gains was first proposed and then fought for by the working class and its organizations — the trade unions and the political parties the working class founded or helped to found.

Even our democratic system was won only after long and bitter, sometimes bloody, struggles in which the working classes played the central role. When the capitalist democratic revolutions overthrew aristocratic tyranny in the 18th and 19th centuries (with the mass support of an armed working class), they established a democracy of the propertied. Only men with property of a certain value could vote.

The agitations in Great Britain leading to the Reform Act of 1832 — agitations which came very close to a general insurrection — reluctantly added men who rented property of a certain value as also eligible to vote: this meant that one in seven men could vote. Further agitations led to the Reform Act of 1867 which extended the vote to all male householders. Universal suffrage for men in Great Britain was not won until 1918, when all men of 21 got the vote. True universal suffrage was achieved in 1928 when all men and women of 21 got the vote. Canada largely followed Great Britain on the suffrage issue. True universal suffrage was won in Canada in 1960 when all aboriginals under treaty were finally granted the franchise.

The historical record is clear. Democracy was never given freely by the capitalist ruling classes; it had to be taken from them, just as all other reforms had to be taken by struggle.

Beginning in the 1980s, and accelerating after the fall of the Soviet Union, the international capitalist ruling classes again dominated the world as they had in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. The reformist mask of capitalism was discarded, and a vicious neo-liberal "take-back" campaign began. The era of neo-liberal globalization was proclaimed as the justification for a relentless attack on the welfare state and the trade unions — a relentless attack on the working classes of the world.

As technology advanced, factories in high wage areas were closed and redistributed around the globe to low wage areas. Unions were faced with massive layoffs, and contract demands from employers included a whole variety of concessions to cheapen the costs of labour in order to achieve global competitiveness. Unions were compelled to take wage cuts, to accept benefit reductions or eliminations, to accept two-tier wage and benefit packages (one "grandfathering" existing workers with existing wages and benefits, the other for new hires with lower wages and fewer benefits).

Besides this attack on trade unions, capitalist political parties (which now included the formerly pro-labour social democratic parties) proclaimed that the new era of global capitalist competitiveness demanded massive cuts to the welfare state.

This campaign against the trade unions and the welfare state has been going on for over 25 years now, and continues to get worse and worse as the numbers of broken unions and discarded social programs mount each day.

Canada's working class is on the ropes. Its major institutions — the trade unions — are reeling from successive defeats. The number of union members in Canada is in serious decline, from 35 per cent in the 1980s to 28 per cent today. The Canadian Auto Workers — Canada's largest, most successful and most militant union — is in a state of collapse as cuts in the auto industry force it to its knees. The CAW, which denounced concession bargaining and proclaimed it would never, ever go down that road, has now fully embraced concession bargaining and two-tier contracts in the name of the "investment competitiveness" of its bosses.

These are dark days for the trade union movement, days of defeat, concessions, and cap-in-hand pleas to the bosses. If the trade union movement continues down this road, it will only get worse — the concessions demanded by capitalism will never end until the working class is powerless and on its knees.

The political clout of the working class in Canada is at its lowest ebb since prior to the Great Depression. The NDP has bought into neo-liberal ideological hegemony, and has essentially become just another capitalist political party. Unorganized workers feel less and less sympathy for trade unions desperately trying to salvage their entitlements while leaving the unorganized to their fate. Public sympathy for unions is very low since unions appear only concerned about the narrow economic interests of their existing members.

What should the working class and its last remaining institution — the trade unions — do at this juncture?

Perhaps the trade unions should learn from history. What did trade unions do during the Great Depression, the last time capitalists tried to use an economic crisis to crush the modest gains the working class had made? The only power of the working class is its own self-organization. And that is what the trade unions and socialist activists did in the 1930s — they commenced a massive organizing drive of the unorganized; they fought strikes over demanded concessions; they occupied closed factories in solidarity with laid-off workers; they organized the unemployed and the poor; and they produced that great slogan of solidarity — "an injury to one is an injury to all," and actually acted on it.

Today unions are not doing much of this. They say they want to do it, they pass resolutions and make speeches about doing it, but they are not acting. As they accept concessions involving two tiers, they are fracturing their own internal solidarity. As they ignore the plight — except for pious, self-congratulatory resolutions passed at conventions — of the unorganized and the poor, they fracture the solidarity of the class as a whole.

The only way the working class ever obtained any effective power was through mass self-organization.

That was true in 1850, and it is even more true in 2008.

從長期看我們都死了？

盧周來
中國經營報
2008年11月09日

作者為中國經濟體制改革研究會特約研究員

發端於華爾街的金融危機正席捲全球，並逐漸向實體經濟蔓延。各國政府都緊急出台各種所謂「救市」方案。這些方案看似五花八門，其實質就兩個：擴張性貨幣政策與擴張性財政政策；措施則都是想增加市場上的流動性。

由此觀之，各國政府應對危機所採取的政策並沒有什麼新鮮的東西。所有的政策都非常正統，也非常老套。所謂正統，即這些政策與標準版的經濟學教科書中提供的應對經濟緊縮時的工具很吻合。因為標準版的經濟學教科書在宏觀經濟部分所提供的工具就是財政政策與貨幣政策工具，而且在經濟走向蕭條時，就是建議使用擴張性工具；所謂老套，即這些政策與歷史上應對危機時所採取的政策幾乎沒有任何變化。

應該承認，從短期看，各國政府應對危機所採取的這些政策或多或少都會對經濟產生積極的影響。但是從長期看，擴張性政策導致的後果對經濟增長的負面影響也將會很嚴重，甚至有可能使下一次危機的規模來得更大。

比如從貨幣政策的長期效果看，根據「貨幣數量論」，央行所增加釋放的流動性，最後必將沉澱於物價上；而如果實體經濟發展跟不上，必將引發通貨膨脹。況且金融危機下的「流動性不足」，並非原來的流動性不存在了，而只是「暫不流動」了而已。在此情況下，如果大規模放鬆銀根，從長遠看，有可能導致通貨膨脹的進一步加劇。

其實，僅從一般性經濟理論看，標準版的經濟學教科書中所推薦的凱恩斯主義宏調政策，也僅止於短期發揮功效。這與經濟凱恩斯主義背後的哲學相關。這一哲學在中國還鮮有人提起，而凱恩斯本人對此有深刻的闡發。

在上世紀30年代末期，有人就批評凱恩斯通過刺激總需求帶動經濟增長的主張僅僅是一種「治標不治本」的「短視策略」，甚至因其與新教倫理所主張的「節制」相悖而被認為是「不道德」。

針對這些批評，凱恩斯在1939年所寫的《我們子孫的經濟學》中承認了這一點。但他為自己辯解道，多少年後，我們將會「再一次把目的看得比手段重要，寧願追求善而不追求實用。」「可是，要注意！這樣的時候還沒有到來，至少在100年內，我們還必須對己對人揚言美就是惡，惡就是美，因為惡實用，美不實用。」

