If Socialism Fails: The Spectre of 21st Century Barbarism

Ian Angus
Climate and Capitalism
July 27, 2008

Ian Angus is a socialist and ecosocialist activist in Canada. He joined the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1962 and then the Young Socialists in Ottawa in 1964. He was active in the YS and the League for Socialist Action into the 1970s. Angus is the founder and director of Socialist History Project and the managing editor of Socialist Voice and the editor of Climate and Capitalism. He is also a founding member and Coordinating Committee Member of Ecosocialist International Network and is a member of Canadian Dimension editorial collective. His writings include Canadian Bolsheviks: The Early Years of the Communist Party of Canada.

The following is an article in the book The Global Fight for Climate Justice Anticapitalist Responses to Global Warming and Environmental Destruction , edited by Angus.

From the first day it appeared online, Climate and Capitalism’s masthead has carried the slogan “Ecosocialism or Barbarism: there is no third way.” We’ve been quite clear that ecosocialism is not a new theory or brand of socialism – it is socialism with Marx’s important insights on ecology restored, socialism committed to the fight against ecological destruction. But why do we say that the alternative to ecosocialism is barbarism?

Marxists have used the word “barbarism” in various ways, but most often to describe actions or social conditions that are grossly inhumane, brutal, and violent. It is not a word we use lightly, because it implies not just bad behaviour but violations of the most important norms of human solidarity and civilized life.[1]

The slogan “Socialism or Barbarism” originated with the great German revolutionary socialist leader Rosa Luxemburg, who repeatedly raised it during World War I. It was a profound concept, one that has become ever more relevant as the years have passed.

Rosa Luxemburg spent her entire adult life organizing and educating the working class to fight for socialism. She was convinced that if socialism didn’t triumph, capitalism would become ever more barbaric, wiping out centuries of gains in civilization. In a major 1915 antiwar polemic, she referred to Friedrich Engels’ view that society must advance to socialism or revert to barbarism and then asked, “What does a ‘reversion to barbarism’ mean at the present stage of European civilization?”

She gave two related answers.

In the long run, she said, a continuation of capitalism would lead to the literal collapse of civilized society and the coming of a new Dark Age, similar to Europe after the fall of the Roman Empire: “The collapse of all civilization as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration – a great cemetery.” (The Junius Pamphlet) [2]

By saying this, Rosa Luxemburg was reminding the revolutionary left that socialism is not inevitable, that if the socialist movement failed, capitalism might destroy modern civilization, leaving behind a much poorer and much harsher world. That wasn’t a new concept – it has been part of Marxist thought from its very beginning. In 1848, in The Communist Manifesto, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels wrote: “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. … that each time ended, either in the revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.” (emphasis added)

In Luxemburg’s words: “Humanity is facing the alternative: Dissolution and downfall in capitalist anarchy, or regeneration through the social revolution.” (A Call to the Workers of the World)

Capitalism’s two faces
But Luxemburg, again following the example of Marx and Engels, also used the term “barbarism” another way, to contrast capitalism’s loudly proclaimed noble ideals with its actual practice of torture, starvation, murder and war.

Marx many times described the two-sided nature of capitalist “progress.” In 1853, writing about the British colonial regime in India, he described the “profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization [that] lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked.” Capitalist progress, he said, resembled a “hideous, pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from the skulls of the slain.” (The Future Results of British Rule in India)

Similarly, in a speech to radical workers in London in 1856, he said:

On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and scientific forces, which no epoch of the former human history had ever suspected. On the other hand, there exist symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors recorded of the latter times of the Roman Empire. (Speech at the Anniversary of the People’s Paper)

Immense improvements to the human condition have been made under capitalism – in health, culture, philosophy, literature, music and more. But capitalism has also led to starvation, destitution, mass violence, torture and even genocide – all on an unprecedented scale. As capitalism has expanded and aged, the barbarous side of its nature has come ever more to the fore.

Bourgeois society, which came to power promising equality, democracy, and human rights, has never had any compunction about throwing those ideals overboard to expand and protect its wealth and profits. That’s the view of barbarism that Rosa Luxemburg was primarily concerned about during World War I. She wrote:

Shamed, dishonoured, wading in blood and dripping in filth, this capitalist society stands. Not as we usually see it, playing the roles of peace and righteousness, of order, of philosophy, of ethics – as a roaring beast, as an orgy of anarchy, as pestilential breath, devastating culture and humanity – so it appears in all its hideous nakedness …

A look around us at this moment shows what the regression of bourgeois society into barbarism means. This world war is a regression into barbarism. (The Junius Pamphlet)

For Luxemburg, barbarism wasn’t a future possibility. It was the present reality of imperialism, a reality that was destined to get much worse if socialism failed to stop it. Tragically, she was proven correct. The defeat of the German revolutions of 1919 to 1923, coupled with the isolation and degeneration of the Russian Revolution, opened the way to a century of genocide and constant war.

In 1933, Leon Trotsky described the rise of fascism as “capitalist society … puking up undigested barbarism.” (What is National Socialism?)

Later he wrote: “The delay of the socialist revolution engenders the indubitable phenomena of barbarism – chronic unemployment, pauperization of the petty bourgeoisie, fascism, finally wars of extermination which do not open up any new road.” (In Defense of Marxism)

More than 250 million people, most of them civilians, were killed in the wars of extermination and mass atrocities of the 20th Century. The 21st century continues that record: in less than eight years over three million people have died in wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Third World, and at least 700,000 have died in “natural” disasters.

As Luxemburg and Trotsky warned, barbarism is already upon us. Only mass action can stop barbarism from advancing, and only socialism can definitively defeat it. Their call to action is even more important today, when capitalism has added massive ecological destruction, primarily affecting the poor, to the wars and other horrors of the 20th Century.

That view has been expressed repeatedly and forcefully by Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez. Speaking in Vienna in May 2006, he referred explicitly to Luxemburg’s words:

The choice before humanity is socialism or barbarism. … When Rosa Luxemburg made this statement, she was speaking of a relatively distant future. But now the situation of the world is so bad that the threat to the human race is not in the future, but now. [3]

A few months earlier, in Caracas, he argued that capitalism’s destruction of the environment gives particular urgency to the fight against barbarism today:

I was remembering Karl Marx and Rosa Luxemburg and the phrase that each one of them, in their particular time and context put forward; the dilemma “socialism or barbarism.” …

I believe it is time that we take up with courage and clarity a political, social, collective and ideological offensive across the world – a real offensive that permits us to move progressively, over the next years, the next decades, leaving behind the perverse, destructive, destroyer, capitalist model and go forward in constructing the socialist model to avoid barbarism and beyond that the annihilation of life on this planet.

I believe this idea has a strong connection with reality. I don’t think we have much time. Fidel Castro said in one of his speeches I read not so long ago, “tomorrow could be too late, let’s do now what we need to do.” I don’t believe that this is an exaggeration. The environment is suffering damage that could be irreversible – global warming, the greenhouse effect, the melting of the polar ice caps, the rising sea level, hurricanes – with terrible social consequences that will shake life on this planet. [4]

Chavez and the revolutionary Bolivarian movement in Venezuela have proudly raised the banner of 21st Century Socialism to describe their goals. As these comments show, they are also raising a warning flag, that the alternative to socialism is 21st Century Barbarism – the barbarism of the previous century amplified and intensified by ecological crisis.

Climate change and ‘barbarization’
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been studying and reporting on climate change for two decades. Recently the Vice-Chair of the IPCC, Professor Mohan Munasinghe, gave a lecture at Cambridge University that described “a dystopic possible future world in which social problems are made much worse by the environmental consequences of rising greenhouse gas emissions.”

He said: “Climate change is, or could be, the additional factor which will exacerbate the existing problems of poverty, environmental degradation, social polarisation and terrorism and it could lead to a very chaotic situation.”

“Barbarization,” Munasinghe said, is already underway. We face “a situation where the rich live in enclaves, protected, and the poor live outside in unsustainable conditions.” [5]

A common criticism of the IPCC is that its reports are too conservative, that they understate how fast climate change is occurring and how disastrous the effects may be. So when the Vice-Chair of the IPCC says that “barbarization” is already happening, no one should suggest that it’s an exaggeration.

The present reality of barbarism
The idea of 21st Century Barbarism may seem farfetched. Even with food and fuel inflation, growing unemployment and housing crises, many working people in the advanced capitalist countries still enjoy a considerable degree of comfort and security.

But outside the protected enclaves of the global north, the reality of “barbarization” is all too evident.

• 2.5 billion people, nearly half of the world’s population, survive on less than two dollars a day.
• Over 850 million people are chronically undernourished and three times that many frequently go hungry.
• Every hour of every day, 180 children die of hunger and 1200 die of preventable diseases.
• Over half a million women die every year from complications of pregnancy and childbirth. 99% of them are in the global south.
• Over a billion people live in vast urban slums, without sanitation, sufficient living space, or durable housing.
• 1.3 billion people have no safe water. 3 million die of water-related diseases every year.

The United Nations Human Development Report 2007-2008 warns that unmitigated climate change will lock the world’s poorest countries and their poorest citizens in a downward spiral, leaving hundreds of millions facing malnutrition, water scarcity, ecological threats, and a loss of livelihoods. [6]

In UNDP Administrator Kemal Dervi’s words: “Ultimately, climate change is a threat to humanity as a whole. But it is the poor, a constituency with no responsibility for the ecological debt we are running up, who face the immediate and most severe human costs.” [7]

Among the 21st Century threats identified by the Human Development Report:

• The breakdown of agricultural systems as a result of increased exposure to drought, rising temperatures, and more erratic rainfall, leaving up to 600 million more people facing malnutrition.
• An additional 1.8 billion people facing water stress by 2080, with large areas of South Asia and northern China facing a grave ecological crisis as a result of glacial retreat and changed rainfall patterns.
• Displacement through flooding and tropical storm activity of up to 332 million people in coastal and low-lying areas. Over 70 million Bangladeshis, 22 million Vietnamese, and six million Egyptians could be affected by global warming-related flooding.
• Expanding health risks, including up to 400 million more people facing the risk of malaria.

To these we can add the certainty that at least 100 million people will be added to the ranks of the permanently hungry this year as a result of food price inflation.

In the UN report, former South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu echoes Munasinghe’s prediction of protected enclaves for the rich within a world of ecological destruction:

While the citizens of the rich world are protected from harm, the poor, the vulnerable and the hungry are exposed to the harsh reality of climate change in their everyday lives…. We are drifting into a world of “adaptation apartheid.”

As capitalism continues with business as usual, climate change is fast expanding the gap between rich and poor between and within nations, and imposing unparalleled suffering on those least able to protect themselves. That is the reality of 21st Century Barbarism.

No society that permits that to happen can be called civilized. No social order that causes it to happen deserves to survive.

Notes
1 In “Empire of Barbarism” (Monthly Review, December 2004), John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark provide an excellent account of the evolution of the word “barbarism” and its present-day implications.

The best discussion of Rosa Luxemburg’s use of the word is in Norman Geras, The Legacy of Rosa Luxemburg (NLB 1976), which unfortunately is out of print.

