Thinking of Action in Iran

Milad S.
Khiaban #18
July 8, 2009

(Note from translator Reza Fiyouzat:This translation of an analytical article from the newspaper Khiaban, #18, came in the mail. The article presents a perspective that needs serious consideration by socialist forces. Whether we agree totally, mostly or partially, the perspective is well worth reflecting on. Thanks to the sender! August 1, 2009)

The purpose of this note is to point out some of the obstacles to the expansion of the Iranian communists' activities.

1. For taking further and well-thought steps, we have to discard a number of erroneous notions. The first misconception is to perceive contemporary Iran as a 'post-revolutionary' society. Iran is not in a post-revolutionary situation, in which another revolution is necessary. The current movement is a new sequence of the revolutionary process that started in 1978. The internal conflicts of the ruling factions, the machinery of oppression and the forms that people's struggle take, their slogans and demands, all these are parts of a historical period that started by the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79. We should perceive the present popular movement in such a broader context, and discard any prevalent sort of sociological analysis, even those that in appearance seem class-based. We will explain this.

This means that the movement that started on June 15 [2009] is a continuation of the people's struggle in answering questions, which they themselves had posed in the society through the overthrow of Shah's regime: How can we establish freedom, independence and a people's republic in Iran? How can we run the society based on people's sovereignty, and without relying on any of the pre-capitalistic institutions, without the royal court and its allies? The first answer, the Islamic Republic, has failed that test. It was not the Iranian revolution that failed the test; such a statement is meaningless, those political alternatives pertaining to the first sequence however failed. The revolution itself is still young.

This is not to say that the course of the events, forms of the struggle and the behavior of the forces in this sequence are a repetition of what happened between 1977 and 1980. Quite the contrary, this movement is different in form and content, and its enemy is not the classic dictatorship of the Shah, but an Islamic regime, which emerged from the same revolutionary process and claims to have inherited the demand for republicanism, freedom and the independence of the Iranian people (this is a reference to the emblematic tripartite central slogan during winter 1978-79_ trans. note).

In the historical events of June 15, this claim was unambiguously taken back from the ruling regime. When Mousavi and the Participation Front [jebhey-e mosharekat] end up in opposition to the main symbol of the Islamic Republic, i.e., velayat-e faqih [rule of religious jurists], and in effect stand alongside the people (not just in words, but in its social objectivity), this is indicative of the fact that the Islamic Republic separated its path from that of the revolution, which amounts to the political suicide of the regime. From this point on, the 1979 revolution will anew seek its own identity and fate, is no longer an Islamic revolution as this regime called it; what it is will be determined by this very movement in its references to that revolutionary memory. The easiest example is the 'Allah-o Akbar' slogan. The slogan was used first time during the uprising in 1978-1979. Today, it is employed against the regime that once had transformed that symbol of protest to an ideological alibi for establishing political Islam. By employing the same phrase, people indicate the radical level of their demand that goes beyond the phrase. People are employing the religious Arabic wording 'Allah-o Akbar' as a metaphor for something else in Persian: Death to the dictator. Here the content goes beyond the phrase. If we don't see this difference, we will misunderstand people's slogans and, worst of all, we will move away from the people and leave the initiative to others. Therefore, in the first instance, any radical political force in Iran must synchronize its behavior, position and outlook with the calendar and sequences of the Iranian Revolution.

This means: Don't interpret! Don't make up slogans that seem revolutionary! Be the thought for an action. (The word employed in the title of the article in Persian is "eqdam" which means the initial, commencing phase of an action, the intentional component of an undertaking. The title of the text reads "fekr e eqdam", thought of/for an action, which is deliberately ambiguous; it both means a thought or idea discernable through action and the deliberations before an action.)

An idea that pertains to such an action is the articulation of the very people's demands. Its point of departure is the people's, all the people's pain and suffering, their capabilities as well as shortcomings. The Iranian people, when they take the initiative to wrest back the political cause from their rulers, are not Muslims, nor idolaters, nor liberals and royalists, nor demanding the overthrow of anything, nor a sect wishing to establish a socialist republic based on premeditated plans. No people have ever been like that. If a people have overthrown any system, it has been because that system blocked the collective movement of the people; if a people in some places transformed their councils/soviets into a new form of republic, this was because in the course of their struggles, they achieved all-encompassing and universal goals, for which that form (the councils, soviets, etc.) was found to be optimal; if they rose to do away with private property in a factory, some neighborhood, this city, a given country, this was because in their daily battles they realized that this form of property was an obstacle to the realization of a humane life. We must think of communism as an equivalent to these conditioned propositions, which means we must free our ideals from burdensome clichés. Anyone who wants to stage the last scene of another revolution as the first act of a revolution here is not thinking of any concrete measures for action. He is, at best, a plagiarist.

2. In the writings of leftist activists in Iran, we see two burdensome concepts, which have caused the scattered, oppressed and wounded figure of the left to turn even more scattered. One is the seemingly unproblematic concept of the 'middle class'. Interesting that this concept is seen precisely in such analyses that most certainly contain class in their titles, and in which quotations from Marx or Lenin abound. However, Marx has never used anything called middle class, with the particular meaning envisioned by these writers, in his historical analyses. On the contrary, this is a contemporary sociological concept. 'Middle class' is a deeply vague and ideological concept. Middle of what, and how did this middle become a class? In the present misery, hospital workers and staff, our school teachers, the factory workers and the youth who have been deprived of employment and who live in dormitories are not middle class. In the midst of the summer solstice in the third world, what middle class?

These are labor force, the very thing you have been looking for, and right in front of your eyes, in the streets of self-representation and in the alleys of common interests. They have, at least momentarily, felt their capacity to impose their presence in the public arenas of our cities and from now on nothing will remain the same as before, including the meaning of democracy. The ashes of petty-bourgeois academism is incapable of understanding the simple fact that people who, reliant on solidarity, claim a common objective for all are no longer the same as a formless mass.

Besides this, this movement has as yet not benefited fully from the independent presence of the organized poor. The current presence of a section of the rulers alongside the movement has also caused some confusion. The most wrongheaded policy in the current situation is to busy ourselves with polemics with this segment of the rulers to prove that they cannot be our fellow travelers. From the point of view of the people, such arguments, no matter how filled with revolutionary phrases, resemble the arguments of the two factions of the rulers. Such is not communist activity. Expansion of people's movement means helping to build popular organizations amongst those people whose voice is not counted, not recognized by the state. Joining of the poor alongside the presence of the labor forces will show any petty-bourgeois ideological illusion to be what they are: moralistic speech. It is at such a [historical] moment, but not earlier, that those few journalists who advocate neo-liberalism will be forgotten.