而針對「短視」的批評，凱恩斯說出了他那句名言，「從長期看，我們都死了」。在他看來，針對眼下的大危機，首要的是使整個資本主義經濟盡快脫離危險，所以採取的措施與手段當然都是短期的，都是「救命」或「治標」的；而如果一開始就考慮「長遠」，想著如何「治本」，可能還沒有等到那些措施發揮功效，資本主義經濟就已經無藥可救了。

所以，凱恩斯主張眼前的利益是最重要的利益，只要眼前利益最大，不必專門去計算經濟行為的未來收益。

應該說，凱恩斯本人的主張在今天看來也沒有錯。一個最恰當的隱喻莫過於「治病」：應付危機與治療突然襲來的大病一樣，首先是急救，保證病人脫離危險；然後才談得上後續進一步「固本」的治療。

但後來人們最大的錯誤在於一再把凱恩斯這些短期內「應急」手段誤解成長期「治本」之策。正因此，每次危機一來，在千篇一律地用了凱恩斯主義這些手段後，危機一過，各國政府並沒有進行後續的「固本」治療，而是很快「好了傷疤忘了痛」，甚至根本忘記了導致危機的深層次「病因」。

就拿中國內地為例。為應對危機，央行放鬆了此前針對房地產市場的信貸政策。而眾所周知，房地產市場泡沫已經成為我國經濟增長的心腹隱患，或者說中國經濟增長與地方政府財政收入已經像吸食鴉片成癮的病人一樣依賴於房地產畸形增長；而造成這種局面就與2003年貨幣政策相關。2003年「非典」之後，央行為刺激經濟增長而放鬆信貸，甚至不惜廢除此前剛剛出台的旨在限制房地產行業貸款的「121」號文件。結果，導致當年信貸量猛增，經濟增長也從該年出現了「偏快轉過熱」的苗頭，房地產業更是出現了畸形發展的局面。

本來教訓十分深刻，但此次為應對危機，央行卻選擇了放鬆房地產信貸。這樣的政策從短期看可能有效果，但從長期看，則不僅會妨礙中國經濟結構性矛盾的解決，還有可能釀成中國式的次貸危機。

所以，在這個時候，想想與凱恩斯同期的另一位經濟學大師熊彼特的話也許更有用。與凱恩斯不同，熊彼特認為，因為眼前經濟行為將無法挽回地釀造未來，因此，作出任何一項短期決策時都要思考它們對「我們都死了」以後的長期效果，否則就是不負責任。

也因此，我建議中國政府在考慮應對危機的策略時，智慧的做法是既要考慮眼前救急，同時也要考慮中國經濟更為長遠的可持續健康發展。比如在財政政策上，還是要加大用於改善民生尤其是支持農村與中低收入者的力度；在貨幣政策上，放鬆創新性企業與中小企業信貸顯然應該優於放鬆房地產信貸，這才是真正兼顧眼前與長遠之策。

金融崩盤與社會主義者的回應

David Finkel
林垕君 譯註

David Finkel 是美國「Against the Current」刊物編輯、Solidarity的全國委員會成員。林垕君為台灣工人民主協會、自主工聯常執委

2008年9月至10月的金融和股市崩盤是我們多數人生平未曾見過的，除非是經歷過1929年和大蕭條時代的美國人才有可能看過這麼巨大的危機。日本人因為經歷過1980年代銀行破產後「失落的十年」，可能對此並不陌生，但當前的情況則是全球規模的災難。

以1929年對照不必然代表今日的全球經濟同樣會走向大蕭條。實際上，這個危機的結果是無法預測的。與1929年的情況相比存在其他相異處—1929年股市崩盤接續著信貸危機，某種程度造成了1930年的大蕭條，是因為當時政府以採取「緊縮」（tight money）政策，而今天中央銀行和政府絕對不會重複這樣的一種自殺行徑。相反地，歐洲與美國極有力的政府介入（和近來自由市場遊戲規則意識型態相衝突）已經暫時緩和了全球金融倒閉的恐懼以及短期股市恐慌。

看看為了援救（因為太大而倒閉的[¹]）大銀行，自由市場和金融去管制化的意識形態如何被快速拋到腦後，這個發展確實很有啟發性。美國財政部不僅以高於市場價格購買這些機構的「不良資產」，而且投注了數千億美元購買他們的特別股 [²]，且是無表決權特別股，如此一來這些獲得緊急援助的倒閉銀行仍然可以保有私人的控制。雖然如此，美國政府作為右翼自由市場保守主義的堡壘，正在採取一種連最自由的民主黨人都想像不到的手段，這在六個月前根本無法想像。很多歐洲政府（如英國）在銀行的部分國有化上走的更遠，即使這些手段傾向只是暫時的。

企業和華爾街那些無能的人和騙子把經濟搞成這樣，竟然還有緊急援助。問題是，政府對於正在失去房子、工作、銀行存款、健康保險和退休保障希望的勞動階級，援救方案又在哪裡？面對我們這種緊急情況，政府可以、或應該做什麼？這個問題應該放在美國和世界經濟的脈絡下來看。

關於經濟，目前可以確定的是全球性的衰退已經開始，在接下來的一年半到二年間可能加劇或更嚴重。九月份的資料顯示，美國和很多歐洲國家的工作機會正在逐漸消失。在那背後，我們不知道當前危機的長期走向，我們在這裡也不嘗試推測。重要的是，社會主義者必須提出當前危機對於工人群眾的意義，以及如何回應。

景氣、泡沫化、衰退、恐慌乃（自17世紀以來）資本主義體系所固有，不論是採「大幅政府干預」或是「完全自由經濟」皆然。但是，當前全球信貸市場災難之大，象徵著金融資本去管制化制度少見的失敗及終點，特別是在美國，過去其自由市場創造了非常多的財富以及某種方式自我管理的機制。關於商業和投資銀行分離 [³]此一衰退時期規則被消滅（安隆事件顯示這種去管制化在能源產業會造成什麼樣的後果[⁴]，但此一教訓已經被忽略）。

大家都知道，當前的現實是結合了房市泡沫化、強加於貧窮和有色人種社區的次級房貸[⁵]風暴、個人和企業舉債的大幅攀升，以及基於債務包裝與再循環[⁶]的衍生性金融商品擴散。遍及全球的銀行，透過猶如賭場籌碼般的相互買賣，創造了大量的紙上利潤（有名無實的利潤），結果是，他們坐擁萬億虛擬價值（那些不良資產包含了永遠不可能清償的貸款）。無疑地，最後他們甚至將停止相互借款，因為每一家銀行都覺得必須保存自己手上的現金，而且懷疑其他銀行隱藏真實情況，如同他們自己（膨脹虛擬價值）一樣。

銀行信貸，就如同全球資本主義發動機的燃料，為了防止信貸完全停工的威脅（此威脅使得股市於數週內驟跌 40%），當前政府干預風潮是很重要的。美國政治潮流也正轉向再管制化，不僅僅是表面上減少那些華爾街CEO們可恨的薪水，而是真的對金融資本的行徑加以控制。這個潮流將在2009年加速國會內民主黨的席次增加，以及民主黨總統的誕生，雖然歐巴馬的經濟顧問包含如Robert Rubin （柯林頓時代去管制化的推手）之流。