2 The works of Marx, Engels, Luxemburg and Trotsky that are quoted in this article can be found online in the Marxists Internet Archive, www.marxists.org/

3 Hands Off Venezuela, May 13, 2006

4 Green Left Weekly, August 31, 2005

5 “Expert warns climate change will lead to ‘barbarisation’” Guardian, May 15, 2008

6 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 2007/2008

7 “Climate change threatens unprecedented human development reversals.” UNDP News Release, Nov. 27, 2007

低消費高福利：通往生態文明之路

文佳筠
《綠葉》雜誌
2009年 第3期

文佳筠，留美學者，就職於全球化國際論壇 (International Forum on Globalization)，著有《使少數人富起來的改革——中國與通往經濟全球化之路》 (www.wyzxsx.com/ebook/002.doc)。

摘要：人類改變現行的消費方式和生活方式，刻不容緩。但是追逐消費的觀念和資本主導一切的邏輯，卻如天羅地網般阻礙綠色生活方式的生存更甭提普及。必須實現從生產到生活到社會關係的全面轉型，和諧社會、生態文明才有可能成功構建。

一、轉變消費—生活方式的迫切性
改變現行的消費方式和生活方式，是人類刻不容緩的任務，人們對此的懷疑已經越來越少了。在這裡，我僅僅從地球生物承載力和生態足跡這個角度再明確強調一下。

地球的生物承載力是指能滿足人類需求的、可用的、具生物生產力的土地面積，包括農田、牧場、森林和漁場。生態足跡是按照生物學上一個地區的生產性土地和海洋供人類使用和吸納經人類使用後產生的廢物所需要的資源，來衡量人類對大自然的需求。生物承載力和生態足跡通常以地球公頃為計量單位；全球平均1公頃土地所能生產的資源和吸收的廢物，就被稱為「1地球公頃」單位。下表中的數據來自於世界自然基金會（WWF）、倫敦動物學會（Zoological Society of London）、全球足跡網絡（Global Footprint Network）聯合發佈的《生命行星報告2006》 (Living Planet Report 2006)。


上表令我們一目瞭然的是，從全球來講，把餅做大的空間已經不存在了，人類的生態足跡已經超出了地球負荷25%，我們早已不再依靠自然的「利息」生存，而是在揮霍大自然的「本金」。即使如美國，地多人少，仍然超載100%以上。照目前這種消耗生態資源的速率走下去，發生生態系統全面崩潰的可能性不可避免。2007年無錫水危機，淮河支流沙穎河沿岸的癌症村，越來越向北京逼近的沙漠，諸多現象，都是中國生態系統局部崩潰的表現。

人類的生產方式和消費方式是不可持續的，必須迅速改變。自然界對人類的報復，日益明顯。除去原有的生態災難，近年來，氣候危機的陰影開始籠罩地球，看似無毒無害的二氧化碳，竟然成為人類的頭號環境敵人。

美國奧巴馬新政府公開承認氣候危機的緊迫性並倡導發展低碳經濟，這是比小布什政府進步之處。但是在倡導低碳經濟的同時，奧巴馬政府又向美國人民許諾，要讓他們繼續過那種既有的美國式生活，住大房子開大汽車的生活。這完全是自相矛盾的。單從資源能源利用的效率來講，今天的美國比50年前高效得多。可是，隨著效率的提高，房子越來越大（美國戶均住房面積比50年前增長了一倍），車子從經濟型的小車換成了SUV，從一家一車變成一家兩車甚至更多，結果資源能源用得更多。與此同時，自我感覺幸福的美國人占總人口的比例，從上世紀70年代就進入平台期，近年來甚至有一些下降。僅僅採用新技術，而不改變美國人消費主義的生活方式，怎麼能真正實現減排、避免生態災難？

近年來，中國政府開始超越單純的GDP發展觀，轉而倡導科學發展觀，主張可持續發展，要構建資源節約環境友好型社會，促進人與人、人與自然和諧共處的新型文明——生態文明。這一理念（更具體地說是發展理念）的轉變是令人鼓舞的。尤其是近期來，中國政府更進一步明確提出要加快轉變經濟增長方式。但是問題是，僅僅轉變經濟發展方式，是不足以完成向資源節約環境友好型社會的轉變的。在中國，儘管人與資源環境的關係「高度緊張」，但是長期以來人們對住大房子開大汽車的美國夢的嚮往卻是空前熱烈。即使真正實現了產業的升級優化，即使擴大了內需——而非依賴現在的「兩高一資」的外向型經濟，只要中國人的美國夢一如既往，可以預計：可持續發展依舊是鏡花水月。從上面圖表中的數據可以推算出，要滿足全體中國人過上美國式的生活，至少需要1.12個地球。但無論是接軌，還是發揮比較優勢，還是「大國崛起」，或者什麼主義和辦法，都不可能變出1.12個地球給中國。

可持續發展，離不開可持續消費，必須探索一條低消費高福利的發展之路。胡錦濤主席在十七大報告中強調：「建設生態文明，基本形成節約能源資源和保護生態環境的產業結構、增長方式、消費模式。」將產業結構、增長方式、消費模式並列在一起，決不是一閃之念，而是深謀遠慮之見。

二、消費主義的誤區
由全球資本主義所主導的人類社會，遵循著兩個原則。在生產領域，是企業的無止境的積累原則，為了追求利潤不斷地擴大再生產。為了讓生產出來的產品有去處，輿論上就引導人們不斷地追逐消費。所謂「能掙會花」的宣傳，實質上把生活等同於消費，用消費取代了生活。正常的生理需求變成了消費競賽，人異化為一種消費動物。人們瘋狂地、辛苦地工作，就是為了享受那所謂消費的歡愉。只有消費者，才是成功者。你比別人消費得多，你就比別人更成功；你比別人消費得少，你就是一個失敗者。其實眾多的研究證明，在滿足了最基本的溫飽之後，幸福感和消費基本上沒有關聯。過度消費並不能給人帶來更多的幸福，相反卻常常帶給人煩惱，即使暫不說其環境後果。2008年，一首叫做《那一年，我們都沒有錢》的詩在網上廣為流傳，引爆眾多網友爭曬美好記憶。這印證了不少社會學家早就發現的道理，幸福感並不隨著消費的增加而增加。

一個剛畢業不久的小姑娘，每月掙兩千塊，捨不得吃，捨不得租好房子，跟好幾個人擠在一個房間裡，辛辛苦苦省下錢來幹嘛了？花三千多去買新型的諾基亞手機，花幾千塊錢買LV的手提包。以犧牲健康、舒適為代價，換來一時的炫耀所帶來的對虛榮心的滿足。攀比無止境，面對花上萬元買更貴皮包者，虛榮心的滿足往往立刻變成沮喪。

我一個朋友，在京郊買了一棟別墅，榮登「別墅族」之列。可是一年當中，除了中秋節召集一幫人撮一頓外，根本沒有幾天趕去享受。物業費還要照樣交，一年下來差不多兩萬。別墅成了燙手山芋，現在想賣都賣不出去。

與對這些奢侈品的過度追求相反，人們對那些雖非奢侈但是對人的生活至關重要的綠色產品，卻又是極端輕視。同樣一個小姑娘，她常常會花幾百甚至幾千元錢去買一套所謂的高級護膚品，以圖達到美容養顏的目的。其實各式各樣的化妝品，不管是產自巴黎，還是北京郊區的某一個開發區的加工廠，它們的差別並不大，都是一些化工產品而已。它們對人的容顏的「呵護」微乎其微，有的甚至因為含有鉛化物而有相當的副作用。真正的「呵護」是由內而外的，這個內，除了睡眠、運動外，主要是由人的日常飲食決定的。綠色食品，由於其不用化肥農藥，投入了較多的人力，所以價格自然會比非綠色食品要高。比如，普通大米一塊一斤，綠色大米可能三四塊錢一斤。這個差價，對於許多對LV手提包和進口化妝品一擲千金的城裡人來說，其實是負擔得起的。可是，中國有機農產品，一半以上供出口——這其中的差價，大部分被中間商拿走，有機種植的農民得到的實惠很有限。中國農業大學的教授何慧麗組織蘭考農民合作社生產無公害大米。好大米生產出來了，在銷售的過程中卻困難重重，還惹來不少「違背市場規律」的嘲笑。人們寧願花一千塊錢買幾十毫升的化學合成劑；卻捨不得在善待農民的同時善待自己，多花一點錢買一袋好大米，這難道就是神聖的市場規律？

近些年來，中國城市中產階級的環保意識越來越強，這是一件好事，但同時他們往往意識不到自己對環境污染的「貢獻」。當中國入世的時候，多少城裡人為了汽車會因此降價而歡呼？中國越來越多的城市為了給小汽車開路，把主幹道對自行車封閉。推動這一政策的出籠，當然是買車的城市中產階級以及代表他們的利益集團。一個朋友一面抱怨著北京的空氣污染，一面說「打算對自己好一點，買了一輛車」，真是令人啼笑皆非。當我們用消費主義填補我們生活中的不滿意時，有沒有想到，每多一輛車，要增加多少能源消耗，廢氣排放？有多少土地會被鋪成馬路？多少農民會因此失去土地？大自然因此失去多少自淨化能力？私人汽車過多，代步工具反倒成了累贅。我一個朋友，為了錯過早晨的交通高峰，六點就起床，七點多開車趕到單位，代價是長期犧牲睡眠質量。在鋼筋水泥的森林裡穿行，開著車到健身館踩自行車鍛煉身體的生活，真的就那麼值得人神往嗎？這是我們真正想要的還是被消費主義製造出來的？

低消費，並不意味著低生活水平。高福利是彌補之道。其實，生活不僅僅是消費，人類有很多需求，決不是消費能夠代替或解決的。現在，金融危機一來，為了拉動市場需求，各地紛紛組織家電下鄉。農民真正需要什麼呢？十幾億人呆坐在一個大盒子面前，看著同樣的節目，這種「現代性」的可取之處到底有多少呢？湖北三農學者賀雪峰教授幾年前就提出，社會主義新農村建設應該是要建設一種「低消費、高福利」的不同於消費主義文化的生活方式，也就是要建設一種不用金錢作為生活價值主要衡量標準，卻可以提高農民滿意度的生活方式。他的研究團隊，在湖北幾個村幫助農民建立老年人協會，每人每天只投入平均一毛錢，就極大地增進了農村老年人之間的交往，提高了農村老年人閒暇生活的質量。老年人協會為老年人提供了老有所樂、老有所為的空間，使中青年人看得見未來的希望，從而降低了生活的貼現率，提高了合作的可能性。同時，中老年婦女自發組織的各種文化組織，如腰鼓隊、健美操隊，不僅給農民帶來了生活的情趣，而且使農村婦女有了生活的主體性，增加了村莊的社會資本。所有這些，都不是彩電冰箱之類的家電能夠取代的。毛澤東時代有人民體育、人民教育、大眾文化和大眾醫療的說法。農村改革，是伴隨著「我們的家鄉，在希望的田野上」的歌聲開始的。可是，將近三十年的經濟高速發展，儘管農民有了電扇電視之類，農村卻越來越成為讓年輕人無所留戀的空心村。究竟是什麼地方出了問題？我們應該如何重建希望的田野？這幾年政府大力重建農村合作醫療，大力投資農村基本教育，給社會主義新農村建設帶來了曙光。何慧麗、賀雪峰們的實踐，對進一步深化新農村建設有相當的啟發意義。

賀雪峰教授提出的低消費高福利的發展之路，不僅是中國農村的急需，也是全世界包括西方在內的急需。在中國一提到西方，很多人首先想到的是美國，美國＝西方。說句公道話，歐洲與美國還是有很大不同的。普通民眾對開大汽車住大房子的嚮往程度，在歐洲遠不及在中國。現在歐洲興起了一股「共享汽車運動」，充分提高一輛汽車的利用效率，由不同家庭不同的人一起使用，達到了節能減排的目的。越來越多的城市開闢了自行車專用道——中國越來越多的城市把主幹道對自行車封閉，完全是和可持續發展背道而馳。荷蘭首都阿姆斯特丹，是有名的自行車之城，我給幾個自行車停車場拍了照片。在國內參與公共活動時，我多次拿出這些照片詢問大家這是什麼地方。答案是東南亞某城市，或者十幾年前的中國某城市。當我說出正確的答案時，舉座嘩然。