Do you see how the difference between people and their enemies is cognizable? It suffices that people organize themselves around all-encompassing demands and recognize their own representation in a common cause. Slogans such as "Give me back my vote!" has, neither immediately nor necessarily, anything to do with acceptance of the elections game or parliamentarianism. We see that many people who had boycotted the elections participated in the rallies. It does not even relate immediately to Ahmadinejad and the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, but goes farther and deeper than these things. This lack of immediate relation must be taken as our point of departure. The important point is the collective uprising to claim our crushed rights; this readiness to rise up for the right to have a vote must be understood the way it actually is, beyond ideological imageries about elections, and must be expanded to include other rights of the people.

3. The second reason for lack of cohesion, I think, relates to a mistake by the communists about who the addressee is. One component of such a mistake concerns the concept of 'enemy'. In short, it is simplistic to think that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and, vice versa, to consider those who are not friends of the people as the enemy. Enemy and friend are asymmetrical terms. We don't determine the enemy by their beliefs and speech, but the criterion is their objective behavior in concrete conditions. The enemies are those who take up arms against the expansion of the people's movement and are destroying their organizations. 'Enemy' is a concept, whose use is akin to that of a weapon, which must be pointed in a particular direction and at a certain target. Friends who are fond of Marx should believe that this is exactly what Marx says. Running hurriedly into the arena, and without any popular backing calling the people whose flags are not our desired colors 'the enemy', is akin to firing an empty gun in the darkness.

Let us reach some conclusions from these three points:

A. If the communists are on the side of revolution, and are capable of discerning the historical demands of the Iranian Revolution and able to understand the logic of its development, then they must welcome the disintegration of the governmental coalition called Islamic Republic and the joining with their ranks of segments of a republican system that claimed to have answers to the demands of the Iranian Revolution. They must not forget that this split among the different factions of rulers was caused by the very movement of the people, and not by the infighting of the two factions, as declared in sociological analyses. NO! Any infighting within the ruling system occurs against the background of a revolutionary society, and always has three sides.

If we look at the behavior of the people from this angle, we can easily see how the people in effect are constantly pushing forward this segment of rulers [that has joined them] with all its resources, and at least for the short-term. Once, a while ago, it was possible for Khatami to avoid such a position, but for Mousavi any retreat is tantamount to political suicide or even a threat to his life.

Intellectual friends, militant comrades! Abandon exposing every inconsistency in their statements; in doing such things, you are actually looking at the whole thing from the top, and staring wide-eyed only at the surface appearance of their infighting, and by necessity you will be limited to playing the role of the permanent pen-wielding critic of the policies of those upstairs, without giving any space or chance to communism as a positive idea to be constructed. From the point of view of the people's movement and its inventiveness, the separation of a segment of the rulers and its alignment alongside the people's demands is a non-negligible victory. Without having any illusions about this segment or its historical background, this victory should be protected. Otherwise, and by proposing ideas about the class nature of this segment and by repeating hasty misreadings of the separating line between 'proletariat' and 'bourgeois', you would be underestimating the present force of the people's movement. Instead of this petty-bourgeois incredulity, turn to organizing the labor forces, turn to expanding the struggle among the poor and the workers, disseminate awareness among the people based on tangible given demands, get to work alongside them for formulating tangible and relevant demands, and thereby recognize yourself as part of a common cause.

B. The relationship between the people and the communist activists and intellectuals is not one of a passive 'addressee' and an active 'agent'. A lot of friends in the Iranian left seem unable to inspire confidence. They are trapped in intellectual labyrinths, in which workers or poor people can not recognize themselves, and at times they produce road maps such as would befit those by parties boasting millions of members. For communists, the dialectic of addressing is a complex one. If an intellectual or an activist has more time to read and think, this does not make them a popular movement's engineer or an expert on budgeting and planning for the people's movement. This type of engineer-like thinking among the left has its own reasons. But, what is important here is that, the people, when in a struggle or when voicing slogans in a demonstration, are both 'addressees' and 'agents'.

Every time we address the people, it is because we want to make their own voices to be heard, and their own right to address all to become possible. This important fact must be present in the very first words that we utter publicly. This means that if we voice a slogan, it must express a demand that is achievable even though it appears for now impossible and is based on a responsible examination of reality and real capacities of social forces; meaning, our slogans are consistently a minimal expression that can embrace a maximum of imaginable objectives, not a blind maximalism that bears no relation to the real conditions. This means that our slogans are part of the collective understanding and our enthusiasm a co-conspirator in the plans that the people, before us, have forged against the dominant grammar of power. "Do not fear, do not fear; We are all together here!" This slogan engages in no exaggerations, nor does it encourage any singular voice, and is not vague, either. It is effective and encouraging, and paves the way. This togetherness of all for a common claim beyond the governmental powers and the media discourse is a thousand times more radical and revolutionary than using worn out clichés.

This inventiveness of the people is the source of force for the communists. Please do not say that you would separate out and arrange two camps facing each other, and that "co-presence of all" is a bourgeois slogan. That is not the case. In its best form, capitalism can only guarantee the wellbeing of a minority among the millions of people deprived of their rights. 'All' is both the 'addressee' and the 'addresser', a historical moment that extends beyond the limits of capitalism; class struggle signifies that a group, as a social class, stands on the way of this progression. To misread Marx, Lenin and others is worse than not reading them at all.

That which is encouraging for our young forces, is their objectively better possibility of success, compared to the period of 1978-1981. The weakness and the scatteredness of the leftist militants from the 1978 revolution, at this moment can be a positive point for the creation of new communist forces that have learned from the past, and stand alongside the people to solve crucial problems of the movement, using their ideas and without concepts estranged from our lived experience.

I will end this note with a reminder: one of the best articles about the conditions of realization of historical demands from the 1978 revolution was written by the reformist thinker Sa'eed Hajjarian, published a few days before the [June 12] elections. Hajjarian's thesis, in a reference to Rosa Luxembourg's slogan, 'Socialism or Barbarity', was that in today's Iran, the choice is between barbarity and civility. We must read this thesis correctly, meaning with the opposite intention of the writer. You have the best chance of success, since the Iranian Revolution, at each new sequence, each time clearer than before, shows that socialism, or better to say communism, is the only possible civility for the future of a free Iran. If we do not act thoughtfully and intelligently, tomorrow we will end up looking blindly for the spent shells after shooting those bullet-less guns; something that some leftist-leaning friends have been busy doing for too many the author and do not necessarily reflect those of this website.