然而，管制就其本身而言，根本無法解決目前數以千萬工人階級家庭所面臨的大災難。面對目前的緊急情況，需要採取的方法如下：

立即禁止（抵押人）回贖權的取消[⁷]。不僅房屋所有人正流落街頭，租屋者也是，他們根本不知道屋主回贖權被取消。還好有一些民眾抗爭，如Cook縣警長暫緩執行驅逐租屋者—這樣的例子應該廣為散佈。任何人不應失去他們的房子，除非— 　　　

對房屋的價值設設抵押權。假裝房屋在今日市場上仍維持他們在房市泡沫化中的紙上價值，已經沒有意義。主要住宅的貸款，不僅僅那些現在已經被取消回贖權的房貸，抵押貸款必須要下降30-40%。利息必須調降，以徹底破壞那些掐住低收入者和有色人種咽喉的次級「浮動利率」機制[⁸]。有很多案例顯示，特別是非裔美國女性，只能貸到敲詐般高利息的貸款，即使他們的收入和信用應該符合標準利息的抵押借款。

政府應該接管這些抵押借款，只付給銀行他們實際的（而非紙上的）價值，而且，次級貸款機構倒閉的愈多愈好。更甚者，任何家庭償還抵押借款，不應超過家庭收入15%以上，這也將使得對美國工人階級的「刺激方案」發生效果。

改變政府的優先考量，優先考量我們需要的，排除我們負擔不起的。當聯邦、州、市政府預算被債務卡住，什麼是我們負擔不起的就很明顯了，即維持美國帝國主義的費用。因此，布希流氓政府在伊拉克的3兆戰爭必須結束，在150個國家的美軍基地、為維持武器空間的無數花費、那些與民營軍事公司（Halliburton公司和Blackwater私人傭兵）浮濫契約——所有這些費用應該要歸零，世界和我們的社會將因此更美好。

然後我們真正需要的是什麼？初步建議如下：

保障普遍健康照護是絕對必要的，特別是在一個就業逐漸不穩定的時代。現在美國至少有450萬人沒有健康保險，且數量持續上升。對那些家庭而言，相較於因病破產的恐懼，甚至因缺乏治療而導致的永久傷害和死亡，恐怖主義份子攻擊的威脅根本微不足道。僅僅一張紙就可說明廣泛醫療保險計畫是負擔得起的，不僅可解決當前這個危機所帶來的問題，同時可削減費用、拯救生命和保護許多家庭免於破產。

一個如1930年代規模的工作計劃是必須且可行的，並非無工作可做，尤其是我們的基礎建設需求不僅須修復，且須轉換至永續性經濟的需要，以避免環境災難。每當美國企業不想投資再生能源、資源回收、大眾運輸和新的運輸技術，政府就必須插手干預這些基本需求，創造出數以百萬計有生產力、且具有工會工人薪資水平的工作。

保証普及化的高等教育，透過支援公立大學可承受的大學學費、藉由免除學生貸款的沉重負擔。我們的社會有足夠資源可提供給所有人免費的高等教育—至少不要讓學生離開學校時負債纍纍（負擔不起的數萬元債務），必須給學生無息貸款，讓他們畢業之後能夠償還，每個月不超過收入的10%。

如同解決全球的飢餓、貧窮和健康危機，以及未來數十年無可逆轉的環境災難，我們的社會中，為了滿足人類需求而非企業利潤，還有很多可以且應該做的事。現實中，要從全球經濟危機中擺脫出來，必須依靠民主控制下的「永續革命」，其深度如同上個世紀的工業或科學革命。此歷程必須從立即的人類需求開始，而上述方法是解決我們當前危機的起步。現在最需要的是勞工和社會運動能夠為他們的需求鬥爭，而且獲勝！

註：

[1] 這裡應該是在諷刺，過去金融機構躲在「大到不能倒」的保護傘下漠視風險的心態。在此心態下，金融機構為了追求更高的利潤，不斷發明新穎、奇異、複雜難解的衍生性信用金融商品，把許多原本無法在市場流通的商品證券化後，轉賣出去，賺取手續費。

[2] preferred shares我國翻譯為「特別股」。公司發行之股票可分為普通股與特別股，享有一般之股東權利者稱為普通股，享有特殊權利、或某些權利受到限制者是為特別股。

[3] 美國投資銀行與商業銀行的分離發生在1929年的大股災之後，當時聯邦政府認為投資銀行業務有較高的風險，禁止商業銀行利用儲戶的資金參加投行業務，故於 1933年通過Glass-Steagall act（葛拉斯-史迪哥法案），規定商業銀行、投資銀行及保險公司不得跨業經營，以避免利益衝突保護大眾權益。結果一大批綜合性銀行被迫分割為商業銀行和投資銀行，其中最典型的例子就是摩根銀行分割為從事投資銀行業務的摩根史坦利以及從事商業銀行業務的摩根大通。Glass-Steagall act在1999年底正式宣告廢止。

[4] 有批評者提到，上述Glass-Steagall act廢止後，使得安隆公司往來密切的摩根大通銀行及花旗集團銀行，得以提供安隆貸款及投資理財顧問雙重角色的服務，但該兩種業務是否有利益衝突之處，值得懷疑。放款銀行的角色乃是評估安隆公司的剩餘價值，以估算有多少機會，銀行可以回收債權；而投資理財顧問的角色，則是不惜推薦安隆從事具有高風險高報酬的策略性投資，以賺取高額的顧問費用。批評對手提出，上述兩家金融集團可能不惜以貸款面的損失為誘引，獲得安隆公司更多頗具利潤的高風險投資金融業務，進而導致了安隆公司的鉅額虧損。

[5] 美國銀行對個人採取信用評級打分的制度，最好的為300，最差的則為900。按照正常標準，如果一個人的信用記分超過620，在正常情況下銀行就不會發放房屋貸款，但在政府鼓勵居民買屋的政策下，許多銀行對許多信用記分超過620的個人也提供房貸。由於這些貸款的風險相對較大，銀行一般也會收取較高的利率。這樣的房屋貸款一般被稱為次級房貸。

[6] 銀行將次級房貸進行資產證券化，其方法一般是將一批次級房貸打包，賣給一個專門為實現資產證券化而設立的機構，這一機構則以未來房貸償還的現金流作為抵押而發行證券。這次出問題的原因是，當這些次級貸款人違約率升高後，債券等級便被SRP等調降，債券價格因此大跌，投資者遭受了很大損失，沒人接手，出售無門。結果，美國第五大投資銀行貝爾斯登公司旗下避險（或私募）基金專門投資這種債券，更糟糕的是他們再拿這些債券抵押，再去投新的次級債券。

[7] 回贖權被取消後，房屋將遭斷頭法拍的命運，使得愈來愈多人流落街頭。

[8] 美國220萬的房奴是來自美國前五年的房市榮景，透過開發商和華爾街這些金融資本推銷，創造出今日的房奴。房奴之所以繳納不出房貸，也是因為房貸採取浮動匯率，美國聯邦不斷調高貸款利率，使得很多房奴現身說法，說自己原本繳得出房貸，最早房貸是7%，後來攀高到14%，他已經繳納不出來了。

Realities of China today

Martin Hart-Landsberg
Against the Current
November/December 2008, No. 137
http://www.solidarity-us.org/node/1940

Martin Hart-Landsberg is Professor of Economics and Director of the Political Economy Program at Lewis and Clark College, Portland, Oregon; and Adjunct Researcher at the Institute for Social Sciences, Gyeongsang National University, South Korea. His publications include: Marxist Perspectives on South Korea in the Global Economy (2007), China and Socialism: Market Reforms and Class Struggle (with Paul Burkett, 2005), Understanding Japanese Capitalism (with Paul Burkett, 2005) and Development, Crisis, and Class Struggle: Learning from Japan and East Asia, ( with Paul Burkett, 2000).