即使在美國，對極端消費主義的反思和批判也要遠遠強於中國。一位美國朋友曾送我的一句話：「一個地球已經不可能再負擔富人。」（One earth cannot afford the rich any more.）——國內的「學者」們肯定會攻擊這是「仇富」的「民粹主義」運動。他是一位志願簡單生活運動（voluntary simplicity）的實踐者，而這個已經有上百萬人參與的運動，還在不斷壯大。為什麼越來越多的美國人加入到這一運動中？因為他們意識到，在滿足了基本的溫飽需要後，物質的增長往往並不能帶來更多的幸福感；與其成為金錢和物質的奴隸，不如滿足於簡單的生活，同時把精力投入到其他層面的追求中。設想，中國人以美國人的生活為富裕的標準，美國人又以比爾·蓋茨的生活為富裕的標準，有限的地球承擔得起如此龐大無限的慾望嗎？有出路嗎？我想起了志願簡單生活運動另一句著名的口號：「簡單生活，讓其他人能夠生活。」（Live simply，so others can simply live.）

三、阻礙消費方式轉變的制度因素
不過，對資本所主導的全球經濟發展模式所帶來的巨大負面環境影響，許多人自發降低自己生態足跡的努力，只是杯水車薪。因為個人或小群體的選擇和行動固然重要，但它的影響力根本不能和制度、規劃比擬。西方真正的環保主義者對過去幾十年環保運動有著清醒的反思：「我們贏得了一些戰役，但我們正在輸掉這場戰爭。」

比如，美國的許多城市是為小汽車設計的，而不是為行人設計的，沒有小汽車簡直寸步難行，這為人們選擇環保的出行方式帶來了巨大的限制和困難。同樣的兩個尋找職業者，有車者的尋找範圍很顯然就會大，而無車者因為公共交通不發達，尋找範圍自然就會小，結果可想而知。既然做一個環保踐行者的代價是如此巨大，那麼指望綠色生活運動會全民化，怎麼可能？

同樣的問題在北京也越來越明顯了。近年來，儘管北京在公共交通方面投入很大，但是對無車族卻越來越不方便。我認識的一位德國朋友，過去五六年內工作生活在北京，一直堅持騎自行車上班。幾年內她的住所和工作地點都沒有改變，但上下班所需要的時間卻越來越長，要繞的路越來越多。這主要是因為最近一些年的道路規劃越來越圍繞汽車而設計。就拿西直門一帶為例，西直門立交橋是汽車交通樞紐，其周圍則是公共交通樞紐。與私人汽車相比，這裡的公共交通的便捷性如何呢？假如你從西面乘公交車來要在西直門換乘地鐵，因為隔著巨大的立交橋，你只能在離地鐵車站很遠的地方下車——再往前就沒有路口和車站了。如果你再提著行李，那這一段路程就絕不會輕鬆。要是再碰上下雨，那會更加狼狽。私人汽車方便了，行人遭罪。記得作家張承志曾指出，北京的那些立交橋縱橫蔓延的巨大路口，在行人眼裡簡直就是「形如天塹」。面對這樣的公交系統，你又會做何種選擇呢？你還會熱衷於綠色出行嗎？顯然，類似的問題必須靠政府和制度來解決，單靠個人選擇是不夠的。

再講一個農村的例子。住房建設是目前中國農民最重要的消費支出。上世紀80年代中期到90年代初期發行的一套中國民居郵票，讓許多人瞭解到中國傳統民居建築是那麼多姿多彩，富有創造性。可是，在經濟越來越發達的今天，八億農民的住房卻越來越如出一轍。從四川到貴州，從江南到西藏，清一色的磚牆貼瓷磚，冬冷夏熱，缺乏抗震能力。而且蓋一棟這樣的房子，至少要消耗農民進城打工十年左右的積累。如果有一種住房能夠融環保、價廉、漂亮、牢固、冬暖夏涼於一體，那可能是中國農民的最佳選擇。中國台灣建築師謝英俊就為我們提供了這一選擇。謝英俊的建築，創造性地繼承了傳統（比如稻磚房土磚房之類），講究形態美，注重建築外觀與自然景致的融合。施工過程中，遵循生態環保原則，因地制宜，就地取材，主要使用無污染、可回收的天然建材如石頭、竹子、麥秸、稻草、木料等，最多輔以少量輕質鋼材。這種房子即使拆毀後，其材料或者可以繼續使用，或者被自然界分解掉，不會產生建築垃圾及污染，稱得上是貨真價實的「可持續建築」。

謝英俊的設計不僅材料成本低廉，人工成本也是如此。因為他在設計中盡可能地降低了施工技術含量，盡可能地去機械與工具化、專業化（設計除外），讓房主及其鄰里鄉親自己動手就可以完成大部分工序，而不需要求助於專門的建築施工隊。中國農村缺乏資金，但是不缺乏勞動力資源。這種合作建房，既為農民節省了資金，又使農民在建房中形成了一種新的社區關係，可謂一舉多得。

這樣一種近乎完美的建築模式，推廣過程中最大的困難是什麼？不是別的，是農民的認同。那麼多農民，明知道磚牆貼瓷磚的房子只是看起來光鮮，住起來冬冷夏熱，但為了攀比「現代化」和所謂的「洋氣」，寧可多花錢也要蓋這樣的房子。所幸的是，謝英俊的合作建房模式以及他所設計的稻磚房，現在開始在蘭考等地的農民合作社裡被推廣。這讓我們看到了突圍的希望。

結語
資本和消費主義主導的邏輯，阻礙著綠色消費和綠色生活的產生與普及。以人為本，還是以錢為本，這是擺在中國政府、中國社會、中國民眾面前的選擇。要想實現可持續發展，就必須實現從生產到生活到社會關係的全面轉型。一個以內需為主的經濟發展方式，不可能與一個忽視社會公正、兩極分化的社會共存；節能減排的生產模式，無法與住大房開大車的消費方式共存。諸種方面是互為因果互相促進的，離開了它們的全面發展，和諧社會、生態文明將勞而無功。在經濟危機和環境危機都愈演愈烈的今天，探索一條低消費高福利的發展之路，是中國和全世界的急需。

Once again on ‘The myth of the Tragedy of the Commons’ : a reply to criticisms and questions

Ian Angus

A reply to criticisms and questions about my article on Garrett Hardin’s influential essay.


November 3, 2008 -- The response to my recent article “The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons” (also posted at Links at http://links.org.au/node/595) has been very encouraging. It prompted a small flood of emails to my inbox, was reposted on many websites and blogs around the world, and has been discussed in a variety of online forums.

The majority of the comments were positive, but many readers challenged my critique of Garrett Hardin’s very influential 1968 essay, “The Tragedy of the Commons”. A gratifying number wrote serious and thoughtful criticisms. While they differed in specifics, these responses consistently made one or more of these three points:

How can you say that the tragedy of the commons is a myth? Look at the ecological destruction around us. Isn’t that tragic?

It doesn’t matter if Hardin’s account of the historical commons was wrong. He wasn’t writing history: he just used the commons as a model, or a metaphor.

Hardin wasn’t rejecting all commons, just “unmanaged commons”. A “managed commons” would not be subject to the tragedy.

This article responds to those points. Except under the first heading, I’ve tried to avoid repeating arguments I made in the first article, so if you haven’t already done so, I encourage you read it here first.

How can you say that?

Some respondents described ecological horrors and catastrophes — vanished fisheries, poisoned rivers, greenhouse gases, and more — and then said, in various ways, “The destruction of the world we all share is a terrible tragedy. How can you call it a myth?”

This question reflects an understandable problem with terminology. When Hardin wrote “The Tragedy of the Commons”, he wasn’t using the word “tragedy” in its normal everyday sense of a sad or unfortunate event. I tried to explain this in my article:

“Hardin used the word ‘tragedy’ as Aristotle did, to refer to a dramatic outcome that is the inevitable but unplanned result of a character’s actions. He called the destruction of the commons through overuse a tragedy not because it is sad, but because it is the inevitable result of shared use of the pasture”.

So the point is not whether ecological destruction is real. Of course it is. The point is, did Hardin’s essay correctly explain why that destruction is taking place? Is there something about human nature that is inimical to shared resources? Hardin said yes, and I say that’s a myth.

But it was only a model!

During the 1970s and 1980s, Hardin’s description of the historical commons was so thoroughly debunked by historians and anthropologists that he resorted to denying that he ever meant to be historically accurate. In 1991, he claimed that his account was actually a “hypothetical model” and “whether any particular case is a materialization of that model is a historical question — and of only secondary importance”. (Hardin 1991)

Similarly, an academic who called Hardin “one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century” wrote that his description of the traditional commons was a “thought experiment”, so criticism of his historical errors is irrelevant (Elliot 2003).

But Hardin offered no such qualification in his 1968 essay, or in the many books and articles he wrote on related subjects in the next 20 years. Quite the opposite, in fact.

In a 1977 essay, for example, Hardin referred explicitly to “the way the common pasture lands of England were converted to private property”, by parliamentary Enclosure Acts in the 1700s and 1800s. These Acts, he wrote, “put an end to the tragedy of the commons in this aspect of agriculture”. That’s a very explicit statement about historical facts — there’s nothing “hypothetical” about it (Hardin 1977: p. 46).

So Hardin’s later claim that historical facts don’t matter was an attempt to rewrite his own history. He only claimed the story was “just a model” after it had been thoroughly disproved.

But it was only a metaphor!

In his 1968 essay and many subsequent articles, Hardin lumped together very different social situations and problems, labelled them all “commons” and claimed that the “tragedy of the commons” explained them all. He argued that the destruction of the historical commons explained the collapse of fisheries, overcrowding in US national parks, air and water pollution, “distracting and unpleasant advertising signs”, overpopulation and even “mindless music” in shopping malls.

While his account is often labelled a metaphor, Hardin didn’t say that those situations were similar to commons. He said they were commons, and he repeatedly referred to their problems not as similar to but as aspects of the tragedy of the commons.

If all of those things were commons, then the fact that he was wrong about the historical “tragedy” completely undermines his core argument.

In reality, however, none of the examples he mentions are “commons” in any meaningful sense. Shopping malls and billboard locations are private property, with access controlled by the owners. National parks are managed or mismanaged by government bureaucrats. Unmanaged shared resources like air and water are being polluted by giant corporations, not by “rational herdsmen”. And Hardin’s claim that population growth results from a “commons in breeding” is just plain bizarre.

There’s no evidence that Hardin meant the “tragedy” to be seen as “only a metaphor” — but if he did, it was a very poor metaphor indeed.

He really meant the `unmanaged commons'

Several people suggested that Hardin was really criticising “unmanaged commons”, and thus presumably favoured a “managed commons”. The problem with that idea is that Hardin clearly thought that “managed commons” was a contradiction in terms.

In his original 1968 essay Hardin wrote that a commons “if justifiable at all, is only justifiable under conditions of low-population density”. As population grew, “the commons has had to be abandoned in one aspect after another”. The “tragedy of the commons” could only be avoided by abandoning the commons: either by converting it to private property, or by imposing external controls that effectively eliminate the sharing of resources.