Debate: How Should Anti-Imperialists Respond to Iran’s Political Crisis?

Socialist Voice
July 28, 2009

A recent Socialist Voice article, Iranian Workers in Action for Democratic Rights, by Robert Johnson and John Riddell, provoked an online debate about how anti-imperialist activists should defend Iranian sovereignty in response to the political crisis there. Because this debate reflects broader disagreements in the left around the world, we are publishing two submissions by Stansfield Smith, together with responses from Johnson and Riddell.

All four contributions originally appeared as comments to the Socialist Voice article:

* “A poorly veiled way of taking sides in Iran” (Stansfield Smith)

* “Self-determination and democratic rights are two aspects of the same question” (Robert Johnson and John Riddell)

* “Support workers movements – but not regardless of the context” (Stansfield Smith)

* “Siding with Ahmedinejad against imperialism does not mean siding with him in his repression” (Robert Johnson and John Riddell)

We welcome further comments on the issues raised in this discussion.

* * * * *

A poorly veiled way of taking sides in Iran
Stansfield Smith
June 29, 2009

Your statement is better than what I have seen in Links, the RCP paper, ISO paper, CP, or IMT, but it still not very good.

1. The most important activity people in imperialist countries should be doing is exposing the imperialist campaign against Iran. You now consider this incidental. The CIA and NED, as you must know, have spent hundreds of millions of dollars to destabilize Iran. Iran is surrounded by countries with U.S. troops. It is blockaded by the U.S. The Big Business media, as you must know, was not simply reporting on they called Iran’s democracy movement, but was instigating it.

These are examples of the primary issues Marxists should be exposing to the public.

2. So far there has never been presented evidence of election fraud on the scale that would overturn Ahmadinejad’s vote. As the protestors against him were calling for the overthrow of the government, should the Iranian government, which was just approved by a large majority vote, simply let them do that? Should a government chosen by the majority in an election just surrender to the forces of the losing candidate? I am sure the Big Business media would call that a victory for the “democracy movement.” As the losing candidate was the choice of imperialism to be president of Iran, and neither he or the movement behind him, denounced the role that imperialism was playing in his campaign, it certainly is reasonable that any anti-imperialist nationalist government should take repressive measures once they warned demonstrators to stop. (And this repression, if the number is still 17, includes eight government police killed by anti-government people.)

3. We should normally support workers movements, but not regardless of the context of the whole class struggle. Any progressive workers movement that does not denounce its being used in an imperialist campaign against an anti-imperialist government is forfeiting its legitimacy and credibility.

We have seen events somewhat reminiscent of this, probably Poland in the 1980s being the most well-known, Walesa never denounced the imperialist role in Poland, and moved steadily to the right over time. Solidarity discredited itself, and Poland became a de facto U.S. colony, all accomplished via a democratic revolution.

Similarly, your printing of articles from workers struggles against the government of Iran right in the middle of an imperialist campaign against Iran strikes me as quite insincere. Is this not participating in the imperialist campaign in a back-handed way?

4. You state, “Progressive activists in Canada should not take sides between the competing factions in Iran ’s capitalist class, nor should we try to instruct the Iranian people on how the present crisis might be resolved. These questions can only be settled by the Iranian people themselves.”

But then you state the following, which is nothing but a poorly veiled way of taking sides in Iran:

“We should, however, support the right of the Iranian people to communicate freely, to demonstrate, and to form trade unions and other popular associations independent of government supervision or control. We should support calls for freeing political prisoners and for an end to the repression.”

Your first paragraph quoted here would sound more sincere if you eliminated the second and then followed it with this:

“At the same time, we should strongly oppose attempts by imperialism to take advantage of this crisis, and call for an end to sanctions and other forms of foreign oppression of the Iranian people.”

However, you do make it seem like the attempts by imperialism to interfere in Iran are hypothetical, while in fact imperialism is intimately involved. Again, the primary task for us in imperialist countries is to oppose the imperialist campaign against the gains of the Iranian revolution. That is the most effective way we can ensure the democratic rights of the Iranian people.

* * * * *

Self-determination and democratic rights are two aspects of the same question
Robert Johnson and John Riddell
July 11, 2009

Thanks to Stansfield Smith for a thoughtful comment on our article, Iranian Workers in Action for Democratic Rights1.

We heartily agree with his main point, that the central activity regarding Iran in imperialist countries must be to oppose the imperialist campaign against Iran. This activity has gained new urgency as the imperialist powers renew their campaign against Iran, taking diplomatic reprisals, planning new sanctions, and revving up for a possible Iraq-style campaign of “regime change.”

U.S. Vice-President Joseph Biden has now declared that Washington may not restrain Israel from a military attack on Iran – an obvious threat of a U.S.-sponsored aggression in one form or another. It should be a wake-up call as to the real stakes in the Iran question.

We also agree that we in the imperialist countries should not support the media campaign to overturn Iran’s election results or line up behind the Mousavi opposition faction among Iran’s capitalist rulers. Nor should we support the pro-Ahmadinejad faction in its dispute with what is clearly a substantial proportion of the Iranian people. The Iranian people must be allowed to decide these matters, free of foreign interference.

We stated these points strongly in our article. What, then, are Stansfield Smith’s objections?

Many issues here are worth discussion. But in our opinion, the central issue relates to our advocacy of support to “the right of the Iranian people to communicate freely, to demonstrate, and to form trade unions and other popular associations independent of government supervision or control. We should support calls for freeing political prisoners and for an end to the repression.”

Quoting this passage, Stansfield Smith states that it is “nothing but a poorly veiled way of taking sides in Iran.”

Yes, supporting democratic rights for the popular masses is a way of taking sides – but not for imperialism, as Smith implies, but for Iranian sovereignty. During the 30 years since the Iranian revolution, the Iranian popular masses have been the main bulwark of resistance to imperialism, leading the people’s defense against the imperialist-backed invasion of the 1980s and holding firm against the continued imperialist sanctions and conspiracies to this day.