Interest in the post-1978 Chinese market reform experience remains high and for an obvious reason: China is widely considered to be one of the most successful developing countries in modern times. The Chinese economy has recorded record rates of growth over an extended time period, in concert with a massive industrial transformation. Adding to the interest is the Chinese government's claim that this success demonstrates both the workability and superiority of "market socialism."

There are those on the left who share this celebratory view of the Chinese experience, believing that it stands as an effective rebuttal to the neoliberal mantra that still dominates economic thinking. Therefore, they encourage other countries to learn from China's gradual, state controlled process of marketization, privatization, and deregulation of economic activity. A small but significant number share the Chinese government's view that China has indeed pioneered a new type of socialism.

Many on the left also believe that China may soon be capable of anchoring an alternative international economic system, thereby offering other countries the opportunity to reduce their dependence on the current U.S. dominated system and pursue their own independent development strategies.

Unfortunately, as argued below, there is no justification for this positive perspective on the Chinese experience. First, regardless of what Chinese leaders say, China is not pioneering a new form of market socialism - rather the reforms have led to the restoration of capitalism. As a result, Chinese internal dynamics are clearly hostile to the creation of any anti-capitalist alternative. Second, the reforms have produced an increasingly exploitative growth process, one that is generating considerable wealth for a small minority at unacceptably high cost for the great majority of Chinese working people.

Finally, China's growth process is now structurally enmeshed in, and dependent upon, the operation of a broader process of regional and international restructuring, one controlled by transnational capital. As a result, China is not only incapable of serving as an anchor for an alternative global economy, its accumulation dynamics actually contribute to the strengthening of existing international structures of power and the global imbalances and tensions they generate.

The stakes are high in this engagement over the nature and significance of the Chinese experience. For example, left support for the Chinese reform experience encourages, consciously or unconsciously, the mistaken belief that socialism can be built through the use of markets and a closer integration with global capitalist accumulation dynamics. At a minimum, this leads to confusion about the nature of socialism, and of capitalism as well.

This is more than a theoretical concern: one finds in many countries - including Cuba, Venezuela, South Africa and Brazil -- advocates for socialism who argue that their respective governments should implement Chinese style market reform policies.

Chinese workers, in growing number, are beginning to challenge Chinese state policies, not just in response to the exploitation they experience but also because of their renewed interest in socialism itself. It is therefore vital that we develop an accurate understanding of the Chinese experience, both to provide support for those seeking socialist renewal in China and to ensure that efforts at social transformation in other countries are not compromised by false understandings of the dangers of markets and capitalist imperatives.

China's structural transformation
In 1978, two years after the death of Mao Zedong, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, led by Deng Xiaoping, decided to radically increase the economy's reliance on market forces. The leadership claimed that such a step was necessary to overcome the country's growing economic problems which were alleged to be caused by Mao's overly centralized system of state planning and production.

Political and economic changes were definitely desired by the majority of Chinese. Deng and his followers, however, greatly overstated the severity of existing problems and, more importantly, ignored popular calls for an exploration of other, non-market reform responses.

Once begun, the market reform process quickly became uncontrollable.(¹) Each stage generated new tensions and contradictions that could only be resolved (given the leadership's opposition to worker-community centered alternatives) through a further expansion of market power. The "slippery slope" of market reforms thus led to an eventual privileging of market dynamics over planning, private ownership over public ownership, and foreign enterprises and markets over domestic ones.

Economic transactions are now overwhelmingly shaped by market prices. The share of retail sales made according to market determined prices rose from 3% in 1978 to 96.1% in 2003. For producer goods, the share rose from zero to 87.3% over the same period.(²)

The growing industrial dominance of the private sector is also clear. In 1978, state owned enterprises accounted for all value added in China's industrial sector (defined as mining, utilities, and manufacturing). By 2003, the private sector share was larger than the state sector share: 52.3% to 41.9%.(³) But even this diminished state share overstates the actual "economic weight" of state production.

Recognizing that many state enterprises are now jointly owned by private interests - either through joint venture or stock ownership - the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) classifies state firms as either directly or indirectly controlled, depending on whether the state share of paid-in capital is greater than 50% of the total. In 2003, directly controlled state enterprises accounted for only 22.9% of industrial value added - less than a quarter of the total.

The declining strategic importance of the state sector becomes even clearer if we narrow our focus to manufacturing. The OECD has divided China's manufacturing sector into two groups. The first includes the five industries that continue to be dominated by state production: petroleum processing and coking, smelting and pressing of ferrous metals, smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals, tobacco processing, and transport equipment.

The second and larger group (which accounts for over 75% of manufacturing value added) is dominated by private enterprise. This group is made up of 23 different manufacturing industries, including food processing, textiles, garments, chemicals, medical and pharmaceuticals, plastics, ordinary machinery, special purpose machinery, electrical equipment, and electronic and telecom equipment. As the OECD explains:

In 1998 the private sector produced the higher share of value added in only 5 out of these 23 . . . manufacturing industries. By 2003, this was true for all 23 of these industries. Moreover, in half of them, private firms produced more than three-quarters of output. Overall in these 23 industries, the private sector employs two-thirds of the labor force, produces two-thirds of these industries' value added and accounts for over 90 percent of their exports.(⁴)

State-owned enterprises do remain important and the Chinese state still exercises control over critical sectors of the economy, but these areas of strength are now largely limited to finance and activities supported by state ownership of natural resources. Thus, in 2006, three state oil companies accounted for half of the earnings of the 160 largest "state owned monopolies and oligopolies." In fact, "Up to 80 percent of the year-on-year increase in profits realized in 2006 by all Chinese enterprises were attributable to . . . monopoly financial groups or monopoly firms in the areas of oil and petrochemicals, electricity, coal and metals."(⁵)

Foreign capital also enjoys a greatly strengthened role in the Chinese economy. The share of foreign manufacturers in China's total manufacturing sales grew from 2.3% in 1990 to 31.3% in 2000.(⁶) Perhaps more revealing, a 2006 government report concluded that foreign capital holds a majority of assets in 21 out of 28 of the country's leading industrial sectors.(⁷)

One consequence of this development is that China's economic growth has become increasingly dependent on foreign produced exports. Foreign firms dominate China's export activity: their share of China's total exports grew from two percent in 1985 to 58% in 2005 (and stands at 88% for high tech exports.(⁸)

Moreover, these exports are increasingly being produced by 100% foreign owned firms. A case in point: the share of computer related exports produced by 100% foreign-owned firms increased from 51 to 75% over the period 1993-2003.(⁹) As a result of these trends, the ratio of exports to GDP has climbed from 16% in 1990 to over 40% in 2006.