He repeated that argument many times in later articles and books. In 1985, for example:

“A commons is a resource to which a population has free and unmanaged access: it contrasts with private property (access only to the owner) and with socialized property (access to which is controlled by managers appointed by some political unit)”. (Hardin 1985: p. 90.)

In short, Hardin defined the commons as unmanaged — so the claim that he was arguing for “managed commons” doesn’t make sense. When he argued for management, he was arguing for enclosing the commons.

He was more explicit in an article written to mark the 30th anniversary of his original essay: “A ‘managed commons’ describes either socialism or the privatism of free enterprise.” (Hardin, 1998.) Since he equated socialism with bureaucratic state control, it is clear that for him the “managed commons” was not a commons at all.

Several readers said they understood that Hardin later changed his mind, that he said the tragedy only occurred in “unmanaged commons”. One pointed to this sentence, in a speech Hardin gave in 1980:

“As a result of discussions carried out during the past decade I now suggest a better wording of the central idea: Under conditions of overpopulation, freedom in an unmanaged commons brings ruin to all”. (Hardin 1980.)

Note, however, that Hardin only says that this is “better wording”. There is nothing in this restatement of his “central idea” that doesn’t appear in the original essay. Far from recanting, he was trying to be more explicit.

In any event, as we’ve seen, five years later Hardin still defined the commons as unmanaged, so it’s evident that he only added the word “unmanaged” in 1980 to clarify his argument, not to change it.

(Nor did the addition of “under conditions of overpopulation” add anything to what he wrote in 1968. Since Hardin believed that overpopulation was the biggest problem in the Third World countries where most commons-based communities exist today, that qualification just reinforced his general anti-commons argument.)

What does `unmanaged' mean?

While Hardin’s later articles did not revise his original argument fundamentally, they did expand it in a way that provides an important insight into the way he thought about commons-based communities. In the 1980 speech quoted above, he accepted that an unmanaged commons can work if (a) “the informal power of shame” is used to keep people in line and (b) “the community does not exceed about 150 people”.

As evidence for these apparently arbitrary requirements, he cited the example of Hutterite religious communes. Between 40,000 and 50,000 people live in such communities in western Canada and the US: they hold all property in common, and communities normally divide in two when the population reaches 150 or so.

The issue of size is a red herring: many shared resource communities are much larger than the limit the Hutterites have chosen. But what’s truly remarkable here is that Hardin classified Hutterite colonies as unmanaged, with the “informal power of shame” as its only means of staving off the tragedy of the commons. Compare that to this account of Hutterite governance in Canada:

“Each colony elects an executive council from the managers of various enterprises, and together with the colony minister, the executive deals with important matters that will be brought before the assembly (all baptised male members — in effect, men 20 years of age and older). Although women have an official subordinate status, their informal influence on colony life is significant. They hold managerial positions in the kitchen, kindergarten, the purchase of dry goods, and vegetable production”. (Ryan 1999: p. 1125)

Obviously, the word “unmanaged” simply doesn’t apply to Hutterite communities. The fact that Hardin thought it did shows how limited his conceptions were. Anything that wasn’t either privately owned or controlled by the state was, by definition, “unmanaged”.

As Derek Wall points out, such blindness to non-capitalist social structures is widespread in mainstream social science:

“The commons is important because it provides a way of regulating activity without the state or the market…. Throughout history, the commons has been the dominant form of regulation providing an alternative almost universally ignored by economists who are reluctant to admit that substitutes to the market and the state even exist”. (Wall 2005: p. 184.)

Hutterite colonies don’t just share resources — they democratically organise and govern their communities to manage those resources. That was also true of the historical commons in Europe, and it’s true of Indigenous societies in many parts of the world today. As historian Peter Linebaugh writes:

“To speak of the commons as if it were a natural resource is misleading at best and dangerous at worst — the commons is an activity and, if anything, it expresses relationships in society that are inseparable from relations to nature”. (Linebaugh 2008: p. 279).

Hardin, like the economists Wall describes, looked at the world with capitalist blinders on. As a result, he couldn’t recognise a community-managed non-tragic commons when it was right before his eyes.

References

Angus, Ian. 2008. “The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons”, Climate and Capitalism, August 28, 2008. http://climateandcapitalism.com/?p=513. Also at Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal at http://links.org.au/node/595).

Elliot, Herschel. 2003. “The Revolutionary Import of Garrett Hardin’s Work”, http://tinyurl.com/5tokrk.

Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons”, http://tinyurl.com/o827.

Hardin, Garrett. 1977. “Denial and Disguise”, in Garrett Hardin and John Baden, editors, Managing the Commons. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, pp 45-52.

Hardin, Garrett. 1980. “An ecolate view of the human predicament”, http://tinyurl.com/t98c.

Hardin, Garrett. 1985. Filters Against Folly, How to Survive Despite Economists, Ecologists and the Merely Eloquent. New York: Viking Press.

Hardin, Garrett. 1991. “The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons: Population and the Disguises of Providence”, in Robert V. Andelson, editor, Commons Without Tragedy: Protecting the Environment from Over-Population - A New Approach. Savage MD: Barnes & Noble.

Hardin, Garrett. 1995. “Extension of the Tragedy of the Commons”, http://tinyurl.com/bow6h.

Linebaugh, Peter. 2008. The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for All. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Wall, Derek. 2005. Babylon and Beyond: The Economics of Anti-Capitalist, Anti-Globalist and Radical Green Movements. London: Pluto Books.

Ryan, John. 1999. “Hutterites”. in James Marsh, editor, The Canadian Encyclopedia, Year 2000 Edition. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, pp. 1124-1125.

公地的悲劇

加勒特 ‧ 哈丁 (Garrett Hardin)
英文：The Tragedy of the Commons by Garrett Hardin (1968)
《科學Science》162(1968):1243-1248頁
1968

J.B. Wiesner 和H.F. York在一篇關於核子戰爭前景的發人深省文章結尾時說：「武器競賽的雙方都是…面對持續增強的軍事力量和持續減弱的國家安全。深思之下，我們的專業意見認為這困局沒有技術性的解決辦法。如果大國只是在科學和科技這方面找尋解決辦法，結果只會令情況惡化。」

希望各位不要集中注意文章的主題（核武世界的國家安全），而是要留意作者的結論，即是問題沒有技術性的解決辦法。專業和半通俗科學期刊的評論，差不多都隱喻評論的問題是有技術性的解決辦法。技術性解決辦法可以定義為只要改變自然科學的技術，無需或只是稍為改變人的道德價值或概念。

我們現在一般都歡迎有技術性解決辦法（以前並非如此）。因為以前的預言往往失準，要有莫大勇氣才會斷言沒有預期的技術性解決辦法。Wiesner 和York表現出勇氣，在科學期刊發表文章，堅持問題不能在自然科學找到解決辦法。他們小心翼翼為聲明加上以下的註解：「深思之下，我們的專業意見…。」本文所關注的。不是他們是否正確，而是一個重要的觀點：有一組關乎人的問題可以稱為「沒有技術性解決辦法的問題」，或是更明確地說：認定和討論這些問題是其中之一。

要表明這類問題不是空號很容易。還記得劃井遊戲。想一想：「我如何贏劃井遊戲？」假設（依照賽局理論的慣例）我的對手是個中能手，大家都知道我不可能贏。換句話說，問題沒有「技術性解決辦法」。要贏，我只能把「贏」的意義根本改掉。我可以打對方的頭，可以弄虛作假。每一種我要「贏」的方法，都是某種意義上放棄了我們認知了解的遊戲。（我當然可以公開放棄—不玩。大多數成年人都這樣。）

「沒有技術性解決辦法的問題」有其他的命題。我的論題：大家慣常認知的「人口問題」是這樣的命題。要說明一下大家是怎樣慣常認知的。持平的說，大多數人為人口問題苦惱，要找出方法避免人口過多的邪惡，但不放棄他們正在享受的特權。他們以為海洋養殖或發明小麥新品種會解決問題—從技術方面。我嘗試証明他們不能找到解決辦法。人口問題正如要贏劃井遊戲，不能技術性解決。

我們要最大化什麼？

如馬爾薩斯 所言，人口自然地以「幾何級數」增加，或是我們現在的說法是函數增加。在一個有限的世界，這即是說世界物品的人均份額必然減少。我們的世界是否有限？

一個中肯的抗辯說法：世界是無限的，或是我們不知道世界不是無限。但是，從實際問題角度來看以後幾代人和可見的科技，很清楚如果我們不是即時假設陸上人類可用的世界是有限的，我們會大大增加人類的痛苦。「太空」不是逃生門。

有限的世界只能養活有限的人口；因此到了最後，人口增長必然是零。（零增長的永恆大幅度上下波動是無關宏旨的變動，不在此討論。）當條件符合，人類的情況會是怎樣？明確地說，邊泌 的目標：「最大數目的最大好處」能否實現？

不可能—理由有二，單是一個已足夠。第一個理由是理論性。數學上，兩個函數是不可能同時最大化。Neumann和Morgenstern已經清楚說明 ，其中的絕對原理是起碼可以追溯至D'Alembert (1717-1783) 的偏微分方程式。

第二個理由是直接源於生物事實。任何生物要生存，必須有一個能源來源（例如食物）。能源用於兩個目的：維生和工作。人要維持生命，每天需要 1600 千卡路里（維生卡路里）。維生以外所做的一切可以定義為工作，由攝取的「工作卡路里」支持。工作卡路里不是只用於我們日常談到的工作；所有享樂形式都需要：遊泳、賽車、音樂，吟詩。如果我們的目標是人口最大化，我們要做什麼是很明顯。我們要每個人的工作卡路里最接近零。沒有可口美食，沒有渡假，沒有運動，沒有音樂，沒有文學，沒有藝術…我以為無需爭議或實証，大家都同意人口最大化不會物品最大化。邊泌的目標是不可能的。

我在達成以上的結論時，作出一貫的假定，問題就是取得能源。有了核能，有些人會質疑這假定。但是，即使有無窮能源，人口增長依然帶來不可逃避的問題。正如J. H. Fremlin機智表達，取得能源的問題，被能源消散取而代之 。分析的算術符號正負倒轉；但邊泌的目標是不能達到。

因此，最合適的人口是少於最大。定義最合適的困難大；依我所知，沒有人曾鄭重處理這問題。要達致一個可接受和穩定的解決辦法，需要多過一代人的辛勤分析—和更大說服力。

我們期望每個人有最大好處；但什麼是「好處」？某人的好處是荒原，另一人是大眾的滑雪小屋。某人的好處是河口盛產水鴨，供獵人射擊；另一人是工廠用地。我們一般說比較各人的心頭好是不可能的，因為物品是不配比較。不配比較就是不能比較。

理論上這可能是對的；但實際生活中不配比較是可以衡量的。只需要一套判斷的標準和比重的制度。大自然的標準就是生存。何等物種較好：小而可掩藏，或是大而有勁力？物競天擇會比較不配比較的。達致的妥協是視乎大自然為眾多變數的價值作出比重。

人必須模仿這過程。無可置疑地，他事實上不自覺地已是如此。只有當隱藏的決定表面化時才有爭端。未來的工作難題是要作出一個可接受的比重理論。這項智力難題因協同作用，非線性變化，和考慮將來而變得困難，但（原則上）不是不可能解決。

至今，是否有任何文化組群解決了這實際問題，即使是直覺層面？一個簡單事實証明還沒有：現今世界沒有繁榮人口在一段時期內達致零增長。只要任何人在直覺上認定最佳點，就可以很快達到，之後增長率為零，其後亦保持為零。