To be an effective force for Iran’s defense, Iran’s masses need to be able to speak, organize, and assemble – including, when they wish, to raise criticisms of the present government or defend themselves against exploitation.

This fact must be apparent in Iranians’ intensive utilization of the democratic rights which they already possess, which are more extensive than in U.S. client states in the region such as Jordan, Kuwait or Egypt. We are confident that Stansfield Smith joins us in defending the democratic rights that exist in Iran today.

Elections in all capitalist countries are channelled and manipulated by the wealthy and powerful. That is true of Iran as well as of Canada, to say nothing of Canada’s ally Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy with no elections at all. Canada’s rulers have no right to preach to Iran about democracy.

But democratic rights in Iran are restricted in ways that are harmful to working people in Iran and that have led to considerable disaffection. In the statements we reprinted, workers call for the right to form unions freely and for these unions to function without mass arrests and police persecution. Such a reform would strengthen Iranian popular sovereignty and improve its defenses against imperialism.

Moreover, workers in Iran, just as in Canada, need freedom to defend themselves against the impact of capitalist exploitation in the neoliberal era. Expansion of worker rights should be supported in Iran as in Canada.

Venezuela today provides us with a striking example of how to organize defense against imperialism by building a dense network of unions and popular committees to draw working people into political action.

Of course Iran must take firm action against imperialist plots and disruption. But this must not become an excuse for anti-worker repression. When workers strike to receive back pay, for example, this cannot be dismissed as an imperialist plot.

To repeat: our main responsibility toward Iran is to oppose imperialist threats against its sovereignty and the hypocritical media campaign aiming to demonize the country and its institutions. However, in defending Iran, we must recognize that national self-determination and democratic rights for the people are two aspects of the same question: popular sovereignty. Defense of Iran includes speaking out against repression that bears down on Iranian working people and weakens the country’s ramparts against imperialist attack.

* * * * *
Support workers movements – but not regardless of the context
Stansfield Smith
July 15, 2009

John Riddell in reply states, “We also agree that we in the imperialist countries should not support the media campaign to overturn Iran’s election results or line up behind the Mousavi opposition faction among Iran’s capitalist rulers.”

Does this mean that you now repudiate what was in your article, where you take Teachers union statement and print it without criticism:

“The Teachers’ Organization of Iran, further, supports the goals of Messrs. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi and calls on the election authorities to annul this election and undertake a free election.”

If you recognize that you should not support the media campaign to overturn Iran’s elections, what do you think you were doing by printing that Teachers Organization statement?

You approve of the Vancouver group, which states they:

“sends warm greetings and solidarity to all those who are rallying for democracy and justice in Iran and abroad this week. We share your commitment to a peaceful and just resolution of the disputes brought to the surface by the recent presidential election in Iran, and your desire for Iranians themselves to determine the future of their country.”

The Mousavi supporters are rallying for “democracy and justice” and the Ahmadinejad supporters were not? That view is taken straight from the corporate media. If there was no fraud more substantial in any bourgeois election, and if there is no fraud of such a size to show that Mousavi won the election – and there has been no evidence of that yet, then the Iranian people have spoken in their election.

And the interests of democracy and justice would mean we respect the will of the Iranian people to overwhelmingly re-elect Ahmadinejad. Why are the supporters of the losers in the election the supporters of “democracy and justice”? That is the view of the corporate media, not the view of Iranians. If that is not the case, where is the evidence Mousavi won the election?

The Vancouver group goes on:

“We demand the release of all arrested workers, students, and political prisoners.” In their statement, they do not mention that 7 volunteer government militia members were killed by protesters. The Vancouver group does not qualify their statement by saying “except for those guilty of crimes, which included murder.” They demand that ALL those arrested be released.

There is no other way to regard their statement except as one that gives legitimacy to the imperialist campaign against Iran.

In addition, I will repeat what I wrote in my first letter, which you did not address:

3. We should normally support workers movements, but not regardless of the context of the whole class struggle. Any progressive workers movement that does not denounce its being used in an imperialist campaign against an anti-imperialist government is forfeiting its legitimacy and credibility.

As I said before, your statement is better than what I have seen in Links, the RCP paper, ISO paper, CP, or IMT, but it still not very good.

* * * * *
Siding with Ahmedinejad against imperialism does not mean siding with him in his repression
Robert Johnson and John Riddell
July 27, 2009

Thanks again to Stansfield Smith for his penetrating questions.

To reiterate, for us in Canada, the central issue posed here is the necessity of supporting Iran against imperialism – and that includes supporting its government, headed by President Ahmedinejad, in that confrontation.

But we have no cause to take sides in the present dispute among Iran’s rulers. Nor do we have cause to condemn Iranians who have taken a position for one side or the other.

Stansfield Smith’s comments focus on the need to differentiate between the world’s imperialist countries and countries, like Iran, that suffer imperialist oppression. We agree that it is necessary to forge alliances of countries prepared to resist imperialism, on whatever level, and to defend them against Empire. This is certainly the ABC of revolutionary politics in today’s world. It is the essence of the policies of revolutionary Cuba and its ALBA allies, and explains their firm defense of Iran in the present context. Their policy applies the spirit of socialism at a governmental level.

It is disturbing that many socialists in imperialist countries do not grasp this principle.

However, siding with Ahmedinejad in Iran’s struggle with imperialism does not mean siding with him in his repression of the recent protests. In our opinion this was a spontaneous outpouring of protest, initially not planned or organized by the Mousavi leadership. It is false to claim, as the Iranian government does, that the protests were inspired and organized by U.S. and British imperialism – although we do not doubt that they have made every effort to take advantage of the situation. The crisis that erupted last month over the election results is only the latest in a series of crisis that have occurred in Iran in recent years as working people have attempted to defend and extend their democratic rights. The struggle to form independent unions has been an important aspect of this broader trend.

The current crisis is deeper and more sustained than its predecessors, reflecting the profound challenges facing Iranian society. Although the movement has been heavily repressed and driven from the streets, the strivings that it expressed remain an weighty factor in Iranian political life.

At present, two factions within the Iranian leadership appear to be waging an extended struggle for power. One faction is headed by President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the other by Mir Hossein Mousavi and Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. They are conducting their struggle mainly behind closed doors; we know very little about the substance of their differences. But each of these leading figures has a long history as a leader of the Iranian government. There is no evidence that any of them have acted as a Trojan horse for imperialism; their policies on the issue of Iranian sovereignty have been essentially similar. During their rule each of them has repressed political dissent, labour organizing, and pro-democracy movements. They have acted to safeguard the interests of Iranian capitalists at the expense of the working people.