In sum, while state planners and enterprises continue to play an important role in China's economy, state power has been used to shape an accumulation process that is now dominated by private (profit-seeking) firms, led by foreign transnational corporations, whose production is largely aimed at markets in other (mostly advanced capitalist) countries.

Regardless of how one might evaluate the performance of the Chinese economy, it is hard to imagine how this development can be viewed as laying the foundation for an alternative to capitalism, at either national or international levels. Rather it points to the conclusion that capitalism itself has been restored in China.

Social consequences of market reform

Many on the left are no longer interested in the debate over whether China is socialist. Rather, they are concerned with whether China's growth and transformation has led to "successful" economic development. For a majority, the answer is an unequivocal "yes." This answer appears largely based on a consideration of a limited but important set of indicators: rates of growth of foreign investment, exports, and GDP.

If we broaden our notion of development, however, to include measures of working-class well-being, the answer tragically changes. The reality is that China's market reform polices have created a growth process underpinned by increasingly harsh working and living conditions for the great majority of Chinese.

Perhaps most surprising is the fact that the country's rapid growth has failed to generate adequate employment opportunities. According to the International Labor Organization (ILO), total urban (regular) manufacturing employment actually declined over the period 1990-2002, from 53.9 million to 37.3 million.(¹⁰) And while there was a small increase in total urban employment, almost all the growth was in irregular employment, meaning casual-wage or self-employment - typically in construction, cleaning and maintenance of premises, retail trade, street vending, repair services or domestic services.

More specifically, while total urban employment over this 13-year period grew by 81.7 million, 80 million of that growth was in irregular employment. As a result, irregular workers now comprise the largest single urban employment category - much as in Africa and Latin America where such an outcome is blamed on stagnant capital accumulation. In addition, the ILO reports declining labor force participation rates and double digit unemployment rates for urban residents.

The reform process has taken an especially heavy toll on state workers. According to Chinese government figures, state-owned enterprises laid off 30 million workers over the period 1998-2004. As of June 2005, 21.8 million of them were struggling to survive on the government's "minimum living allowance" - the basic welfare grant given to all poor urban residents. In June 2005, this allowance was approximately $19 a month.(¹¹)

Of course there has been job growth in the private sector, especially at firms producing for export. But most of the new jobs are low paid with poor working conditions. "Even after doubling between 2002-2005, the average manufacturing wage in China was only 60 US cents an hour, compared with $2.46 an hour in Mexico."(¹²)

A recent report on labor practices in China by Verite Inc., a U.S. company that advises transnational corporations on responsible business practices, found that "systemic problems in payment practices in Chinese export factories consistently rob workers of at least 15% of their pay."(¹³) Workplace safety is an even greater problem. According to official Chinese government sources, about 200 million workers labor under "hazardous" conditions. "Every year there are more than 700,000 serious work-related injuries nation-wide, claiming 130,000 lives."(¹⁴)

One critical but often overlooked explanation for China's manufacturing competitiveness is that approximately 70% of manufacturing work is done by migrants. Over the last 25 years, some 150-200 million Chinese have moved from the countryside to urban areas in search of employment.

Although the great majority of these migrant workers have moved legally, they suffer enormous discrimination. For example, because they remain classified as rural residents under the Chinese registration system, not only must they pay steep fees to register as temporary urban residents, they also have no rights to the public services available to urban born residents (including free or subsidized education, health care, housing and pensions). The same is true for their children, even if they are born in an urban area.

As a consequence migrant workers are easily exploitable. They typically work 11 hours a day, 26 days a month. Most receive no special overtime pay and commonly earn one-quarter to one-half of what urban residents receive.(¹⁵)

The overall effectiveness of Chinese labor policies (which are primarily designed to boost export competitiveness) is well illustrated by recent trends in wages and consumption. Chinese wages as a share of GDP have fallen from approximately 53% of Gross Domestic Product in 1992 to less than 40% in 2006. Private consumption as a percent of GDP has also declined, falling from approximately 47% to 36% over the same period. By comparison, private consumption as a share of GDP is over 50% in Britain, Australia, Italy, Germany, India, Japan, France, and South Korea; it is over 70% in the United States.(¹⁶)

As the Economist states, "the decline in the ratio of consumption to GDP . . . is largely explained by a sharp drop in the share of national income going to households (in the form of wages, government transfers and investment income), while the shares of profits and government revenues have risen." In fact, according to the Economist, "Many countries have seen a fall in the share of labor income in recent years, but nowhere has the drop been as huge as in China."(¹⁷)

A vicious cycle is at work here: the lower the share of income going to workers, the more economic forces reinforce the export orientation of the Chinese economy, which encourages the implementation of new policies to suppress worker standards of living.

To be sure, China's growth and industrial transformation has also generated great wealth - leading to an explosion of inequality and the formation (or solidification) of new class relations. An Asian Development Bank study of 22 East Asian developing countries concluded that China had become the region's second most unequal country, trailing only Nepal. This is not surprising considering that over a roughly ten-year period (from the early 1990s to the early 2000s) China recorded the region's second highest increase in inequality, again trailing only Nepal.(¹⁸)

While the results of the Asian Development Bank study are significant, they do not adequately convey the real concentration of wealth that has accompanied and motivated China's market reform program. According to the Boston Consulting Group, China had 250,000 U.S. dollar millionaire households (excluding the value of primary residence) in 2005, the sixth greatest national total in the world. Although this group made up only 0.4% of China's total households, it held 70% of the country's wealth.(¹⁹)

According to a yearly listing of China's richest people, the number of U.S. dollar billionaires has grown from one in 1999 to 106 in 2007 (more than any other country except the United States).(²⁰) China's nouveau riche have not been shy about spending their money: "LVMH Moët Hennessy Louis Vuitton, the world's largest luxury goods maker, plans to open two to three stores a year in China, where sales are rising 50% annually. Financièr Richemont, the world's second-biggest, expects to quadruple sales in China within five years by selling more Cartier jewelry and Piaget watches."(²¹)

There are clear signs that the Communist Party is becoming concerned that widening income (and consumption) inequalities are adding fuel to growing popular anger over deteriorating employment, health, housing, environmental and retirement conditions. And with good reason: the number of large scale "public order disturbances" has grown from 58,000 in 2003, to 74,000 in 2004, 87,000 in 2005, and an estimated 94,000 in 2006.(²²) Particularly worrisome to the leadership is the increasingly effective and militant strike activity at foreign-owned export factories (despite the fact that strikes remain illegal in China).

As repression has failed to stem the rising tide of protest, the Party has also begun to initiate a number of reform efforts. These are designed to ameliorate the worst excesses generated by China's growth strategy without radically changing its orientation. For example, the central government approved a new Labor Contract Law which came into force on January 1, 2008.(²³) Both the European and U.S. Chambers of Commerce bitterly opposed this effort and intervened heavily during the drafting stage in a successful effort to reduce its scope.