當然，增長率為正數，可以作為人口在最佳點之下的證據。但是，以任何理性標準來看，今天世上增長最快的人口，（一般而言）是最悲慘的。這種連繫（無須是一成不變的）令人對所謂正數增長率表示人口還沒有達致最佳點的樂觀假定感到懷疑。

邁向人口最佳數目，我們要驅逐亞當‧史密的實踐人口學的幽靈，才可以取得寸進。「國富論」 (1776) 廣為宣揚「無形之手」，這概念即是個人「只是追求自己的利益」，因而「被無形的手指揮，推動…公眾利益。」亞當‧史密沒有宣稱這是一成不變的真理，甚至他的追隨者也沒有。但他帶動的主導思想趨勢自此干擾著基於理性分析的積極性行動。這種趨勢就是假定個人決定事實上是整個社會的最佳決定。如果這假定是正確的，現在的自由放任生育政策是有據可依。如果這假定是錯誤的，我們重新檢視種種個人自由，看看那些是可以辯護的。

公地自由的悲劇

無形之手控制人口的反駁論點，最先見諸1833年一位業餘數學家William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852) 撰寫的一本鮮為人知的小冊子，可稱之為「公地悲劇」；「悲劇」一詞借用自哲學家Whitehead ：「戲劇性的悲劇要素不是不快樂，而是蘊藏於事物無懊無悔運作的嚴肅性。」他續後又說：「命運之無可避免，只能以人生不如意事引證，只有這樣戲劇才可顯現逃避是徒然的。」

公地悲劇是如此發展的。想像草原對大眾開放，估計每個牛郎都會在公地飼養最多的牛隻。數百年來，這樣的安排都是相安無事，因為部族戰爭，偷獵，和疾病把人和動物的數目保持在土地承載能力之下。最終，人們長久渴望的社會穩定的一天到來，是醒悟的時候了。這時，公地的內在邏輯無情地導致悲劇。

作為理性人，每名牛郎追求取得最大得益。或明或暗，有意無意，牛郎撫心自問：「牛群多添一頭，對我有什麼效益？」這效應有正、負成份各一。

（1）多一頭動物的函數是正成份。出售牛隻的收益全歸牛郎，所以正效益接近+1。
（2）負數部份是多一頭動物造成的過度放牧的函數。因為過度放牧的效果由全體牛郎承擔，所以任何一位牛郎作出決定，負效益只是 -1的小部份。

把這些效益成份相加，理性牛郎總結他只有一個理性選擇：多養一頭牛。再多養一頭…但這也是分享公地的每一位牛郎的結論。悲劇因此而起。每個人都是被制度束縛，驅使他無限制地增加牛隻—而世界是有限的。在一個信奉公地自由的社會中，每個人都追求本人的最好利益，而整體是走向毀滅的終點。公地自由帶來整體毀滅。

有人會認為這是陳腔濫調。這不是碼？某程度上來說，我們幾千年前就學會了，但物競天擇偏向於心理否認 。縱使個人也是成員的社會受損，個人會因為取得私利而否認真相。教育可以對衡做錯事的自然傾向，但必須持續才可以對抗一代傳一代的無情力。

幾年前，在麻省市有一件小事足以說明知識逐漸消失。聖誕節購物期間，市中心的停車錶用膠袋遮掩，上有告示：「聖誕節後重開。免費停車由市長和市議會提供。」換句話說，面對本來已是短缺的停車位的需求增加，城市之父再建立公地制度。（嘲笑一句，我們懷疑他們這倒退的行為是得（選票）大於失。）

大概是同樣道理，我們長久以來已明白公地的邏輯，可能是自從發現農業或發明私人房地產的產權。但了解的大都是特殊個案，不足以一般而論。即使到了現在，租用西部山區國家土地的牧人證實這樣矛盾的了解；他們向聯邦機關施壓，要求增加牛隻數目，幾乎因為過度放牧導致侵蝕和雜草叢生。全球海洋依然因為公地哲理殘存而受害。海洋國家依然聽從「四海自由」的口令。他們聲言相信「海洋有無窮資源」，令多種魚類和鯨魚幾乎滅絕。

國家公園是公地悲劇的另一個例子。現今是對外開放，沒有限制。公園範圍是有限的—只有一個優勝美谷 —但人口增長沒有限制。公園訪客享樂的價值逐漸減弱。很簡單，我們要盡快不要把公園當作公地，否則對任何人都不會有價值。

我們可以做什麼？有幾個方案。可以出售為私人產業；可以保留為公共財產，但分配進入的權利。分配可以是以財富為基礎，用拍賣方式。亦可以根據一些彼此同意的標準來定優劣。可以是彩票。或是先到先得，由人龍決定。我以為以上提到的都令人反感。但我們必須選擇—或是默許我們稱為國家公園的公地被毀。

污染

公地悲劇的反面是污染問題，不是從公地拿走，而是放入—往水中排放污水，或化學、放射性、和熱力廢物；往空氣排放有害和危害的氣體；在視線所及樹立令人分神和不悅目的廣告。計算效益和前述一樣。理性人發覺他向公地排放廢物的成本，是少於排放前潔淨廢物的成本。無個人都是一樣；只要我們這些獨立，理性，自由的投機者自作妄為，大家都受縛於「自家弄髒自家」的制度。

食物籃子的公地悲劇，因為私產或類似的正式安排而避免了。但我們周圍的空氣和水不能輕易地分隔，所以要用不同的方法防止污水坑公地悲劇：強制的法律或稅務措施，做成污染者在排放前處理污染物成本比不處理為低。我們解決這問題的進展，不如解決第一個問題。停止我們耗盡地球的直接資源的私產概念，實際上助長污染。小河岸邊工廠的主人—他的產權伸延到小河的中央—不容易明白弄髒流經門前的河水不是他的自然權利。法律永遠趕不上時代，需要修修補補來適應這「公地」的新意識。

污染問題是人口的後果。未開發地區的孤獨居民如何棄置廢物，沒有所謂。祖父以前常說：「水流十里，自我淨化。」當他是小孩時，這神話可能近乎真理，因為沒有太多人。但人口變得密集，大自然的化學和生物循環過程負荷過重，呼喚產權要重新定義。
如何為節制立法？

分析污染問題作為人口密度連帶產生的事物，帶出一項不是普遍了解的道德原則：行動的道德是其進行時體制情況連帶產生的事物。把公地用作污水池，在未開發情況不會危及大眾，因為沒有大眾；在大都市這樣做就不能忍受。一百五十年前，平地居民殺死野牛，只割下牛舌頭做晚餐，其他的棄掉。他不是浪費。今天只餘下幾千頭野牛，同樣的行為令人驚駭。

順帶一提，不能由一張相片決定行動的道德。除非知道某人行動時的整體體系，我們不知道某人殺象或放火燒草是否危及他人。中國古人有言：「一張圖畫可代千言萬語」，但可能要用千言萬語來証實圖畫。生態學者和改革者一般試圖用相片捷徑來說服他人。但相片不能攝影辯論的要義；這必須用文字理性表達。

以前編理道德，沒有注意到道德是和體系有緊密關係。傳統的道德指令形式：「汝不得…」沒有顧及特別環境。我們社會的法律依循古老道德的模式，所以大大不適用於複雜，人多和可改變的世界。我們的團團轉解決辦法是用行政法擴大法定的法律。實際上是不可能列出在後園燒垃圾或是沒有煙霧管制開車的全部情況，我國立法把細節下放給官僚。行政法就是這樣來的；有一個古老的理由令我們擔心—誰來監管監管者 ？John Adams說過，我們必須有「法治的政府，不是人治。」行政官僚嘗試評價處於整個體系的行動的道德，容易變得腐敗，貪污；產生人治的政府，不是法治。

立法禁止容易（但執法不一定如是）；但我們如何為「節制」立法？經濟指出用行政法來仲裁可以達到目的。如果我們對「誰來監管」的感受防礙利用行政法，我們是不必要地限制了可行的辦法。我們應當保留這一句話來提醒我們不能避免可怕的危險。我們面對的大挑戰，是發明矯正的回饋，保證監管者大公無私。我們必須找出方法，為監管者和矯正的回饋立法，賦予所需權力。

自由生育是不能容忍

人口問題在另一方面涉及公地悲劇。在一個由「狗吃狗」原則管治的世界—如果曾經有這樣的世界—一個家庭有多少子女不會受公共關注。為人父母生育過多子女，存活的後裔只會少，不會多，因為他們沒有能力照顧子女。David Lack和其他人發現這樣的負面回饋控制了鳥類的生育力。但人類不是鳥類，超碼在過去幾千年都不是如此。

如果每個人類家庭都是依賴本身的資源；如果眼光短淺父母的子女飢餓致死；如果過度生育為生殖細胞帶來自我的「懲罰」—那麼管制家庭生育是不涉公共利益。但我們的社會是深深地受福利國家所約束 ，因而面對公地悲劇的另一面。

在一個福利國家，我們如何應付以過度生育來保證擴大本身的家庭，宗教，種族，或階層（或是任何可以識別和有凝聚力的社群） ？自由生育的概念，連同人人生而平等的信念，足以令世界逃脫不了悲慘的行動。

不幸地，這正是聯合國要採取的行動。1967年後半年，約三十個國家同意「人權宣言描述家庭是社會的自然和基本單位。因此家庭人口的任何選擇和決定，無可置疑是由家庭作出，不可聽命於他人。」

要明確否定這項權利的合法性是痛苦的；要否定，人們感到不安，正如十七世紀的麻省居民否定女巫存在的現實。現時，自由主義陣營視批評聯合國為禁忌，感覺是聯合國是「我們最後，最好的希望」，我們不應吹毛求瑕，不要讓頑固保守主義者玩弄。但是我們不要忘記Robert Louis Stevenson的話：「朋友禁制的真理，是敵人最靈活的武器。」如果我們深愛真理，我就必須公開否定人權宣言的合法性，雖然這是聯合國所推廣。我國應當聯同Kingsley Davis ，試圖改變「計劃生育-世界人口組織 」追隨同一悲劇性理想的錯誤。

良知是自我消除

認為長期控制人類生育是訴諸良知，這種想法是錯誤的。Charles Galton Darwin在他祖父的偉大著作百年紀念時發言時，就指出這點。達爾文式的論點簡單直接。

人各不同。面對限制生育的呼籲，無疑有些人的反應比較積極。比起那些易受良知影響的人，那些多子女的佔下一代的比例較大。這些差別會一代傳一代的重複。

C. G. Darwin如是說：「可能要經歷幾百世代才發展出這種偏重繁殖的本能；如確實如此，大自然會報復的。避孕人品種會滅絕，被生殖人品種取代。」

這論點是假設生兒育女的良知或欲望（無所謂是那一種）是遺傳的—所謂遺傳是以最一般性的正式意思而言。用J. Lotka的定義來說：無論這態度是經生殖細胞或是體外傳播，結果都是一樣。（如果否定後者的可能性，也否定前者，那麼教育有什麼意義？」以上是在人口問題的背景提出這個論點，但這也適用於社會呼籲濫用公地的個人，為了大眾利益而抑制自己的任何情況—利用他的良知。利用這樣的呼籲，是設立一個最終消除人類良知的選擇性機制。