Smith states that a workers’ movement that permits itself to be used in an imperialist campaign forfeits its credibility. If we wish to apply that concept, surely the place to start is right here in Canada, where our Labour Congress shares responsibility for Canadian government crimes in Palestine, Haiti, and elsewhere. Yet no one suggests we should withdraw support for struggles by workers in Canada for union rights.

We have no cause to lecture Iranian workers about anti-imperialism. They have stood firm against imperialism for 30 years, and if they protest now, it is not in favour of fraudulent U.S.-style “democracy” but for basic rights of speech, assembly, and unionization. It goes without saying that if these rights are persistently denied, in the name of defending national sovereignty, this casts discredit on the national movement and creates an opening for the CIA.

Smith objects to us publishing the position of the Iranian teachers’ union. We think that the voice of Iranian workers on the crisis deserves to be heard. We published statements by three different workers’ organizations, presenting a range of views. We stated our own position in the introduction to the article.

Smith also objects to the call of the Vancouver antiwar coalition Stopwar.ca for “the release of all arrested workers, students, and political prisoners.” He states that this gives “legitimacy to the imperialist campaign against Iran.” But in its statement Stopwar – which unites a wide range of political currents – unambiguously opposes imperialism’s attempts to use the crisis to undermine Iran’s right to decide its own future. This appeal remains one of the very few statements on Iran to combine respect for the democratic rights of working people with a firm axis of opposition to imperialist intervention. This is an example of effective defense of Iranian sovereignty that is well worth emulating.

Iran's Revolution

Mehrdad F. Samadzadeh
Z Net /ZSpace
July 10, 2009
URL: http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/21944

Mehrdad F. Samadzadeh is native Iranian and a PhD student at the University of Toronto, Canada.

The massive protest movement that erupted in the wake of Iran's presidential election on June 12 took many by surprise. The vivacity and vigor with which millions of people took to the street to oppose the allegedly fraudulent re-election of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad is unprecedented in the entire history of the Islamic regime.

Whether the charges of voter fraud as claimed by Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karoubi, the other presidential contenders, are true or false are immaterial. What is relevant is that the controversy surrounding the election has given vent to a deep-seated popular resentment which is unlikely to disappear any time soon. For one thing, the movement which has taken shape around Mousavi, the reformist and pragmatic candidate, shows the potential to take on a broader dimension. It is against this current that soon after the election a statement issued by Iran's Revolutionary Guards Corps warned: "‘the argument over the election and the number of votes and the winner, have only been a pretext for generating insecurity and riot." There is some truth in what the statement reveals in so far as the words ‘insecurity' and' riot' are translated as manifestations of a popular will for a major transformation in the country's political structure. This was echoed in one of the slogans chanted during the street demonstrations: "Mousavi bahaneh ast, hokomat neshaneh ast" (Mousavi is a pretext; the regime itself is the target).

To be sure, Mousavi's promise of reform on the cultural front galvanized a large section of the population, especially women and the middle-class professionals, who have been chafing under thirty years of repressive clerical rule. But the initiative for so widespread a movement was undoubtedly theirs, with the added incentive that the worsening economic conditions in recent years have witnessed an unemployment rate of 20 per cent for male university graduates and 40 per cent for their female counterparts. By thus rallying behind Mousavi, the disenchanted middle-class led by its youth created an historic moment to press for change. It is this popular initiative that in the immediate aftermath of the election led to a national uproar, a situation which was beyond what Mousavi could envisage. As one protester told the Financial Times in a rather lighthearted manner: "Poor Mousavi, we took the easel away from his hands and gave him a gun".

Today's Iran, with a nation in turmoil, is reminiscent of the revolutionary upheavals of the 1978-79 that brought down the Shah's regime, a phenomenon that has led many observers to wonder if the country is at the threshold of yet another revolution. This specter of revolution gains currency in light of the fact that the slogans on the streets of Tehran and other major cities have been directly targeting Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader, who in his Friday prayer on June 19 almost unequivocally endorsed Mahmud Ahmadinejad's presidency. Rahbar-i ma ghateleh velayatesh bateleh (our leader is a murderer and his leadership is void) is now one of the main slogans chanted on the rooftops and on the streets throughout Iran. If unabated, the ongoing popular unrest could expand into a formidable political movement capable of putting an end to the Islamic regime altogether.

Yet, others fear that with the intensification of government crackdown and the decline in revolutionary zeal the country may plunge into an abyss of political repression. The detention of hundreds of reformists, religious and political figures alike, and the closure of the dissident newspapers followed by the mass arrest of ordinary citizens in the days after the mass protest point to this direction. This is further indicated in a repeated call on the part of the political right for the arrest of Mousavi on charges of conspiracy. The most daunting of all came from Hossein Shariatmadari, editor-in-chief of the influential Kayhan newspaper and the supreme leader's media representative. In his editorial on Saturday July 4 he relentlessly lambasted both Mousavi and Mohammad Khatami for acting as ‘America's fifth column' and ‘committing horrible crimes', including ‘the killings of innocent people' and ‘causing riots'. He then went on to call for their trial upon arrest "in an open court in front of the people's eyes". Such threats may serve as a warning sign that preparations are well underway for a wave of Stalinist-style purge and the formation of a police state in which the ruling elite is none other than the supreme leader surrounded by a handful of top military commanders.

Whatever the outcome, it all depends on how the balance of power on the levels of popular and elite politics is played out in the days or months ahead. This is a crucial factor in any assessment of the current political crisis in Iran. For, beneath the crisis lies a class war which is fought on cultural and ideological fronts. On one side of it, there are the ruling clerics who by virtue of their leading role in the 1979 Islamic Revolution have been transformed into oligarchs, thanks to their monopoly over the state and economy. On the other side, there is the defiant middle-class with women and the youth in the forefront venting out their frustration against a system that has denied them their basic rights and yet failed to deliver what the revolution stood for.

The young men and women who have poured into the streets echo the voice of a new generation of middle-class which increasingly finds it difficult to reconcile theocracy with its social aspirations. They belong to the age of modern communication technology with secularly inspired demands that directly threaten to undermine the theological base of the current Iranian oligarchy upon which their claim to political legitimacy rests. This is precisely why the intransigent ruling clerics represented by the supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi, the ideological architect of ‘The Just Islamic Government', have been highly reluctant to concede to such demands, simply because any concession of this sort would mark the beginning of their demise.