The approved law requires, among other things, that all employers provide their workers with a written contract (something that a majority of workers either do not have or have never seen) that specifies the terms of employment and includes pension and insurance benefits. The new law also requires that companies pay a premium for overtime and weekend work.

While the new law has generated a sharp increase in arbitration cases (most of which involve non-payment of wages and overtime premiums), its impact on employment conditions appears limited (even in the areas it was intended to address).(²⁴) Many companies are circumventing the law by reducing their employment of "regular" workers (some did so before the law went into effect), relying instead on workers provided by labor dispatch companies or increasing their use of subcontracting relationships.

Some companies now pay workers their contracted salaries and respect vacation and overtime standards, but then undermine worker gains by increasing what the same workers must pay for company-provided dormitories and canteen meals. Some foreign-owned companies are threatening to shift production to a different location within or even outside of China if workers press their demands too aggressively.

In addition, the many-layered official dispute resolution process remains slow and costly, making it difficult for workers to force unwilling companies to comply with the higher standards contained in the new law. Finally, and most importantly, the new law still allows local governments, and thus employers, to differentiate between urban born and migrant workers; the latter continue to be denied unemployment and other employment-based social security benefits.

A major reason that many in the leadership of the Communist Party remain unwilling to support fundamental changes in China's current growth strategy, despite its devastating effects on working people, is that they have been among its biggest beneficiaries. Their ability to shape the reform process has enabled them to use state assets for personal gain, place family and friends in lucrative positions of authority in both the state and private sector, and ensure that the rapidly growing capitalist class remains dependent on the Party's good will.

This, in turn, has led to a fusion of party-state-capitalist elites around a shared commitment to continue the advance of a capitalist political economy with "Chinese characteristics."

The results of this development are easy to see. Many of the children of leading party officials (known as the "princelings") were appointed to key positions in "China's most strategic and profitable industries: banking, transportation, power generation, natural resources, media, and weapons. Once in management positions, they get loans from government-controlled banks, acquire foreign partners, and list their companies on Hong Kong or New York stock exchanges to raise more capital. Each step of the way the princelings enrich themselves - not only as major shareholders of the companies, but also from the kickbacks they get by awarding contracts to foreign firms." Not surprisingly, more than 90% of China's richest 20,000 people are reported to be "related to senior government or Communist Party officials."(²⁵)

China's elite has been willing to share the fruits of the country's production with international capital - although struggles over distributional issues are growing sharper as international capital strengthens its position within China - because international capital's participation has been critical to the establishment and continued growth of China's new political economy. China's elite, however, appears determined to ensure that they will be the primary national claimant.

Thus, at the same time that the "Chinese Communist Party has opened up an unprecedented number of sectors for foreign-equity participation . . . the authorities have . . . tightened control over other aspects of the economy. This has resulted in the truncation, if not atrophy, of thousands of [small and medium sized] private firms. These are in danger of being edged out by powerful monopolies and oligopolies that are controlled either by the party-and-state apparatus or by senior cadres and their offspring."(²⁶)

In sum, it appears that those driving China's economic strategy have been remarkably successful in using the reforms to shape an accumulation process responsive to their interests. And consistent with the underlying capitalist nature of this process, their gains have come at ever greater cost to the majority of Chinese working people.

As a result, Chinese leaders must now contend with an explosion of strikes and demonstrations. It remains to be seen whether such actions will threaten future foreign investment and export production, two of the most important pillars upholding China's growth strategy. Regardless of what happens, it is difficult to see on what basis progressives would want to celebrate and promote China's reform experience.

Market reforms and transnational accumulation
Many on the left believe that the combination of China's size and pattern of growth along with the (self-proclaimed) socialist (or at least anti-imperialist) orientation of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party mean that China will soon be capable of anchoring a new, more progressive international economic order.

This belief tends to be buttressed by the following reasoning: China has maintained (and can be expected to sustain) high rates of growth for decades. Because this growth is highly import dependent, it supports the export production and thus economic growth of China's trading partners (especially in East Asia but also in Latin America and Africa).

Moreover, China's export success has enabled the country to build up its own huge foreign exchange holdings, which the government is increasingly using to help its Latin American and African trading partners finance needed (infrastructure) modernization.

This vision of China as a powerful and positive agent for international change is attractive but flawed. In most cases, it is the result of using a nation-state lens to understand Chinese accumulation dynamics. The reality is that China's economic transformation is not occurring in a vacuum or solely in response to Chinese initiatives.

Rather, East Asia's economies, including that of China, are being linked and collectively reshaped by broader transnational capitalist dynamics, in particular by the establishment and intensification of cross-border production networks organized by transnational corporations. As a result, China's own accumulation dynamics are increasingly being tied to dominant patterns of investment and trade, thereby reinforcing rather than offering an alternative to them.

Most immediately, the expansion of cross-border production networks has led to a significant increase in the trade dependency of all East Asian economies. One indicator of this trend: the region's export/GDP ratio grew from 24% in 1980 to 55% in 2005. By comparison, the world average in 2005 was only 28.5%.(²⁷) Further, a growing share of this activity is now under the control of transnational corporations; for example, they account for 73% of Malaysia's and 86% of Singapore's exports of manufactures.(²⁸)

More significantly, as a consequence of the operation of these networks, a rising share of East Asia's trade in manufactures is now in parts and components. This is illustrated by the changing trade composition of leading Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam).

The share of parts and components in the group's total exports of manufactures grew from 27.5% in 1992-3 to 40.3% in 2004-5.(²⁹) The import share of parts and components also grew substantially over the same period, from 32.6% to 48.5%. Trends are similar for Taiwan and Korea. For example, the export share of parts and components for Taiwan grew from 21.2% to 43.5%.

In addition, almost all the parts and components being traded by East Asian countries come from the same three industrial categories (with identical national rankings of importance): electronics machinery, office machines and automatic data processing, and telecommunications and sound recording. Moreover, these parts and components are increasingly being traded from one developing East Asian country to another; the intra-regional share of parts and components trade rose from 37.8% in 1992-3 to 55.6% in 2004-5.

In short, East Asian export production (itself a growing share of total national production) is increasingly narrowing not only to parts and components, but also to a select few operations in a select few industries in response to the needs of transnational corporate-controlled production networks.

China was not only pulled into this process of regional restructuring, it has become central to its functioning. In the words of the Asian Development Bank, "the increasing importance of intra-regional trade is attributed mainly to the parts and components trade, with the PRC functioning as an assembly hub for final products in Asian production networks."(³⁰)

China's unique position as the final production platform in this transnational structured regional production system is highlighted by the fact that it is the only country in the region that runs a regional trade deficit in parts and components.

As a consequence of this restructuring, East Asia's overall export activity has shifted away from the United States and the European Union and towards East Asia, and in particular China. On the other hand, China has shifted its export emphasis away from East Asia and towards the United States and the European Union.