良知的致病效果

呼籲良知的長期弊端已足以宣告廢棄這作法；這亦有短期缺失。當我們要求濫用公地的人們，「因良知之名」而停止，可以對他說什麼呢？他會聽到什麼？ —不止是當時，也是夜深人靜，半睡半醒時，他記得我們的說話，也記我們的非言語溝通暗示？有意無意之間，他遲早體會到他接收到兩種訊息，而彼此是矛盾的：（1）（存心的訊息）「如果你不遵紀，我們會公開譴責你沒有作為負責任的公民」；（2）（無意的訊息）「如果你聽話而行，我們會暗中責怪你頭腦簡單，罵幾句就站在一旁，容許我們這些人繼續濫用公地。」

每個人都陷於Bateson稱之為「進退兩難的處境」。他和同僚有一個言之成理的說法，認為進退兩難是精神分裂症的重要成因。 進退兩難，不一定是這樣有害，但人若陷於其中，會危及精神健康。尼采如是說：「良心不安，是一種疾病。」

喚起他人的良知，對試圖超越法定限制，伸展控制的人來說，是具誘惑的。最高領導人屈從於這種誘惑。在過去一代人，是否有總統從不號召工會自願節制他們對較高工資的要求，或是要求鋼鐵公司遵守定價的自動指引？記憶所及，沒有。每一次的用詞遣字都著意在令不合作者有犯罪感。

幾百年來，一直都假定犯罪感是文明生命中有價值，甚至是不可缺少的成份。在這個後佛洛依德的世界，我們有懷疑。

Paul Goodman從現代觀點來看：「犯罪感從來沒有帶來好事，無論是智能，政策或熱情。犯罪者只關注自己，不會留意犯錯的事物，甚至不會留意本身的利益（這可能有意思），只留意本身的焦慮。」

我們不需要是專業心理學家才看出焦慮的後果。我們在西方社會中，正從兩百年的欲望黑暗年代走出來；這年代部份是由禁制性法律所維繫，但可能更為見效的是教育的產生焦慮機制。Alex Comfort在The Anxiety Makers 描述得很好；這並不是賞心悅目的。

因為取證困難，我們甚至可能承認焦慮的後果，可能有時從某些觀點來看，是值得的。我們要提一個較大的問題，就是作為政策，我們應否鼓勵使用一項傾向（如果不是動機）於心理病態的技術。這些日子中，我們時常聽到提及負責任—父母心；這兩個相連的詞語也包括在一些專注於控制生育的組織。有人提出龐大的宣傳，向全國（或是全世界）的生育者灌輸責任感。但什麼是良知的意義？當我們引用「責任」而沒有相當的制裁，我們是否在嚇唬公地的人們作出有違本身利益的行動？「責任」是實體代用品的言語偽裝，試圖不付出而取得一些回報。

如果我們要用上「責任」，是好是用上Charles Frankel的意思 。這位哲學家說：「責任是有限社會安排的產物。」留意Frankel提出社會安排—不是宣傳。

彼此同意的彼此強制

產生責任的社會安排，是建立強制安排，或是類似的安排。考慮銀行劫案。搶劫銀行的歹徒是把銀行當作是公地。可以如何防止？當然不是用語言來喚起他的責任感來試圖管制他的行為，只是依隨Frankel的指導—用宣傳來堅持銀行不是公地；我們尋求有限度的社會安排，確保銀行不會成為公地。這樣一來我們侵犯了潛在劫匪的自由，我們不會否認或後悔。

搶劫銀行的道德觀很容易明白，因為我們接受要完全禁止這種活動。我們情願說「汝不得搶劫銀行」，沒有例外。但節制也可以由強制建立。稅務是一項好的強制措施。要節制市中心的購物者使用車位，我們用停車錶管制短期停車，交通罰款處理長時間停車。我們無需禁止市民泊車，他要停多久就多久；我們只需讓他泊車越久，費用就更高。我們不是提出禁制，而是仔細考慮的偏重方案。廣告人 可能稱之為「說服」，我喜用直率的「強制」。

對大多數自由主義者來說，「強制」是髒話，但無需永遠是這樣的。正如其他髒話，暴露於光線之下，一次又一次不帶道歉，不感侷促說出來，都會清洗骯髒感。對許多人來說，強制的含意是遙遠，不負責任的官僚的隨意決定；這不是本來意義的必然部份。我推薦的唯一強制是彼此強制，由大多數受影響的人們彼此同意。

彼此同意強制，並不是說我們需要享受強制，或是假裝享受。誰人會享受納稅？我們全都為納稅發牢騷。但我們接受強制性稅務，因為認識到自願性納稅只會是沒有良知的人得益。我們開創和（抱怨）支持納稅和其他強制性措施來逃避公地的恐怖。

公地以外的另外方案無需是十全十美，只要是較好的。房產和其他實質物品的另外方案是創立產權和法定承繼權。這制度是否完全公正？作為基因曾受訓的生物學者，我持否定見解。對我來說，如果個人承繼要有差別的話，法定擁有權應該和生物性承繼完全關連—那些生物性方面是產業和權力更適合的監護人，應當在法律方面承繼更多。「龍生龍，鳳生鳳」的說法，隱含於我們的法定承繼法律，但經常被基因重組所嘲弄。笨蛋可以承繼百萬家財，和信託基金可以完整保存全部財產。我們必須承認我們的私有產權法律制度，連同承繼權，是不公正的—但我們接受，因為我們不相信到現時為止，有人發明更好的制度。公地的另外方案是不敢想像的恐怖。不公正比全面毀滅來得好。

改革與保持現況的戰爭，奇特之處之一是被雙重標準無意識地管制。當有改革措施提出時，往往因為反對者找到其中瑕疵而落敗。正如Kingsley Davis指出：現況的崇拜者有時暗示沒有完全同意的協議，改革是不可能的；這樣的暗示違反史實。我盡可能去了解，自動拒絕改革建議是基於兩項不自覺的假定：（1）現況是十全十美；或（2）我們面對的選擇是改革，或是不採用行動；如果改革建議不是十全十美，我們大概應當不採用行動，等待十全十美的建議。

但是我們不可以全然不動。幾千年來，我們所做的就是採取行動。這也會產生邪惡。一旦我們和道行動就是現況，我們就可以比較可發現的利害，和改革建議的利害比較，盡我們所能因為我們沒有經驗而打折扣。基於這樣的比較，我們可以排除認為只能接受完美制度這項不通的假定，作出理性的決定。

承認必然力

或許對人們的人口問題最簡單的摘要是這樣：如果要說道理的話，公地只可以在低人口密度的條件下成立。隨著人類人口增加，公地的觀點必須逐一放棄。

我們先放棄在公地採集食物，把農地圈圍起來，草原，獵區和漁區列為禁區。這些限制不是在全世界都有全部執行。

稍後，我們所見公地作為廢物處置地亦要放棄。西方世界普遍接受限制家庭污水排放；我們仍然苦心經營從公地排除汽車、工廠、殺蟲劑、施肥、和核電裝置的污染。

我們對尋樂的公地弊端的認識還在萌芽階段。對於公眾媒介散播音浪，幾乎沒有限制。購物大眾在沒有許可的情況下，被無意義的音樂猛烈襲擊。我們的政府付出億萬美元創造超音速運輸；把一位仁兄快速從此岸送到彼岸，省下三小時，就有五十萬人受到騷擾。廣告商弄髒了電台和電視的大氣電波，污染游人的視覺。立法禁止尋樂公地，我們還有很長的路。這是否因為我們的清教徒傳統視尋樂為罪惡，視痛苦（即是廣告污染）為美德？

每次公地被圈圍，都侵犯了一些人的個人自由。大家都接受往日做成的侵犯，因為現代人不會投訴有損失。我們激烈反對的是新近提出的侵犯；「權利」和「自由」充斥。但「自由」是什麼意思？當人們彼此同意立法禁止搶劫，人類享有更多自由，不是更少。受困於公地邏輯的人們，享用自由只會帶來全面毀滅；一旦人們看清楚彼此強制的必然性，他們變得有自由去追尋其他目標。我相信是黑格爾說過：「自由是必然性的了解。」

我們必須承認必然性最重要一點，是放棄生育的公地。沒有技術性的解決辦法，可以從人口過多的憂愁中拯救我們。生育自由會毀滅全體。為了避免困難的決定，現時我們大多數會受誘惑傾向宣傳良知和負責任的父母心。必須抗拒這種誘惑，因為呼籲獨立運作的良知，長期而言是選擇全部良知消失，短期而言增加焦慮。

要保存和孕育其他和更寶貴的自由，唯一的辦法是放棄生育自由，還要快快放棄。「自由是必然性的了解」—教育的作用是向大家披露放棄生育自由的必然性。只有這樣，我們才可以終結這方面的公地悲劇。

（自學書院譯文，根據Creative Commons條款發表 : http://www.self-learning-college.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=303）

The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons

Ian Angus
Is community ownership of land, forests and fisheries a guaranteed road to ecological disaster?
Socialist Voice --- http://climateandcapitalism.com/?p=513
August 25, 2008


Will shared resources always be misused and overused? Is community ownership of land, forests and fisheries a guaranteed road to ecological disaster? Is privatization the only way to protect the environment and end Third World poverty? Most economists and development planners will answer “yes” — and for proof they will point to the most influential article ever written on those important questions.

Since its publication in Science in December 1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons” has been anthologized in at least 111 books, making it one of the most-reprinted articles ever to appear in any scientific journal. It is also one of the most-quoted: a recent Google search found “about 302,000” results for the phrase “tragedy of the commons.”

For 40 years it has been, in the words of a World Bank Discussion Paper, “the dominant paradigm within which social scientists assess natural resource issues.” (Bromley and Cernea 1989: 6) It has been used time and again to justify stealing indigenous peoples’ lands, privatizing health care and other social services, giving corporations ‘tradable permits’ to pollute the air and water, and much more.

Noted anthropologist Dr. G.N. Appell (1995) writes that the article “has been embraced as a sacred text by scholars and professionals in the practice of designing futures for others and imposing their own economic and environmental rationality on other social systems of which they have incomplete understanding and knowledge.”

Like most sacred texts, “The Tragedy of the Commons” is more often cited than read. As we will see, although its title sounds authoritative and scientific, it fell far short of science.

Garrett Hardin hatches a myth

The author of “The Tragedy of the Commons” was Garrett Hardin, a University of California professor who until then was best-known as the author of a biology textbook that argued for “control of breeding” of “genetically defective” people. (Hardin 1966: 707) In his 1968 essay he argued that communities that share resources inevitably pave the way for their own destruction; instead of wealth for all, there is wealth for none.

He based his argument on a story about the commons in rural England.

(The term “commons” was used in England to refer to the shared pastures, fields, forests, irrigation systems and other resources that were found in many rural areas until well into the 1800s. Similar communal farming arrangements existed in most of Europe, and they still exist today in various forms around the world, particularly in indigenous communities.)

“Picture a pasture open to all,” Hardin wrote. A herdsmen who wants to expand his personal herd will calculate that the cost of additional grazing (reduced food for all animals, rapid soil depletion) will be divided among all, but he alone will get the benefit of having more cattle to sell.

Inevitably, “the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd.” But every “rational herdsman” will do the same thing, so the commons is soon overstocked and overgrazed to the point where it supports no animals at all.

Hardin used the word “tragedy” as Aristotle did, to refer to a dramatic outcome that is the inevitable but unplanned result of a character’s actions. He called the destruction of the commons through overuse a tragedy not because it is sad, but because it is the inevitable result of shared use of the pasture. “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”

Where’s the evidence?

Given the subsequent influence of Hardin’s essay, it’s shocking to realize that he provided no evidence at allto support his sweeping conclusions. He claimed that the “tragedy” was inevitable — but he didn’t show that it had happened even once.