Yet, what we are witnessing in Iran is not a class war in its conventional sense. The power struggle between the competing factions of the clerical establishment over the nature of the Islamic government on the one hand, and the cultural divide between the Western-educated middle class and the religiously inclined lower-middle class and the poor on the other complicate the situation. While the middle class has the blessing of many moderate and disenchanted clerics outside the government, the power elite has the backing of many urban poor who make up the core of Ahmadinejad's electoral support. Given the deployment of the social forces in the equation between the two warring camps, it is unlikely that one could easily oust the other.

Certainly, the state's apparatus of repression, including the die-hard supporters of Ahmadinejad, may find it increasingly difficult to stop the rising tide of a movement set off by a deep-seated hatred for the totalitarian nature of the Islamic regime. There is a limit to what violence can achieve, for in the end it will prove counter-productive, as the revolutionary experience of 1978-79 has shown. There are already reports indicating that support for Ahmadinejad is diminishing as fresh news of government brutalities against the detainees are spread.

On the other hand, the cry for freedom by the middle-class has its own limitations to successfully lead a revolutionary movement. It has little to offer to the balk of the urban poor. As a Financial Times editorial noted on June 15, "Change for the poor means food and jobs, not a relaxed dress code or mixed recreation." Insensitivity to such concerns by the reform movement has given Ahmadinejad the upper hand to manipulate the working poor with his right-wing populist agenda. His self-projection as the protector of the poor and his concept of ‘moral economy' versus free market were for the most part propagandist tools which only aim to undermine his political opponents. His ruthless suppression of organized worker unions and his pursuit of policies designed to privative important sectors of the economy for the sole benefit of the elite Revolutionary Guards Corps and the security officials speak for themselves.

The artfulness of the reform leaders in combating this right-wing agenda will help neutralize if not completely win over a good section of the impoverished masses who are often incited to violence by the religious right against those who are seen as defiling the faith. This is of immense importance in the creation of a culture of resistance that brings people together for a common cause. Certainly, the poor and the underclass do not necessarily share a single political ideology. They too have an inherent desire for democratic rights, and are as such disposed to secular ideological influences which embrace social justice. Some raise doubt as to whether Mousavi is capable of playing such a unifying role. He may or may not. But the left-leaning intellectuals with a vision of social justice could extend their hands to their worse off compatriots by including their grievances in their program of action. After all, the Iranian middle-class has history on its side. Its demands, limited as they are, represent the will of a nation that looks forward to a society in which each and every section of its population will have an equal right. It is this dynamic aspect of the current movement that has led many unionized workers like the union of the autobus drivers in Tehran to join forces with the rest.

The political assertion of the middle-class has also had its impact on the nature of the elite politics. It is for the most part seen in the deepening rift in the clerical establishment, a rift that has undeniably confronted the Islamic state with a crisis of legitimacy. While the hard line clerics who wield the state power are on the path to lose their legitimacy by further allying themselves with the military and security forces, their reformist opponents seeks theirs in voicing the popular sentiment. To a lesser degree, this latter movement is also true of some pragmatic clerics from within the conservative order. Sensing that their wealth and power are at stake with the collapse of the regime, they are on an expedition to restore the legitimacy of the Islamic state by persistently trying to forge a compromise between the two factions. In their effort to preserve the status quo, the go-between pragmatists are equally prompted by a fear that they too might be the target of a systematic purge, once the hard liners take full control. Their self-motive notwithstanding, the course of action pursued by the conservative pragmatists has distinctly brought them closer to the reform camp. Rafsanjani's campaign among the influential clerics of Qum soon after the election for the formation of a national reconciliation government, though unsuccessful, may serve as an indication that he cast in his lot with Mousavi. This would have meant a setback for the supreme leader, since the proposed government was to be entrusted with the task of overseeing a new election to be held within six months or a year. Likewise, in his recent visit to the families of those detained, while still urging for unity, Rafsanjani broke the silence by telling them of some sinister plots which have resulted in the current state of affairs.

The announcement on June 29 by the Guardian Council that dismissed the charges of vote riggings has not necessarily brought a closure to the crisis surrounding the election. Nor has it dissuaded Mousavi to advance his political campaign, despite mounting pressures from various centers of power to isolate him. In fact, in a 25-page document released on Saturday July 4, Mousavi reiterated his refusal to accept the election result as he detailed specific irregularities and abuses carried out both before and during the election. Its repercussion was serious enough to draw the attention of the Association of Researchers and Teachers of Qum, the country's most influential body of clergy who in a statement issued on the same day not only denounced the re-election of Ahmadinejad as illegitimate, but also went so far as to reprimand the supreme leader for failing to adequately investigate complaints of vote riggings. The statement also strongly condemned the government's use of violence against peaceful protesters that resulted in the killings of 20 people and the arrest of countless others. Finally, it urged other clerics to speak out, and demanded the immediate release of all those detained in weeks past. Although, this body of independent clerics did not favor any one particular candidate, the message it delivered certainly placed it on the side of the reform movement.

In the meantime, the chorus of Allah-o Akbar (Good is Great) continues to be heard from the rooftops in the middle of nights throughout Tehran and several other cities. In retrospect, this was a powerful slogan that ushered in the downfall of the Shah's regime. It now seems as if the chanting of Allah-o Akbar portends the demise of the very regime it once brought to power. It has a different sound and a different connotation; it is directed against Allah Himself.

This clearly is a moment of disenchantment in contemporary history of Iran which is far more significant than what happened in 1979. Then it was a revolution looking backward even as it rid the masses of a truly oppressive regime and gave them a sense of national dignity. In contrast, the one we are now experiencing is a forward looking movement with an altogether different sense of national dignity. Painful as it may seem it is the only path humanity has open to it if only it must do away with all forms of authoritarian ideologies that privilege one section of society over all the rest.