Between 1992-3 and 2004-5, the East Asian share of China's final goods exports declined from 49.5% to 26.5%, while the OECD share (excluding Japan and Korea) increased from 29.3% to 50.1%.(³¹) In fact, China is now the region's largest exporter to the United States and the European Union in absolute and relative terms. Thus, the mirror image of China's surplus in trade with the United States and the European Union is its deficit in trade with East Asia.

As a result of this regional restructuring, China has become the first or second most important export market for almost all East Asian nations. This development has, as noted above, encouraged the belief that China's import dependent production will enable East Asian countries (and those in Latin America and Africa that also export to China) to "uncouple" from the U.S.-dominated international economic order.

However, since this trade activity largely involves an intra-regional trade of parts and components culminating in China-based production with final sales largely directed to the United States and the European Union, East Asia's overall dependence on developed capitalist markets has actually grown stronger rather than weaker. According to various estimates cited by the Asian Development Bank, it appears that the percentage of Asian exports consumed within Asia ranges from a high of 22% to a low of only 11%.(³²)

This regional perspective enables us to see more clearly the problematic nature of Chinese growth dynamics (for working people both inside and outside China). The most obvious problem is that China's continued growth (and thus the region's production) is now dependent on the ability of the United States to run ever greater trade deficits. Since it is doubtful that the U.S. economy can continue to sustain such large and growing deficits, it is difficult to see how China (and by extension the East Asian countries that provide China with parts and components) can avoid painful adjustments involving lower rates of growth and a further worsening of majority employment and living conditions.

Chinese growth dynamics remain problematic even if international trade imbalances can be sustained. For example, China's position as final assembly hub within numerous cross-border production chains has significantly weakened Chinese efforts at technological upgrading.

Surveying China's situation five years after the country's 2001 accession to the WTO, the Chinese economist Han Deqiang recalls that he had "argued the greatest damage [of membership] would be to China's capacity to control its industrial and technological development autonomously. I think it's safe to say these last five years have more than proven that true. In China, any industry that wants to develop its own technology or markets has encountered increasingly great barriers."(³³)

More problematic still is the fact that in order to maintain the country's key regional position in the face of competition from other countries seeking to improve their own position within cross-border value chains, the Chinese state has had to ensure that wages are kept low and productivity high.

One consequence of China's success is that transnational corporations throughout East Asia (and elsewhere) have been shifting their production to China to take advantage of its more profitable production conditions. This has led to lower rates of investment and growth throughout the region and the implementation of new labor regimes designed to weaken labor protections. As a result, workers throughout East Asia (and elsewhere) have become pitted against each other in a contest to match the level of labor exploitation achieved in China.(³⁴)

The problems for China's main Latin American and African trade partners are somewhat different but also serious. These countries supply China with primary commodities rather than manufactured parts and components. And China's large and growing need for these commodities has certainly boosted Latin American and African foreign exchange earnings and growth. These gains, however, come at significant long-term cost. Trade agreements with China, sometimes supported by Chinese financial assistance and foreign investment, reinforce existing structural imbalances by further strengthening the dominance of the primary commodity sector.(³⁵)

At the same time, Latin American and African efforts to build up manufacturing (and diversify exports) tend to be undermined by China's own export offensive. For example, close to 95% of all Latin American high technology exports face competition from China-based exporters. These threatened high technology exports represent almost 12% of all Latin American exports.(³⁶) Finally, of course, Latin American and African trade with China can also be expected to suffer if Chinese growth falters.

In sum, the market logic driving China's reform strategy promoted an economic transformation that allowed Chinese economic dynamics to become enmeshed in a broader process of transnational restructuring, one that accelerated the reforms in ways guaranteed to ensure the dominance of capitalist imperatives in China.

As a result, far from opening up new possibilities for working people, China's reform strategy has actually strengthened a transnational accumulation process that is generating serious national and international imbalances and tensions that will eventually require correction at considerable social cost.

Final thoughts
Several conclusions emerge from the above examination of the Chinese experience. First, China's market reform process has led not to a new form of (market) socialism, but rather to the restoration of capitalism (although "with Chinese characteristics"). Concretely, the Chinese growth process has given rise to a new political economy that is hostile to the goals of socialism, the promotion of all-rounded human development, solidaristic relations, cooperative planning and production for community needs, and collective or social ownership of productive assets.

Thus, the Chinese experience stands as a clear warning: socialism cannot be built through the use of markets and a closer integration with global capitalist accumulation dynamics. In fact, the confusion within the left over the nature of the Chinese experience suggests that there has been a loss of clarity about what constitutes socialism and appropriate criteria for evaluating progress towards building it.

Second, China's economic experience reveals much about contemporary capitalism. China is considered a model developer; the country has achieved a sustained and rapid rate of growth, attracted massive inflows of productive capital, and is exporting ever more sophisticated manufactured goods. Yet these accomplishments have not translated into meaningful gains for growing numbers of Chinese workers.

In fact, workers in China face labor and working conditions increasingly similar to those in Latin America and Africa, regions where most countries are considered development failures. Therefore, it appears that the answer to worker problems in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere for that matter, is not to be found in supporting policies designed to achieve "successful" capitalist development, especially those designed to replicate the Chinese experience.

Third, China's growth trajectory has become tied to and dependent upon existing accumulation processes shaped by transnational capitalist dynamics. As a result, China cannot be counted on to assist in the creation of a radically new economic system.

This does not mean that trade with China is to be avoided. It also does not mean that Chinese elites and western (especially U.S.) elites see eye to eye on all geopolitical issues. Capitalist competition is real and differences between these elites can and often does create openings that are helpful for the third world, especially for those countries under threat from the United States.

At the same time, since Chinese elite interests are structurally shaped by capitalist imperatives, there are limits to the types of changes that Chinese leaders can be expected to support. Caution is also in order, given the expected consequences from the imbalances and tensions generated by the above described transnational dynamics.

This critical perspective on the Chinese experience should not be taken as support for those analysts (many of whom write in the United States; some of whom are close to the U.S. labor movement) who view China as the primary cause of most economic problems. Their often repeated claim is that if only the Chinese government were forced to "abide" by the "free-market" rules of acceptable capitalist competition, all would be well in the world economy (and by extension for working people).

An implied assumption is that Chinese workers are enjoying real benefits from their country's "unfair" state interventions, and their employment and income gains are coming at the expense of workers in other countries, especially in the advanced capitalist countries (which are the main market for Chinese exports).

Tragically, this line of argumentation encourages workers outside of China to mistakenly believe that their enemy is China, rather than the system of capitalism that shapes their country's economic relationship to China and pits them against Chinese workers in a destructive competition. In fact, as we saw above, Chinese growth is increasingly dependent on the export activities of transnational corporations, many of which come from the advanced capitalist countries.

Moreover, despite - or in fact because of - their country's rapid growth, Chinese workers, like workers everywhere, are facing hard times. Decent jobs are scarce, social services are disappearing, inequality is growing, and competitive pressures demand ever greater sacrifices.