Hardin simply ignored what actually happens in a real commons: self-regulation by the communities involved. One such process was described years earlier in Friedrich Engels’ account of the “mark,” the form taken by commons-based communities in parts of pre-capitalist Germany:

“[T]he use of arable and meadowlands was under the supervision and direction of the community …

“Just as the share of each member in so much of the mark as was distributed was of equal size, so was his share also in the use of the ‘common mark.’ The nature of this use was determined by the members of the community as a whole. …

“At fixed times and, if necessary, more frequently, they met in the open air to discuss the affairs of the mark and to sit in judgment upon breaches of regulations and disputes concerning the mark.” (Engels 1892)

Historians and other scholars have broadly confirmed Engels’ description of communal management of shared resources. A summary of recent research concludes:

“[W]hat existed in fact was not a ‘tragedy of the commons’ but rather a triumph: that for hundreds of years — and perhaps thousands, although written records do not exist to prove the longer era — land was managed successfully by communities.” (Cox 1985: 60)

Part of that self-regulation process was known in England as “stinting” — establishing limits for the number of cows, pigs, sheep and other livestock that each commoner could graze on the common pasture. Such “stints” protected the land from overuse (a concept that experienced farmers understood long before Hardin arrived) and allowed the community to allocate resources according to its own concepts of fairness.

The only significant cases of overstocking found by the leading modern expert on the English commons involved wealthy landowners who deliberately put too many animals onto the pasture in order to weaken their much poorer neighbours’ position in disputes over the enclosure (privatization) of common lands. (Neeson 1993: 156)

Hardin assumed that peasant farmers are unable to change their behaviour in the face of certain disaster. But in the real world, small farmers, fishers and others have created their own institutions and rules for preserving resources and ensuring that the commons community survived through good years and bad.

Why does the herder want more?

Hardin’s argument started with the unproven assertion that herdsmen always want to expand their herds: “It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. … As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain.”

In short, Hardin’s conclusion was predetermined by his assumptions. “It is to be expected” that each herdsman will try to maximize the size of his herd — and each one does exactly that. It’s a circular argument that proves nothing.

Hardin assumed that human nature is selfish and unchanging, and that society is just an assemblage of self-interested individuals who don’t care about the impact of their actions on the community. The same idea, explicitly or implicitly, is a fundamental component of mainstream (i.e., pro-capitalist) economic theory.

All the evidence (not to mention common sense) shows that this is absurd: people are social beings, and society is much more than the arithmetic sum of its members. Even capitalist society, which rewards the most anti-social behaviour, has not crushed human cooperation and solidarity. The very fact that for centuries “rational herdsmen” did not overgraze the commons disproves Hardin’s most fundamental assumptions — but that hasn’t stopped him or his disciples from erecting policy castles on foundations of sand.

Even if the herdsman wanted to behave as Hardin described, he couldn’t do so unless certain conditions existed.

There would have to be a market for the cattle, and he would have to be focused on producing for that market, not for local consumption. He would have to have enough capital to buy the additional cattle and the fodder they would need in winter. He would have to be able to hire workers to care for the larger herd, build bigger barns, etc. And his desire for profit would have to outweigh his interest in the long-term survival of his community.

In short, Hardin didn’t describe the behaviour of herdsmen in pre-capitalist farming communities — he described the behaviour of capitalists operating in a capitalist economy. The universal human nature that he claimed would always destroy common resources is actually the profit-driven “grow or die” behaviour of corporations.

Will private ownership do better?

That leads us to another fatal flaw in Hardin’s argument: in addition to providing no evidence that maintaining the commons will inevitably destroy the environment, he offered no justification for his opinion that privatization would save it. Once again he simply presented his own prejudices as fact:

“We must admit that our legal system of private property plus inheritance is unjust — but we put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better system. The alternative of the commons is too horrifying to contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin.”

The implication is that private owners will do a better job of caring for the environment because they want to preserve the value of their assets. In reality, scholars and activists have documented scores of cases in which the division and privatization of communally managed lands had disastrous results. Privatizing the commons has repeatedly led to deforestation, soil erosion and depletion, overuse of fertilizers and pesticides, and the ruin of ecosystems.

As Karl Marx wrote, nature requires long cycles of birth, development and regeneration, but capitalism requires short-term returns.

“[T]he entire spirit of capitalist production, which is oriented towards the most immediate monetary profits, stands in contradiction to agriculture, which has to concern itself with the whole gamut of permanent conditions of life required by the chain of human generations. A striking illustration of this is furnished by the forests, which are only rarely managed in a way more or less corresponding to the interests of society as a whole…” (Marx 1998: 611n)

Contrary to Hardin’s claims, a community that shares fields and forests has a strong incentive to protect them to the best of its ability, even if that means not maximizing current production, because those resources will be essential to the community’s survival for centuries to come. Capitalist owners have the opposite incentive, because they will not survive in business if they don’t maximize short-term profit. If ethanol promises bigger and faster profits than centuries-old rain forests, the trees will fall.

This focus on short-term gain has reached a point of appalling absurdity in recent best-selling books by Bjorn Lomborg, William Nordhaus and others, who argue that it is irrational to spend money to stop greenhouse gas emissions today, because the payoff is too far in the future. Other investments, they say, will produce much better returns, more quickly.

Community management isn’t an infallible way of protecting shared resources: some communities have mismanaged common resources, and some commons may have been overused to extinction. But no commons-based community has capitalism’s built-in drive to put current profits ahead of the well-being of future generations.

A politically useful myth

The truly appalling thing about “The Tragedy of the Commons” is not its lack of evidence or logic — badly researched and argued articles are not unknown in academic journals. What’s shocking is the fact that thispiece of reactionary nonsense has been hailed as a brilliant analysis of the causes of human suffering and environmental destruction, and adopted as a basis for social policy by supposed experts ranging from economists and environmentalists to governments and United Nations agencies.

Despite being refuted again and again, it is still used today to support private ownership and uncontrolled markets as sure-fire roads to economic growth.

The success of Hardin’s argument reflects its usefulness as a pseudo-scientific explanation of global poverty and inequality, an explanation that doesn’t question the dominant social and political order. It confirms the prejudices of those in power: logical and factual errors are nothing compared to the very attractive (to the rich) claim that the poor are responsible for their own poverty. The fact that Hardin’s argument also blames the poor for ecological destruction is a bonus.

Hardin’s essay has been widely used as an ideological response to anti-imperialist movements in the Third World and discontent among indigenous and other oppressed peoples everywhere in the world.

“Hardin’s fable was taken up by the gathering forces of neo-liberal reaction in the 1970s, and his essay became the ‘scientific’ foundation of World Bank and IMF policies, viz. enclosure of commons and privatization of public property. … The message is clear: we must never treat the earth as a ‘common treasury.’ We must be ruthless and greedy or else we will perish.” (Boal 2007)

In Canada, conservative lobbyists use arguments derived from Hardin’s political tract to explain away poverty on First Nations’ reserves, and to argue for further dismantling of indigenous communities. A study published by the influential Fraser Institute urges privatization of reserve land:

“[T]hese large amounts of land, with their attendant natural resources, will never yield their maximum benefit to Canada’s native people as long as they are held as collective property subject to political management. … collective property is the path of poverty, and private property is the path of prosperity.” (Fraser 2002: 16-17)

This isn’t just right-wing posturing. Canada’s federal government, which has refused to sign the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, announced in 2007 that it will “develop approaches to support the development of individual property ownership on reserves,” and created a $300 million fund to do just that.

In Hardin’s world, poverty has nothing to do with centuries of racism, colonialism and exploitation: poverty is inevitable and natural in all times and places, the product of immutable human nature. The poor bring it on themselves by having too many babies and clinging to self-destructive collectivism.

The tragedy of the commons is a useful political myth — a scientific-sounding way of saying that there is no alternative to the dominant world order.

Stripped of excess verbiage, Hardin’s essay asserted, without proof, that human beings are helpless prisoners of biology and the market. Unless restrained, we will inevitably destroy our communities and environment for a few extra pennies of profit. There is nothing we can do to make the world better or more just.

In 1844 Friedrich Engels described a similar argument as a “repulsive blasphemy against man and nature.” Those words apply with full force to the myth of the tragedy of the commons.

Ian Angus is editor of Climate and Capitalism and an associate editor of Socialist Voice
(Originally published in Socialist Voice, August 24, 2008)
Update: See also A reply to criticisms and questions about this article

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Works cited in this article

Appell, G. N. 1993. “Hardin’s Myth of the Commons: The Tragedy of Conceptual Confusions.” http://tinyurl.com/5knwou

Boal, Iain. 2007. “Interview: Specters of Malthus: Scarcity, Poverty, Apocalypse.”

Counterpunch,September 11, 2007. http://tinyurl.com/5vepm5

Bromley, Daniel W. and Cernea Michael M. 1989. “The Management of Common Property Natural Resources: Some Conceptual and Operational Fallacies.” World Bank Discussion Paper. http://tinyurl.com/5853qn

Cox, Susan Jane Buck. 1985, “No Tragedy on the Commons.” Environmental Ethics 7. http://tinyurl.com/5bys8h

Engels, Friedrich. 1892. “The Mark.” http://tinyurl.com/6e58e7

Engels, Friedrich. 1844. Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy. http://tinyurl.com/5p24t5
Fraser Institute. 2002. Individual Property Rights on Canadian Indian Reserves. http://tinyurl.com/5pjfjj

Hardin, Garrett. 1966. Biology: Its Principles and Implications. Second edition. San Francisco. W.H. Freeman & Co.

Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” http://tinyurl.com/o827
中文版：公地的悲劇 http://activistseducation.blogspot.com/2008/11/blog-post.html

Marx, Karl. [1867] 1998. Marx Engels Collected Works Vol. 37 (Capital, Vol. 3). New York: International Publishers

Neeson, J.M. 1993. Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700-1820. Cambridge University Press.

Humanity, Society and Ecology: Global Warming and the Ecosocialist Alternative

Daniel Tanuro
October 21, 2008

Ecosocialism is much more than a new label, or a revamping of an old perspective: it is a new project for the emancipation of humanity.

(Daniel Tanuro is an activist in Climat et Justice Sociale in Belgium, and the ecological correspondent of the newspaper La Gauche. This is the text of his talk at the Socialistikt Forum in Uppsala, Sweden, on October 18, 2008 and first published at http://climateandcapitalism.com)

Humanity produces its own life, through labour as a conscious social activity. This basic characteristic of our species has two important consequences for a discussion of ecology.

The first is that humanity doesn't just evolve biologically, as other species do, but also develops itself through history. As it develops, passing through different modes of production, it changes its relationship with the environment and changes the environment itself. That is why our species has such an impact on the environment. The nature of our impact is not fated in advance: more development does not automatically imply more environmental destruction. For example, in some regions agricultural communities probably put less pressure on the environment than hunting communities that used fire as a means of production. The relationship between human development and the environment is dialectical. We have choices. Development does not necessary imply material, quantitative growth. Within certain limits, we can develop while protecting the environment.

The second consequence is that knowledge of homo sapiens's biological characteristics doesn't help us to understand any particular problem in the relationship between humanity and nature. On the contrary, the decisive role is played by socially and historically conditioned forms of development. To seek an explanation or solutions for modern environmental crises by studying the history of Easter Island, or the Mayan collapse, as Jared Diamond does in his bestseller Collapse, is pure nonsense. The Neolithic civilisation on Easter Island had no nuclear power, didn't use pesticides and didn't burn fossil fuels.