What seems very clear both then and now is the inability of the clergy to meaningfully engage with modernity in the specific context of Iran. The contradictions inherent in this engagement must surface sooner or later, and nowhere is this more vividly expressed than the kind of transformations that have occurred within the women population in Iranian society. The conditions of women throughout Islamic societies have often drawn severe criticism from feminist and women rights groups both in the West and the Islamic societies. One of the most spectacle changes that one witnesses in Iranian society over the past few decades is the increasing number of women who have availed of education. So much so that in today's Iran there is in fact a female intelligentsia that has decided to stand up for its freedoms and rights. There is all likelihood that a right wing backlash would make such women its first targets. The killing of Neda Agha Soltan may well be seen as a symbolic manifestation of such a backlash, a trend that had actually begun with the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005. One could hope that there is enough courage and support from all quarters to help the women's movement to resist the hidden patriarchal oppression of the conservatives often dressed up as religious diktats. After all, the next Iranian revolution belongs to women who alongside men will bring down the current authoritarian regime in Iran. It will be a color revolution no doubt, but one tainted with blood.

Finally, the crowd in the coming revolution will consist of the same social forces which were present during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909 and the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Each one is drawn to the revolutionary movement for its own specific reason and each try to stamp its own brand on it. As usual, there will be opportunists, defectors, foreign collaborators mixed with the crown. But the crowd for the most part are millions men and women, old and young, who love the revolution, even if it does not love them back.

Toronto, July 2009

The Tragedy of the Left's Discourse on Iran

Saeed Rahnema
ZSpace / Z Net
July 10, 2009
(http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/21948)

Saeed Rahnema is Professor of Political Science at York University, Canada. His books include Selected Communities of Islamic Cultures in Canada: A Statistical Profile; Rebirth of Social Democracy in the Iranian Left Movement; (with S. Behdad); Iran After the Revolution: Crisis of an Islamic State; Organization Structure: A Systemic Approach.

The electoral coup and the subsequent uprising and suppression of the revolting voters in Iran have prompted all sorts of analyses in Western media from both the Right and the Left. The Right, mostly inspired by the neo-con ideology and reactionary perspectives, dreams of the re-creation of the Shah's Iran, looks for pro-American/pro-Israeli allies among the disgruntled Iranian public, and seeks an Eastern European type velvet revolution. As there is very little substance to these analyses, they are hardly worth much critical review; and one cannot expect them to try to understand the complexities of Iranian politics and society.

As for the Left in the West, confusions abound. The progressive left, from the beginning openly supported the Iranian civil society movement. ZNet, Campaign for Peace and Democracy, Bullet, and some other media provided sound analysis to help others understand the complexities of the Iranian situation (see, for example, here). Some intellectuals signed petitions along with their Iranian counterparts, while others chose to remain silent. But disturbingly, like in the situations in Gaza or Lebanon, where Hamas and Hezbollah uncritically became champions of anti-imperialism, for some other people on the left, Ahmadinejad has become a champion because of his seemingly firm rhetoric against Israel and the US. Based on a crude class analysis, he is also directly or indirectly praised by some for his supposed campaign against the rich and imagined support of the working poor. These analyses also undermine the genuine movement within the vibrant Iranian civil society, and denigrate their demands for democracy, and political and individual freedoms as middle class concerns, instigated by western propaganda (a view shared by Khamenei, Ahmadinejad and his supporters).

MRZine and Islamists
The most bizarre case is the on-line journal MRZine, the offshoot of Monthly Review, which in some instances even publicized the propaganda of the Basij (Islamic militia) hooligans and criminals. The website has given ample room to pro-Islamist contributors; while they can hardly be considered to be on the left, their words are appreciated by the leftists editing the site. One writer claims that the battle in Iran is about "welfare reform and private property rights," and that Ahmadinejad "has enraged the managerial class," as he is "the least enthusiastic about neo-liberal reforms demanded by Iran's corporate interests," and that he is under attack by "Iran's fiscal conservative candidates." The author conveniently fails to mention that there are also much "corporate interests" controlled by Ahmadinejad's friends and allies in the Islamic Guards and his conservative cleric supporters, and that he has staunchly followed "privatization" policies by handing over state holdings to his cronies.

During the 1979 revolution, the late Tudeh Party, under the direction of the Soviet Union, was unsuccessfully digging deep and looking hard for "non-capitalists" among the Islamic regime's elements to follow a "non-capitalist path" and a "socialist orientation." Now it seems that MRZine magazine is beginning a new excavation for such a breed among Islamists, not understanding that all factions of the Islamic regime have always been staunch capitalists.

Azmi Bishara's imagined Iran
In "Iran: An Alternative Reading" (reproduced in MRZine), Azmi Bishara argues that Iran's totalitarian system of government differs from other totalitarian systems in two definitive ways: Firstly, it has incorporated "such a high degree [of] constitutionally codified democratic competition in the ruling order and its ideology." Bishara does not explain however that these "competitions" are just for the insider Islamists, and all others, including moderate Muslims or the wide spectrum of secular liberals and the left are excluded by the anti-democratic institutions within the regime.

The second differentiation Bishara makes is that "... the official ideology that permeates institutions of government ... is a real religion embraced by the vast majority of the people." He is right if he means the majority of Iranians are Muslim and Shi'i, but it is wrong to assume that all are religious and share the same obscurantist fundamentalist version as those in power. He also fails to recognize the existence of a large number of secular people in Iran, one of the highest percentages among Muslim-majority countries.

He praises "such tolerance of political diversity," "tolerance of criticism," and "peaceful rotation of authority" in Iran. One wonders if our prominent Palestinian politician is writing about an imaginary Iran, or the real one. Could it be that Bishara has not heard of the massacres of thousands of political prisoners, chain killings of intellectuals, and silencing of the most able and progressive voices in the country? Doesn't he know that a non-elected 12-member conservative body (The Guardianship Council) only allows a few trusted individuals to run for President or the Parliament, and that the real 'authority,' the Supreme Leader, does not rotate, and is selected by an all-Mullah Assembly of Experts for life? The unelected Leader leads the suppressive apparatuses of the state, and since 1993 has created his own "Special Guards of Velayat" (NOPO) for quick suppressive operations. So much for tolerance and democracy.

Bishara undermines the genuine massive reform movement and claims that "expectations regarding the power of the reform trend ... were created by Western and non-Western media opposed to Ahmadinejad...." Had Bishara done his homework, he would have learned about the massive campaigns led by large number of womens' organizations, the youth, teachers and select groups of workers. He warns us of "elitism" and of having an "arrogant classist edge," and implicitly dismisses these movements of "middle class backgrounds" and claims that "these people are not the majority of young people but rather the majority of young people from a particular class." It is unclear on what basis he makes the assertion that most of the youth from poor sectors of the society support Ahmadinejad.