As noted above, growing numbers of people in China are openly and directly challenging their country's growth strategy. Even more noteworthy, these challenges are now fueling political discussions and debates (many of which are taking place on electronic chat rooms and bulletin boards) about the nature and significance of Mao era experiences and socialism.(³⁷) To this point, farmer and worker participants appear focused on refuting the false claims of ruling elites that the Mao period was both a social and economic disaster by drawing on their own life experiences to illustrate the accomplishments of that period, in particular employment and social security and a sense of national purpose.

This process of political renewal is taking place under very difficult conditions due, most importantly, to the ongoing repression of grassroots organizing and activism by the Communist Party. Additional challenges include tensions between immigrant and urban born state workers over jobs and access to social services; confusion caused by Chinese Community Party claims to be building socialism; and the fact that the strongest resistance to Party policies comes from those who continue to uncritically praise Maoism, despite the fact that Mao generally opposed farmer and worker self-organization and direct participation in political and economic decision-making.

Despite their current limitations, these struggles, discussions and debates represent a promising development, one that we can learn from and hopefully contribute to by finding ways to share our own understandings of socialism and experiences in movement building with Chinese participants. It makes our own efforts to better understand the nature of the Chinese reform experience ever more important.

* While a majority of those on the left are now critical of China’s market reform strategy, a significant number of defenders remain. People want to believe that there are workable alternatives to neoliberalism, and belief in the progressive nature of China’s social transformation is no doubt encouraged by the fact that China continues to be demonized by the U.S. government; China makes loans to, invests in, and trades with Cuba and Venezuela; and the Chinese Communist Party still rules and publicly proclaims its commitment to socialism. More specifically, I have participated in international conferences and meetings where Cuban and Venezuelan economists have supported the Chinese market reform strategy and argued for adoption of similar policies in their own countries. Defenders of the Chinese growth process also continue to argue their position on numerous left internet discussion lists. The journal Critical Asian Studies had no trouble in organizing a roundtable in which several editors of the journal took issue with Paul Burkett and my critique of China’s market reform experience as expressed in our book China and Socialism, Market Reform and Class Struggle (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2005). The criticisms and then our response were published in the journal (Critical Asian Studies, September 2005 and December 2005). In addition, well known scholars such as Giovanni Arrighi, David Schweickart, and Immanuel Wallerstein continue to publish articles and books in which China’s rise as a non-capitalist/socialist power is celebrated. For a recent example of such writings see Giovanni Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century, London: Verso, 2007.

Notes

1. For a discussion of the reform process see Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett, China and Socialism, Market Reforms and Class Struggle (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2005), especially Chapter 2.

2. OECD, OECD Economic Surveys: China, OECD Economic Surveys, 2005, 29.

3. Data in this and the following paragraph come from Ibid, 133.

4. Ibid, 82.

5. Willy Lam, "China's Elite Economic Double Standard," Asia Times Online, 17 August 2007.

6. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness, New York: United Nations, 2002, 17.

7. Eva Cheng, "China: Foreign Capital Controls Three-quarters of Industry," Green Left Weekly, 18 May 2007.

8. John Whalley and Xian Xin, "China's FDI and non-FDI Economies and the Sustainability of Future High Chinese Growth," National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper Series, Number 12249, 2006; Tom Miller, "Manufacturing That Doesn't Compute," Asia Times Online, 22 November 2006.

9. Enrique Dussel Peters, Economic Opportunities and Challenges Posed by China for Mexico and Central America, Bonn, Germany: German Development Institute, 2005, 102.

10. Ajit K. Ghose, "Employment in China," International Labor Organization, Employment Analysis Unit, Employment Strategy Papers, 2005.

11. China Labor Bulletin, "Subsistence Living for Millions of Former State Workers, 7 September 2005.

12. John S. McClenahen, "Outsourcing," IndustryWeek.com, 1 July 2006.

13. Craig Simons, "New Labor Movement Afoot in China," Statesmen, 4 February 2007.

14. China Labor Bulletin, "Migrant Workers in China," June 2008.

15. Ibid. In 2005, the central government gave local governments the authority to reform the registration system, including ending distinctions between rural and urban residents. The great majority have refused to make any changes; most local officials are closely allied with local business interests and do not want to jeopardise enterprise (or their own personal) profitability.

16. The Economist, "A Workers' Manifesto for China," 11 October 2007.

17. Ibid.

18. Asian Development Bank, Inequality in Asia, Key Indicators 2007, Special Chapter Highlights, Manila: Asian Development Bank, 2007, 3, 6.

19. Wu Zhong, "China's 'Most Wanted' Millionaires," Asia Times Online, 19 September 2007.

20. Robin Kwong, "China's Billionaires Begin to Add Up," Financial Times, 22 October 2007.

21. Samuel Shen, "For China, A Full Embrace of Luxury, High-end Retailers Take Aim at Mainland's Monied Class," International Herald Tribune, 16 October 2006.

22. Bruce Einhorn, "In China, A Winter of Discontent," BusinessWeek, 30 January 2008.

23. Ariana Eunjung Cha, "New Law Gives Chinese Workers Power, Gives Businesses Nightmares," Washington Post, 14 April 2008.

24. International Trade Union Confederation, "China: Some Steps Forward, but Trade-Related Worker Exploitation Persists," 21 May 2008; Kinglun Ngok, "The Changes of Chinese Labor Policy and Labor Legislation in the Context of Market Transition," International Labor and Working Class History, Spring 2008.

25. Peter Kwong, "The Chinese Face of Neoliberalism," Counterpunch, 7/8, October 2006.

26. Lam, "China's Elite Economic Double Standard."

27. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2007: Growth Amid Change, Hong Kong: Asian Development Bank, 2007, 68.

28. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2006, Hong Kong: Asian Development Bank, 2006, 273.

29. Data in this and the following paragraph come from Prema-chandra Athukorala and Nobuaki Yamashita, "Production Fragmentation in Manufacturing Trade: The Role of East Asia in Global Production Networks," in Filippo di Mauro, Warwick McKibbin and Stephane Dees (eds.), Globalization, Regionalization and Economic Interdependence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.

30. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2008, Workers in Asia, Hong Kong: Asian Development Bank, 2008, 22.

31. Prema-chandra Athukorala, "The Rise of China and East Asian Export Performance: Is the Crowding-out Fear Warranted?" Australian National University, Division of Economics, Working Paper No. 2007/10, September 2007.

32. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2007, 70.

33. Stephen Philion, "The Social Costs of Neoliberalism in China, Interview With Economist Han Deqiang," Dollars & Sense, July/August 2007. For a more detailed discussion of the negative consequences of the reforms on China's technological capacities see Martin Hart-Landsberg, "The Chinese Market Reform Experience, A Critical Assessment," forthcoming.

34. Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook 2007, 32-3; Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett, "China, Capital Accumulation, and Labor," Monthly Review, May 2007.

35. He Li, "Red Star Over Latin America," NACLA, September-October 2007; Eva Cheng, "Is China Africa's New Imperialist Power?" Green Left Weekly, 2 March 2007.

36. Kevin P. Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, "Climbing up the Technology Ladder? High-technology Exports in China and Latin America," Center for Latin American Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper 20, 2008, 14.

37. For a discussion of this development see Mobo Gao, The Battle for China's Past, Mao and the Cultural Revolution. Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2008.