Ignoring history and the concrete mode of production in a discussion of humanity and nature can only lead to a seemingly trite but very dangerous conclusion: that, other things being equal, the more human beings there are on Earth, the more ecological problems we create. That in turn leads to just one question: How many people should there be? James Lovelock, author of the Gaïa hypothesis, says 500 million, others say 3 billion. Who will decide? Above all: with that diagnosis, how can we democratically address an urgent ecological problem like global warming? According to the IPCC, global GHG emissions should decrease by 50% to 85% by 2050. Faced with such a great challenge, obsessive “Population Bomb” thinking can only pave the way for a new barbarism — which is why, while not in the least favoring pro-natalist policies, the left should consider the “overpopulation” debate as an important ideological battlefield.

Peculiarities of the capitalist environmental crisis
To address the environmental crisis both realistically and humanely, it is absolutely necessary to understand the specific social and historical characteristics of the capitalist environmental crisis, and to understand the differences between capitalism and previous modes of production.

Pre-capitalist modes of production produced use-values, quantitatively limited by human needs. Labour productivity was low, and growth occurred very slowly. Social crises involved shortages of use-values.

Capitalism produces exchange-values, not use-values as such. Its only limit, as Marx said, is capital itself. Over-production and over-consumption (the first conditioning the second) are inherent in this highly productive system, which is based on ever more profit and ever more growth to produce profit. Social crises involve overproduction of commodities — that is, of exchange-values.

These basic differences shape very important distinctions between present and past ecological crises.

Previous ecological crises, in so-called primitive societies for instance, mainly involved low production communities looting natural resources as a response to food shortages caused by droughts, flooding, or wars.

Capitalism also loots nature, but in a very different way: capitalist looting aims to obtain and sell exchange values, not to satisfy needs, so it causes more environmental degradation than previous societies.

But an even more important difference — a qualitative one — is that capitalist ecological crises mainly proceed from overproduction and the resulting overconsumption. Not only does capitalism use more resources, it does so by developing environmentally dangerous technologies. Each capitalist tries to get surplus profit, also called technological rent, by replacing human labour with machines, chemicals, etc., to improve productivity. Among other problems, this race for more productivity, this permanent revolution in production, leads to the development and use of new technologies like nuclear power, new molecules like DDT or PCB, and even new genetically modified organisms.

Climate change must be seen within that framework
That might seem obvious, but it is not. The IPCC's reports — which are excellent, especially those from Workgroups I and II — label global warming as “anthropic,” which is misleading. Global warming is not a result of human activity in general but of capitalist human activity. Indeed global warming is the purest and more perfect example of a capitalist environmental crisis: it is a direct result of overproduction. Today's atmosphere is saturated with CO2, due to the massive burning of fossil fuels — coal, oil, gas — in imperialist countries since the Industrial Revolution. Climate Change is the global inheritance of 250 years of capitalist accumulation.

‘Those who don't want to hear about capitalism should not talk about global warming'
Of course, coal, which contributes most to global warming, was essential to the birth of the modern economy. But within a few years, scientific discoveries had made it possible to consider alternative technological paths based on renewable energy sources. The photovoltaic effect, for instance, was discovered by Edmond Becquerel as early as 1839. Prototypes were even built. For reasons of profit, capitalism did not invest in this technology until the NASA decided to use it for space vehicles. Thermal solar systems existed by the end of the 19th century, but utilities sabotaged them. Even today, solar energy is not a clear priority for energy research programs: Most budgets are devoted to the development of nuclear energy, a backward step that could turn in a real nightmare.

So, in our struggle against climate change, we have to face the major, fundamental fact that the capitalist mode of production has been built on burning fossil fuels, to the exclusion of other energy sources. One major reason — not the only one — is that fossil fuels reserves can be owned, and that those who own them then have the monopoly on the resource. Because they have that monopoly, they can impose a monopoly price, a rent above the average rate of profit. The higher cost of less productive reserves, not the average cost, determines the market price, so that those who produce at a lower cost get a higher than average profit.

A few figures illustrate how unimaginably huge this rent is. The global turnover in the oil industry in total is about 2,000 billion Euros. Production costs total about 500 Euros. Assuming a “normal” return of 15%, the rent amounts to at least 1400 billion Euros a year, above the average profit. This is a goose laying golden eggs. No wonder that those who own the goose want it to continue laying eggs as long as possible.

Another reason why capitalism depends on fossil fuels is that they enable very centralised and standardised energy systems, a high degree of social control, and a uniform market that favours corporate investment. This trend began very early, as capitalist competition eliminated traditional forms of decentralised and carbon-free energy production such as small water and wind mills.

Orkheimer, a German philosopher, once said, “Those who don't want to hear about capitalism should not talk about fascism.” Similarly we can say, “Those who don't want to hear about capitalism should not talk about global warming.”

Towards a new capitalist climate policy?
Is it possible to stop global warming, and if so, how? People who ask this question are usually concerned about technological possibilities, but generally speaking, technology is not the principal problem in the struggle against climate change, for two reasons.

* On the one hand, there's massive inefficiency and huge energy waste in developed capitalist societies. The main problem is not energy waste by individuals (although that is important and we should all try to reduce it) but rather structural energy waste resulting from separate heat and power production, absurd transportation systems, weapons production, advertising, disposable products, etc, — all related to greed for profit.

* On the other hand, the solar energy that reaches the Earth surface is 10,000 times the global energy requirement, and, using various forms of current technology, we could use it to generate 10 times global needs, a figure that could improve very quickly.

According to the IPCC 4th assessment report and the famous footnote in the Bali roadmap, by 2050 emissions in developed countries should decrease by 80-95%, while emissions in developing countries should “deviate substantially from baseline,” compared to 1990 levels. This is necessary to restrict the temperature increase to about 2°C above pre-industrial level. It is important to stress that these figures are underestimates, because they don't fully take into account non-linear phenomena such as the disintegration of glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica, one of the major threats we face today. So the IPCC recommendations should be taken as a minimum.

The question is: is it possible to meet these objectives in such a short time span? The short answer is: yes, it will be difficult, but it can be done through a plan that combines three measures: structural measures to cut energy waste, improved energy efficiency, and massive shift to a publicly owned decentralised energy system based on renewables.

But:

* Cutting energy waste is contrary to unlimited capitalist growth and accumulation of exchange-values;

* Improved energy efficiency is contrary to profit maximisation by utilities, oil companies, etc.;

* And most renewable energy sources cost more, and so reduce profit.

So for now, capitalists are waiting for a time when renewables are more profitable than fossil fuels. In the meantime, they demand that public authorities pay them to develop renewables. They lobby governments to overallocate free emissions allowances that they can sell on the market (as the EU does in the European Emission Trading System, another goose laying golden eggs). They develop nuclear power plants, telling us nuclear is a carbon-free carbon technology, which is totally untrue — if the entire nuclear production chain is considered, it produce more emissions than a modern natural gas power production chain. They transform so-called “clean investments” in developing countries into emission credits, rights to pollute — golden eggs once again. They appropriate natural ecosystems in the South to compensate for their own emissions: in other words they appropriate the carbon cycle, which amounts to appropriating control of life on Earth.

In short, capitalists seek to determine the rhythm and the direction of the struggle against climate change, tying both to their need for profit — and the governments go along. In July, the G8 leaders said they were in favour of a 50% global emission reduction by 2050. They didn't mention the specific IPCC recommendation of an 80%-95% reduction in developed countries, nor the 85% global reduction, nor the intermediate goals proposed by the IPCC. Where did the G8 target come from? Well, it was “suggested” to the G8 leaders by the World Economic Forum, in a memo posted a few days before the summit.

Those who deny the reality of climate change have been defeated. I think governments will do something to address climate change. I doubt they will keep even their vague promise of a 50% reduction by 2050, but they will have to do something a bit more serious than Kyoto, which is peanuts. But if we let them control the process, they will do too little, too late, and do it in a way that will be socially extremely costly and unfair.

The social and ecological consequences of a new, global capitalist climate policy could be terrible indeed. Hundreds of millions of people, mostly poor people in poor countries, will face more coastal floods, more malaria, and more food shortages. Billions face water shortages. Remember Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans. Most of the 1500 casualties were poor people, black people, women and children who died because money that could have strengthened levies was spent for the war on Iraq, and because the city, state and federal authorities didn't evacuate the poor. Katrina may offer a preview of the catastrophes we will face in the future.

These won't be natural catastrophes but capitalist catastrophes. As James Hansen, NASA's chief climatologist, said to the US Congress in June: “Special interests have blocked transition to our renewable energy future. Instead of moving heavily into renewable energies, fossil companies choose to spread doubt about global warming, as tobacco companies discredited the smoking-cancer link. CEOs of fossil energy companies know what they are doing and are aware of long-term consequences of continued business as usual. In my opinion, these CEOs should be tried for high crimes against humanity and nature.”

Social mobilisation, demands and the ecosocialist perspective

What conclusions should we draw? Climate change is not simply an environmental question but also a major human and social issue that anticapitalist currents must respond to. I would like to stress three points.

First, activists should help build a global climate movement. December 2009 will be an important time for a demonstration in Copenhagen where the United Nations will be trying to negotiate a post-Kyoto international treaty. To put maximum pressure on the governments, we need to help build a mass movement on a single issue: for an international treaty that is environmentally efficient and socially fair to the developing world and to working people in general.

Second, we need to raise proposals and demands that link climate and social struggles. This is a key question, a pre-condition for success. Bourgeois climate change policies are becoming a class weapon against poor and working people worldwide. If the struggle against climate change means more austerity, lower wages, more flexibility for the bosses, more job losses, more unfair taxes, etc, then the workers will resist, and they will be right to do so.

Look at the Polish mineworkers, a key sector of the workers movement. A few months ago, they won a fight for better wages and labour conditions. This was a victory for the international workers movement, because it was a victory against social dumping, in Europe and elsewhere. If the EU attacks the miners in name of the struggle against climate change, they will fight back because they know that the EU's real goal is to break their social strength. But we also know that continuing burning coal even for 30 years would be suicidal. (The development of safe Carbon Capture and Storage technology might reduce this danger, but CCS would not be a structural solution to climate change.)

Linking social and climate demands is especially important in the context of the systemic financial crisis and deep economic recession. The economic situation may reduce public concern about climate change, but it could also increase support for red-green demands such as public ownership of natural resources, free public transportation, expropriation of utilities, public service for home insulation, retraining of workers occupied in heavy polluting industries, etc.

Third, it is obvious that climate change challenges the socialist alternative. May I remind you Lenin once defined socialism as equal to soviets plus electricity? It is crystal clear that this formula as such is no longer valid. But what kind power is needed? Green power or nuclear power? How will it be it produced? How much is needed? What are the ecological consequences? These are basic questions, and we know from history that a non-capitalist society won't automatically find the answers — so the socialist alternative must be profoundly redefined in a non-productivist way.

This is a huge challenge to socialism, but a complete revision isn't needed. There is a concept in Marx's writing that can help us: the concept of a rational management of the social metabolism, of the material exchanges between humanity and nature. In fact, climate change is precisely the product of irrational management of the social metabolism: the world economy emits about 10 giga-tonnes of carbon a year into the atmosphere, double the absorption capacity of forests and oceans.

Building not only a socially rational but also an ecologically rational alternative to this irrational system will have far-reaching consequences for the socialist project. Socialism only makes sense if the new power of associated producers — another classic definition of socialism — steadily but radically replaces the capitalist production apparatus with a totally different one, based on a different energy system. This means different systems based on other technologies for food production, transportation, land management, etc.

So ecosocialism is much more than a new label, or a revamping of an old perspective: it is a new project for the emancipation of humanity.