James Petras' message: freedom is not "vital"!
One of the most shocking pieces is by the renowned controversial Left writer and academic, James Petras. In his piece "Iranian Elections: 'The Stolen Elections' Hoax," Petras conclusively denies any wrongdoings in the Iranian elections and confidently goes into the detail of the demographics of some small Iranian towns, with no credibility or expertise in the subject.

The abundant facts pointing to massive electoral fraud speak for themselves, so I will not waste time refuting his evidence and 'sources,' but will rather focus on his analysis. The most stunning aspect of the Petras piece is the total absence of any sympathy for all the brave women, youth, teachers, civil servants and workers who have been so vigorously campaigning for democracy, human rights, and political freedoms, risking their lives by spontaneously pouring into the streets when they realized they were cheated. Instead we see sporadic references to "comfortable upper class enclave," "well-dressed and fluent in English" youth, etc. Women are not mentioned even once, nor is there any recognition of their amazing struggle against the most obscurantist policies such as stoning, polygamy, and legal gender discriminations. Neither is there any reference to trade union activists, writers, and artists, many of whom are in jail.

Instead, the emphasis is on crude class analysis: "[t]he demography of voting reveals a real class polarization pitting high income, free market oriented capitalist individuals against working class, low income, community based supporters of a 'moral economy' in which usury and profiteering are limited by religious precepts." Petras could not be more misguided and misleading. Of course this would fit well within the perceived traditional class conflict paradigm (with an added touch of imagined Islamic economics!). However, the reality is far more complex. The Ayatollahs on both sides are "market-oriented capitalists," so are the leaders of the Islamic Guards, who run industries, control trade monopolies, and are major land developers. There are also workers on both sides. Failed economic policies, the rising 30% inflation rate, growing unemployment and the suppression of trade unions turned many workers against Ahmadinejad. The communiqués of Workers of Iran Khodrow (auto industry) against the government's heavy-handed tactics, the long strikes and confrontations of the workers of Tehran Public Transport and the participation of workers in the post-election revolts, are all examples of opposition to Ahmadinejad by workers. It would also be simplistic to talk of the Islamists' 'moral economy,' when both sides have been involved in embezzlement and corruption, much of which was exposed during the debates fiasco in which they exposed each other.

On the basis of his limited understanding of the situation, Petras declares that "[t]he scale of the opposition's electoral deficit should tell us how out of touch it is with its own people's vital concerns." Firstly, like many others he cannot distinguish among different groups and categories of this "opposition," and worse, is telling Iranian women, youth, union activists, intellectuals and artists, that their demands and "concerns" for political and individual freedoms, human rights, democracy, gender equity and labour rights are not "vital." It seems he's telling the Iranian left: rofagha (comrades), if you are being tortured and rotting in prisons, your books are burned and you are expelled from your profession, don't worry, because the "working class" is receiving subsidies and handouts from the government! Professor Petras and those like him would not be as forgiving if their own freedoms and privileges were at issue.

The left has historically been rooted in solidarity with progressive movements, women's rights and rights for unions and its voice has been first and foremost a call for freedom. The voices that we hear today from part of the Left are tragically reactionary. Siding with religious fundamentalists with the wrong assumptions that they are anti-imperialists and anti-capitalists, is aligning with the most reactionary forces of history. This is a reactionary left, different from the progressive left which has always been on the side of the forces of progress.

Zizek also misses an important point
In a much admired and distributed piece , Slavoj Zizek, the prominent voice of the new left, refers to versions of events in Iran. Zizek explains that "Moussavi supporters... see their activity as the repetition of the 1979 Khomeini revolution, as the return to its roots, the undoing of the revolution's later corruption." He adds "[w]e are dealing with a genuine popular uprising of the deceived partisans of the Khomeini revolution," "'the return of the repressed' of the Khomeini revolution."

Zizek does not differentiate between the "partisans of Khomeini" during the 1979 revolution, and the non-religious, secular elements, both liberals and Left, who actually started the revolution and in the absence of other alternatives, accepted Khomeini's leadership. Lack of recognition of this reality, that sometimes draws us to despair, is a big mistake. Along the same line, Zizek, wrongly attributes all of today's movement to support for Moussavi: "Moussavi ... stands for the genuine resuscitation of the popular dream which sustained the Khomeini revolution." On this basis he concludes that "the 1979 Khomeini revolution cannot be reduced to a hard line Islamist takeover." To substantiate his point, Zizek refers to the "incredible effervescence of the first year of the revolution...." In fact much of the 'effervescence' of the first year, or before the hostage taking at the American Embassy, was because of the actions of the non-partisans of Khomeini; from the workers councils movement, to confrontations of Fedais and other left organizations in Kurdistan and in Gonbad, to the women's and university-based movements. It was a period when Khomeini and his supporters had not consolidated their power. After the hostage crisis and beginning of the Iran-Iraq war "the Islam establishment" took over.

All these draws Zizek to conclude that "what this means is that there is genuine liberating potential in Islam." Zizek does not recognize that Moussavi is a conservative Islamist, and this "liberating potential" can hardly be applied to him. For sure, there exists a new breed of Muslim intellectuals, the likes of Mohamad Shabestari, Mohsen Kadivar, Reza Alijani, and Hassan Eshkevari, who believe in the separation of religion and state, and can be the champions of such liberating potentials, but definitely not the likes of Khomeini and Moussavi.

There is no doubt that the Iranian 1979 revolution is an unfinished business and its main demands for democracy and political freedoms, and social equity have remained unfulfilled. But these were not Khomeini's demands, in the same manner that not all today's demands are those of Moussavi.

What is happening in Iran is a spontaneous, ingenious and independent revolt by a people frustrated with thirty years of obscurantist tyrannical religious rule, triggered by electoral fraud but rooted in more substantial demands. Much to the dismay of the clerical regime and their supporters inside and outside the country, the ever expanding Iranian civil society brilliantly seized the moment of the election to take strong steps forward. They have no illusions about the Islamist regime, or about their own capabilities. Their strategy is to gradually and non-violently replace the Islamic regime and its hegemony with a secular democratic one. This is a hugely significant, delicate and protracted confrontation. It is essential that they get the wide-ranging effective support from the left in the West so that they don't fall prey to the misleading conception of the left not having concerns for democracy and civil liberties.